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INTRODUCTION
Almost exactly two centuries ago, in March 1807, both the United States
and Great Britain passed landmark legislation prohibiting the slave trade. The
anniversary of this event has been marked with fanfare in both countries.' But
these celebrations mask the fact that the transatlantic slave trade continued for
another sixty years before it was finally suppressed. This Article is about those
sixty years and the surprising and forgotten role that international law and
international courts played in the extinction of the slave trade.
Between 1817 and 1871, bilateral treaties between Britain and several other
countries (eventually including the United States) led to the establishment of
international courts for the suppression of the slave trade.' Though all but
forgotten today, these antislavery courts were the first international human
rights courts. They were made up of judges from different countries. They sat
on a permanent, continuing basis, and they applied international law. The
1. See Robert Barr, Associated Press, In Liverpool, Abolition's Bicentenary Revives the Memory of
Slavery, WASH. POST, Mar. 18, 2007, at A15.
2. Some of the treaties referred to them as "Mixed Courts of Justice," while others referred to
them as "Mixed Commissions." Compare Treaty Between His Britannic Majesty and His
Majesty the King of the Netherlands, for Preventing Their Subjects from Engaging in Any
Traffic in Slaves art. VII, Gr. Brit.-Neth., May 4, 1818, 5 B.S.P. 125 [hereinafter Anglo-Dutch
Treaty of 1818] (referring to "Mixed Courts of Justice"), with Additional Convention to the
Treaty of 22 January 1815 Between His Britannic Majesty and His Most Faithful Majesty, for
the Purpose of Preventing Their Subjects from Engaging in Any Illicit Traffic in Slaves art.
VIII, Gr. Brit.-Port., July 28, 1817, 4 B.S.P. 85 [hereinafter Anglo-Portuguese Treaty of 18171
(referring to "Mixed Commissions"). On occasion, they are referred to in various records as
the "Courts of Mixed Commission." See, e.g., List of Cases Adjudged in the Courts of Mixed
Commissions at Sierra Leone, Between the ist of January 1822, and the ist of January 1823,
enclosed in Letter from E. Gregory & Edward Fitzgerald to George Canning (Jan. 1, 1823), in
CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE BRITISH COMMISSIONERS, 1822-23, class B, at 14, in 9 BRITISH
PARIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1969) (1823-24). Because the
procedures provided for by the various treaties are basically identical, this Article uses the
terms "courts" and "commissions" interchangeably. Similarly, for ease of reference, they are
referred to as "antislavery courts," though they only exercised jurisdiction over the slave
trade and not the institution of slavery itself.
The records of the commissions are housed in the Public Records Office (now known as
the U.K. National Archives) in London. F.O. 312 (Cape Town); F.O. 313 (Havana); F.O. 314
(Spanish Town); F.O. 315 (Sierra Leone); F.O. 128,129,131 (Rio de Janeiro). Copies of cited
materials are on file with the author. In addition, much of the correspondence between the
British commissioners and the Foreign Office, as well as diplomatic correspondence between
the British government and the governments of other nations related to the treaties, is
reproduced in the annual volumes of BIUTISH & FOREIGN STATE PAPERS [hereinafter B.S.P.]
and the slave trade series of the Irish University Press's BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS. In
citations in this Article, correspondence is ordered in chronological order.
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courts explicitly aimed to promote humanitarian objectives. Though the courts
were extremely active for only a few years, over the treaties' lifespan, the courts
heard more than 6oo cases and freed almost 8o,ooo slaves found aboard illegal
slave trading vessels.' During their peak years of operation, the courts heard
cases that may have involved as many as one out of every five or six ships
involved in the transatlantic slave trade.
4
These international antislavery courts have received scant attention from
historians,' and legal scholars have almost completely ignored them.6 To be
sure, the cases they adjudicated represented only a fraction of the transatlantic
slave trade from West Africa, and they left the East African slave trade
untouched. Social, economic, political, and military factors created an
environment amenable to the formation of the courts, and it is difficult to
untangle the causal role played by these factors from the role of the courts
themselves in the ultimate global abolition of the slave trade. The final
suppression of the slave trade only occurred when changes in attitudes toward
the trade in various countries led to effective enforcement of domestic laws
against the traffic; these changes in domestic attitudes appear linked at least in
part to international efforts to ban the slave trade, though other factors likely
played a role as well. But regardless of the weight of various causal factors in
the suppression of the slave trade, an international legal institution that had a
direct and tangible impact on nearly 8o,ooo human lives should be far more
than a footnote in the history of international law. Modern international
3. See Leslie Bethell, The Mixed Commissions for the Suppression of the Transatlantic Slave Trade
in the Nineteenth Century, 7 J. AFR. HIST. 79 (1966).
4. See infra text accompanying notes 205-207.
s. The most comprehensive treatment is a fourteen-page article published in 1966. See Bethell,
supra note 3; see also LEsLIE BETHELL, THE ABOLITION OF THE BRAZILIAN SLAVE TRADE 122-50
(1970) (discussing the Brazilian mixed commission). As I will discuss in Part I, the extensive
historical literature on the British abolition movement and the transatlantic slave trade
focuses on the social, economic, and political forces that led Great Britain to spearhead
efforts to suppress the transatlantic slave trade, and it mentions the courts' role only in
passing. None of these historians examine the courts from the perspective of their role in the
history of international law.
6. The only legal scholarship discussing the courts in any depth is a recent South African
article that focuses on the commission located in Cape Town, which operated for a short
time and heard only a handful of cases. See J.P. Van Niekerk, British, Portuguese, and
American Judges in Adderley Street: The International Legal Background to and Some Judicial
Aspects of the Cape Town Mixed Commissions for the Suppression of the Transatlantic Slave Trade
in the Nineteenth Century (pt. 3), 37 COMv. & INT'L L.J. S. AFR. 404 (2004). The courts are
simply not mentioned in most books and articles on international courts and tribunals or on
international human rights law.
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courts- about which tens of thousands of scholarly pages have been spilled -
measure their successes on a much smaller scale.'
In addition to its intrinsic historical interest, the story of the antislavery
courts has important implications for contemporary issues in international law.
Most legal scholars view international courts and international human rights
law largely as post-World War II phenomena, with the Nuremberg trials of the
Nazi war criminals and the founding of the United Nations as the seminal
moments in the turn to international law as a mechanism for protecting
individual rights.' But in fact, the nineteenth-century slavery abolition
movement was the first successful international human rights campaign, and
international treaties and courts were its central features. 9
The history of the antislavery courts also reveals a more complex
interrelationship between state power, moral ideas, and domestic and
international legal institutions than many contemporary theories of
international law and relations acknowledge. Great Britain, the main instigator
of the antislavery treaties, no doubt would not have campaigned so strongly for
abolition if it had been truly devastating to its economic and political interests.
Yet substantial evidence shows that Britain's abolition policy was motivated by
genuine humanitarian concerns and that the policy inflicted significant
economic costs on its empire. Of equal significance, Britain used international
law as one important tool for persuading other countries to abandon a
widespread and profitable practice. Britain was the nineteenth century's
greatest naval power, and its initial efforts to suppress the slave trade were
military and unilateral, involving seizures of slave vessels by the British navy
and condemnation of those ships in British courts. Over time, however, Britain
found it could not rely on its military power alone, but instead had to utilize
that power in conjunction with cooperative legal action to achieve its goals.
Over several decades, Britain convinced one country after another to ratify
7. The International Court of Justice, for example, has heard only 136 cases in the past sixty
years, most of which have had little tangible impact, and yet it is mentioned in more than
nine thousand law journal articles. Similarly, the International Criminal Court has yet to
hear a single case but is mentioned in more than five thousand articles.
8. See, e.g., LouIs HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS 1 (1990) ("The contemporary idea of human
rights was formulated and given content during the Second World War and its
aftermath."). To the extent these accounts acknowledge the nineteenth-century antislavery
treaties as predecessors to modem international human rights laws, they usually relegate
them to a brief reference or a footnote. See, e.g., ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 376
(2d ed. 2005).
9. For an accessible history of the early abolition movement written for a popular audience, see




increasingly powerful treaties against the slave trade. At the same time, these
international legal mechanisms would have been ineffective without Britain's
military and economic power. At critical moments, Britain was forced to deploy
its "hard" powers, as well as its domestic laws and courts, to bring reluctant
treaty partners back into the legal fold. In short, neither raw coercive power
nor international law alone was enough to achieve the abolition of the slave
trade. Both were necessary.
Each time and place in history is different, of course, and yet this episode is
evocative of contemporary problems in international relations, including
efforts to foster democracy and human rights both through the use of force
and/or through international legal institutions, including courts. The
antislavery movement's use of international law and legal institutions as part of
a broader social, political, and military strategy can help us better understand
the potential role of international law today in bringing about improvements in
human rights. In more theoretical terms, the history of the antislavery courts
suggests a need for a thicker, more robust account of the relationship between
power, ideas, and international law. In short, this forgotten bit of history
should change the way we think about international courts and international
human rights law- their origins, limits, and potential.
I. ORIGINS OF THE ANTISLAVERY COURTS
In 18oo, slavery was a fundamental part of the world's economic and social
order. Though not practiced in Europe itself, European colonies in the Western
Hemisphere relied heavily on slave labor to support their plantation
economies. Slave trading ships crossed the Atlantic flying the flags of all the
seafaring European nations, as well as of the newly independent United States
of America. In the first decade of the nineteenth century, an estimated 6o9,ooo
slaves arrived in the New World.'"
Within a relatively short time span, however, things began to change. In
1807, Britain became the first major country, followed shortly by the United
States, to ban its subjects from participation in the slave trade." By the early
1o. See DAvID ELTIS, ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE ENDING OF THE TRANSATLANTIC SLAVE
TRADE 249 tbl.A.8 (1987).
ii. See Act for Abolition of the Slave Trade, 1807,47 Geo. 2, c. 36 (Eng.). The United States also
enacted legislation banning the slave trade in 1807, but it did not take effect until the
following year. See Act of Mar. 2, 1807, ch. 22, 2 Stat. 426. The Kingdom of Norway and
Denmark banned the importation of slaves into its West Indian possessions in 1792. See
Edict of the King of Denmark and Norway, Concerning the Slave Trade, Mar. 16, 1792, in 1
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1840s, more than twenty nations - including all the Atlantic maritime powers -
had signed international treaties committing to the abolition of the trade. By
the late 186os, only a few hundred slaves per year were illegally transported
across the Atlantic.12 And by 19oo, slavery itself had been outlawed in every
country in the Western Hemisphere.
The abolition of slavery has received a great deal of attention from
historians, 3 but much less from scholars of international law. And yet the
abolition of chattel slavery remains perhaps the most successful episode ever in
the history of international human rights law. Slavery is one of the few
universally acknowledged crimes under international law.14 Though powerful
countries today defend torture'"- another practice placed strictly off limits by
international law-no nation today officially defends slavery. To be sure,
modern forms of forced labor remain a significant human rights issue affecting
millions of people, but the type of widespread, legalized chattel slavery that
was commonplace in the nineteenth century has mostly disappeared.'6
How did such a dramatic shift occur in disparate societies around the world
in less than a century? Changes in the world economy in the nineteenth
century certainly created the conditions that made the abolition of slavery more
feasible. But the best historical evidence suggests that slavery did not die an
accidental death of abandonment in the face of competition from industrial
B.S.P. 971; Bernard H. Nelson, The Slave Trade as a Factor in British Foreign Policy, 1815-1862,
27 J. NEGRO HIST. 192,193-94 (1942).
12. ELTIS, supra note lo.
13. See, e.g., ROGER ANSTEY, THE ATLANTIC SLAVE TRADE AND BRITISH ABOLITION, 1760-1810
(1975); DAVID BRION DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY IN THE AGE OF REVOLUTION, 1770-
1823 (1975) [hereinafter DAVIS, AGE OF REVOLUTION]; DAVID BRION DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF
SLAVERY IN WESTERN CULTURE (1966) [hereinafter DAVIS, SLAVERY IN WESTERN CULTURE];
SEYMOUR DRESCHER, FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM: COMPARATIVE STUDIES IN THE RISE AND
FALL OF ATLANTIC SLAVERY (1999); ELTIS, supra note io.
14. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 7(1)(c), July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 93 (criminalizing enslavement); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 404 (1987) (criminalizing the slave trade).
15. See Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice Office of
Legal Counsel, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President (Aug. 1, 2002), in THE
TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAM 172, 172 (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L.
Dratel eds., 2005).
16. Sadly, even this form of slavery may not have been completely eradicated. See, e.g., ANTI-
SLAVERY INT'L, Is THERE SLAVERY IN SUDAN? (2oo1) (suggesting that the nineteenth-century
antislavery movement's success should not be read to diminish the significance of modem
forced labor trafficking); see also INT'L LABOUR ORG., A GLOBAL ALLIANCE AGAINST FORCED
LABOUR 10 (2005) (estimating that 12.3 million people are currently victims of forced labor
and other modem forms of slavery).
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capitalism.17 Slavery was eradicated, intentionally, by people who had come to
believe it was morally wrong. It was eradicated in part by military force, but
also by coordinated legal action- including, surprisingly, international courts.
A. The Rise ofBritish Abolitionism
The indisputable star of the international abolition story is Great Britain.
Britain was, along with the United States, one of the first major countries to
ban the slave trade. Unlike the United States, 8 Britain, whose ships were
responsible for more than half of the trade in the years leading up to the ban,
enforced its prohibition on slave trading with persistent vigor. Moreover,
Britain soon became the main advocate of international treaties banning the
trade. Though it received little immediate benefit, Britain devoted significant
material resources to suppressing the slave trade. As one historian has
explained, slavery was unlike other issues in foreign policy at the time:
Although the British saw abolition as in the national and
indeed international interest, it was not a matter of national
survival and honor, nor was it even likely to result in any short-run
gain for the country. The ultimate goal was not the winning of territory
or trade concessions, but rather the imposition of a conception of
freedom....'9
By one modern estimate, Britain's effort to suppress the slave trade cost an
average of nearly two percent of its annual national income for each year
between 1807 and 1867,20 and the direct costs of its annual suppression efforts
17. See, e.g., ELTIS, supra note 1o, at 15, 204 (concluding a detailed analysis of economic data by
asserting that "[t]he market for African slaves in the Americas, as with slavery itself, thus
did not fade away in the second half of the nineteenth century, rather it was suppressed").
is. See, e.g., W.E. BURGHARDT Du BoIs, THE SUPPRESSION OF THE AFRICAN SLAVE-TRADE TO
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 1638-1870, at 1O9 (1896) (noting that the Act To Prohibit
the Importation of Slaves into Any Port or Place Within the Jurisdiction of the United
States, ch. 22, 2 Stat. 426 (1807), "came very near being a dead letter").
ig. ELTIS, supra note lo, at 104.
20. See Chaim D. Kaufmann & Robert A. Pape, Explaining Costly International Moral Action:
Britain's Sixty-Year Campaign Against the Atlantic Slave Trade, 3 INT'L ORG. 631, 631 (1999);
see also STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRIsY 107-09 (1999)
(discussing the fact that Britain's antislavery campaign was contrary to its material
interests). The costs Britain incurred included diplomatic, legal, and naval costs;
emancipation indemnities to planters; lost customs revenues; lost income from the slave
trade, including supplies to slave traders; reduced exports to West Africa and the British
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
between 1816 and 1862 were roughly equal to the total profits it had received
from the trade between 1761 and 1807.21 During the height of its suppression
efforts in the 184os, somewhere between one sixth and one quarter of the ships
in the Royal Navy were involved in antislavery patrols.22
Not surprisingly, there is an extensive historiography of the causes and
origins of British abolitionism. Early historians described the British
government's campaign to eradicate the slave trade as one of pure idealism. As
one oft-quoted historian put it, "[t] he unweary, unostentatious and inglorious
crusade of England against slavery may probably be regarded as among the
three or four perfectly virtuous pages comprised in the history of nations."
23
Later historians viewed skeptically these claims of pristine moral motives. In
1944, Eric Williams published an influential revisionist history, Capitalism and
Slavery, in which he argued that economic self-interest motivated Britain's
antislavery campaign. 4 Williams contended that by the turn of the nineteenth
century, the British plantation economies in the West Indies were already in
decline, while industrial capitalism was on the rise. As industrial capitalists
came to dominate the British economy and political system, he argued, they
pushed for the abolition of slavery to advance their own interests."
The next generation of historians acknowledged some connection between
the rise of capitalism and the abolition of slavery but rejected Williams's
account as overly simplistic.26 Among other things, Williams's account was not
supported by the evidence; the economic decline of British West Indian
plantations did not begin until well after the abolition of the trade.27 In fact,
West Indies; losses in the sugar trade; and higher sugar prices for British consumers. See
Kaufmann & Pape, supra, at 637.
21. See ELTIS, supra note lo, at 97.
22. See Ethan A. Nadelmann, Global Prohibition Regimes: The Evolution of Norms in International
Society, 44 INT'L ORG. 479, 492 (1990).
23. WILLIAM EDWARD HARTPOLE LECKY, HISTORY OF EUROPEAN MORALS 153 (1929), quoted in
CHRISTOPHER LLOYD, THE NAVY AND THE SLAVE TRADE, at xiii (2d ed. 1968).
24. See ERIC WILLIAMS, CAPITALISM AND SLAVERY (1944).Williams, an Oxford-trained historian,
later became a political leader and the first Prime Minister of Trinidad & Tobago, leading
the country to independence within the Commonwealth and serving as its head from 1956
until his death in 1981. See generally ERIC WILLIAMS, INWARD HUNGER (1969). His
anticolonial agenda may have influenced his earlier scholarly writings.
25. WILLIAMS, CAPITALISM AND SLAVERY, supra note 24, at 154-57.
26. See, e.g, SEYMOUR DRSCHER, CAPITALISM AND ANTISLAVERY (1986); Roger T. Anstey,
Capitalism and Slavery: A Critique, 21 ECON. HIST. REV. 307 (1968).
27. See, e.g., Kaufmann & Pape, supra note 20, at 636. Britain dominated both the slave trade
and the sugar industry in the years immediately before the Act for the Abolition of the Slave
Trade, 1807, 47 Geo. 3, c. 36 (Eng.) (repealed 1824): "British ships carried 52 percent of
slaves transported between 1791 and 18o5, and British colonies also produced 55 percent of
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both the slave trade and slave colonies were highly profitable to Britain at the
time of abolition and would likely have remained so for many years.2s It was
abolition itself, not some other factor, that led to both the absolute and relative
decline of British plantation colonies in the Caribbean.29 As one economic
historian explained:
In 18oo, if one were to argue in terms of economic self-interest, the
British should have been actively encouraging the slave trade and slave
settlements throughout the world. Such a policy would have been
highly effective in achieving national goals as laid down by the
amalgam of London merchants and landed gentry who dominated the
British government at this time. It would also have best served the
material aims of manufacturers and wage earners alike.3"
Though disagreeing on many details, historians now largely concur that
British abolitionism arose out of a confluence of factors, including
Enlightenment philosophy and religious revival movements.3' Abolition was
also only one part of a broader humanitarian movement in England: other
areas of concern included poor laws, labor standards, and prison conditions.32
As for the role of capitalism, some have suggested that the antislavery
movement served to legitimate free labor, thereby reinforcing the interests of
new capitalist elites in Britain.33 Others have challenged the degree to which
antislavery did deflect attention from domestic labor issues and have suggested
instead that capitalism's key contribution to the antislavery movement was a
cognitive one, namely an awareness of cause and effect across the marketplace
that brought home to British consumers the causal connection between their
the world's sugar in 18o5-o6-and both percentages were rising." Kaufmann & Pape, supra
note 20, at 634. The West Indian trade made up more than half of Britain's total colonial
trade. Id.
28. See generally SEYMOUR DRESCHER, ECONOCIDE: BRITISH SLAVERY IN THE ERA OF ABOLITION
(1977).
29. See ELTIS, supra note lo, at 5-6.
30. Id. at 6.
31. See, e.g., DAVIS, SLAVERY IN WESTERN CULTURE, supra note 13, at 365-445 (describing
religious and Enlightenment sources of antislavery thought).
32. See Thomas W. Laqueur, Bodies, Details and the Humanitarian Narrative, in THE NEW
CULTURAL HISTORY 176 (Lynn Hunt ed., 1989).
33. See David Brion Davis, The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution, 177o-1823, in THE
ANTISLAVERY DEBATE: CAPITALISM AND ABOLITION AS A PROBLEM IN HISTORICAL
INTERPRETATION 17, 71 (Thomas Bender ed., 1992) [hereinafter THE ANTISLAVERY DEBATE]
("The antislavery movement, like Smith's political economy, reflected the needs and values
of the emerging capitalist order.").
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demand for sugar, the demand for slave labor on the sugar plantations of the
West Indies, and the horrors of the "Middle Passage" - the voyage across the
Atlantic in the hold of a slave ship.34 More recently, historians have also
countered the emphasis on elite interests by demonstrating the genuine
importance of widespread, popular support in Britain for the abolitionist
cause." For their part, international relations scholars have puzzled over the
degree to which abolition affected British foreign policy, finding Britain's
actions against the slave trade unexplained by conventional theories of
international relations? 6
Regardless of its precise origins, the abolition movement indisputably
became an important force in British politics in the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries. Early abolition efforts did not strike at the heart of the
problem -the institution of slavery itself, which was not abolished in British
colonies until 1833-but focused first on limiting the geographical reach of
slavery, and second on restricting the trade in slaves from Africa to the New
World.
On both sides of the Atlantic, opponents of the slave trade conceptualized
the issue in terms of human rights, and spoke as well of a religious and moral
obligation. Upon introduction of an early and unsuccessful bill to ban the slave
trade in 1776, one member of the British Parliament argued that the "[s]lave-
trade was contrary to the laws of God, and the rights of man. ' 37 Speaking in
support of legislation to ban the slave trade in 18o6, Lord Grenville likewise
characterized slavery as contrary to the "rights of nature" whereby "every
human being is entitled to the fruit of his own labour. ''s8 President Thomas
Jefferson's message to the U.S. Congress in 18o6 supported legislation against
the slave trade because it would "withdraw the citizens of the United States
34. Thomas L. Haskell, Capitalism and Origins of the Humanitarian Sensibility (pt. 1), in THE
ANTISLAVERY DEBATE, supra note 33, at 107, 111.
3S. Seymour Drescher, Whose Abolition? Popular Pressure and the Ending of the British Slave
Trade, 143 PAST & PRESENT 136, 166 (1994). For a detailed account of the leaders and key
moments in the popular movement against the slave trade, see HOCHSCHILD, supra note 9.
36. See Kaufmann & Pape, supra note 20, at 631-32 (noting that realism and liberal
institutionalism "focus on states' material interests and therefore cannot offer much advice
on how costly international moral action might be accomplished," while constructivism,
though it focuses on "the ways in which political discourse can shape states' conceptions of
their interests," does not take into account the purely domestic coalition politics that appear
to have shaped British foreign policy on the slave trade).
37. 1 THOMAS CLARKSON, ABOLITION OF THE AFRICAN SLAVE TRADE BY THE BRITISH PARLIAMENT
40 (Augusta, P.A. Brinsmade 1830) (quoting David Hartley).
38. GR. BRIT. PARLIAMENT, SUBSTANCE OF THE DEBATES ON A RESOLUTION FOR ABOLISHING THE
SLAVE TRADE 99 (18o6) (statement of Lord Grenville).
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from all further participation in those violations of human rights which have
been so long continued on the unoffending inhabitants of Africa."39
From the beginning, law was a key weapon in the abolitionists' arsenal. In
1772, in the landmark case of Somerset v. Stewart,4° a British court held that
slavery would not be legally recognized within Britain itself. James Somerset, a
slave from Virginia, had been brought to England by his master, Charles
Stewart, who intended ultimately to return with Somerset to America. Once in
England, however, Somerset's situation came to the attention of abolitionists,
who helped him file a petition for habeas corpus seeking his release. 4' The
court held that slavery was "so odious" and contrary to natural law that it could
only be justified by positive law.42 Thus, despite the practical "inconvenience"
39. Thomas Jefferson, President of the United States, Sixth Annual Message (Dec. 2, 18o6), in 1
A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1789-1897, at 408 (James
D. Richardson ed., 1898); see also Du Bois, supra note 18, at 8o (quoting petitions for the
abolition of the slave trade to the United States that describe the trade as "an outrageous
violation of one of the most essential rights of human nature" and "degrading to the rights
of man"); EXECUTIVE COMM. OF THE AM. ANTI-SLAVERY SOC'Y, SLAVERY AND THE INTERNAL
SLAVE TRADE IN THE UNITED STATES OF NORTH AMERICA 162 (photo. reprint 1969) (1841)
(referring to "the cause of human rights"). This view of the slave trade as a "human rights"
issue was carried on through the later part of the nineteenth century, as when Yale College
President Theodore Dwight Woolsey's 19o6 edition of Introduction to the Study of
International Law explained that under the "correct views of human rights" slavery was a
status unprotected by the law of nations and that "new views of men's rights" had led to the
prohibition of the slave trade in international law. THEODORE DWIGHT WOOLSEY,
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 236-37 (6th ed. 19o6).
40. (1772) 98 Eng. Rep. 499 (K.B.). For a discussion of similar cases in French courts, see SUE
PEABODY, "THERE ARE No SLAVES IN FRANCE": THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF RACE AND
SLAVERY IN THE ANCIEN REGIME (1996).
41. See HOCHSCHILD, supra note 9, at 48-51 (describing the role of abolitionists in bringing
Somerset's case).
42. Somerset, 98 Eng. Rep. at 51o. For a discussion of the natural law underpinnings of Somerset
and other antislavery cases, see ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS 8-30 (1975). As Cover notes, jurists in England and the United States
during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries had conflicting and incompletely theorized
views of the relationship between natural law, statutory law, the common law, and the law
of nations. Slavery was a particularly complicated case, because although originally seen by
some philosophers as a natural part of the order of the world (and perhaps even mandated
by God), over time other philosophers came to view it as contrary to natural law. At the
same time, slavery was sanctioned by the Roman predecessor of the law of nations, thejus
gentium. As early as the third century, the Roman jurist Ulpian pointed out slavery as the
sole example of a conflict between thejus naturale and the jus gentium, a contradiction that
was later recognized by Justinian. See DAVIS, SLAVERY IN WESTERN CULTURE, supra note 13,
at 83. Full exploration of the way that natural law, statutory law, the common law, and the
law of nations were conceptualized in the nineteenth century is beyond the scope of this
Article, but it is sufficient to note that in the face of a direct conflict between some kind of
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that might follow from the decision -which Stewart had argued would include
the liberation of some 14,000 slaves in England valued by their owners at a
total of£8oo,ooo - the court ordered Somerset's release.
43
Having succeeded in establishing that any slave who touched British soil
would be free, the abolitionists next focused their efforts on banning the
transport of slaves from Africa to the New World. The immediate abolition of
slavery was deemed politically infeasible because it was too vital to the
economies of the West Indian colonies. The slave trade, although lucrative for
the British merchants who participated in it and a vital source of new slaves for
British colonies, was a somewhat easier target. For one thing, the slave trade
was viewed as the cruelest part of the system. Accounts by sailors and freed
slaves of the horrors of the Middle Passage were widely circulated in Britain.
Abolitionists also argued that cutting off the supply of fresh slaves would
induce owners to treat their existing slaves better and thus reduce horrific
mortality rates on plantations; better treatment of slaves, they argued, might
even improve productivity.
Abolitionist leaders succeeded in putting the abolition of the slave trade on
the political agenda in the late 178os and early 179os. Under the leadership of
William Wilberforce, a bill for the abolition of the trade passed the House of
Commons in 1792, but was blocked in the House of Lords.' After this initial
progress, however, almost a decade followed in which the movement made
little headway. The French Revolution had provoked fear in Britain's ruling
classes and led to a crackdown on political agitation; the public meetings and
petition campaigns that had propelled abolition onto the parliamentary agenda
came to a halt.4" Though Wilberforce continued to introduce antislavery
legislation each year, the legislation received little attention, and other matters,
such as the war with France, dominated Britain's political agenda.
In the spring of 18o6, the abolitionists finally changed tactics and used the
renewed war with France to their advantage. The crucial first step was the
passage of the Foreign Slave Trade Act,4 6 which prohibited British subjects
from participating in the slave trade with the current or former colonies and
possessions of France and its allies.4 7 Framed as a national security measure
rather than a humanitarian one, the Act easily passed the House of Commons.
positive law (including the law of nations) and natural law, judges of the time felt
themselves obliged to apply the positive law. See COvER, supra.
43. Somerset, 98 Eng. Rep. at 509.
44. See HOCHSCHILD, supra note 9, at 233-34.
45. See id. at 241-55.
46. See Act To Prevent the Importation of Slaves, 18o6, 46 Geo. 3, c. 52 (Eng.).
47. HOCHSCHILD, supra note 9, at 302-03; Drescher, supra note 35, at 141-42.
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Proslavery forces realized the potential importance of the measure by the time
it reached the House of Lords, and submitted a petition with more than four
hundred signatures from the key trading center of Manchester opposing the
Act. The abolition forces responded within hours with a counter-petition from
Manchester bearing more than 2300 signatures. 48 The House of Lords quickly
agreed to the Act.
49
Having gained this wedge, the abolitionists promptly renewed their efforts
to achieve a broader ban. Conditions were favorable in more ways than one.
First, the petition campaign in support of the Foreign Slave Trade Act had
shown that popular support for abolition was both widespread and deep, even
in regions where trading interests were strong. Although British voting rights
would not be expanded beyond a limited segment of the population for
another twenty-five years, strong popular sentiment influenced politics.
The slave trade became an issue in key parliamentary elections in the fall of
18o6."° By that time, two changes since the 179os had reduced the perceived
threat of foreign competition with British commercial interests in the West
Indies: first, the war with France had reduced French power in the West Indies
and on the high seas; and second, a Haitian slave revolt had led to the
independence of France's most productive sugar colony. And so it happened
that, in early 1807, both houses of Parliament finally passed the Act for the
Abolition of the Slave Trade.' As of May 1, 1807, the law completely prohibited
participation in the slave trade by British subjects and the importation of slaves
to British possessions. The British navy began to enforce the ban, and the slave
trade under the British flag rapidly decreased.s2
B. Abolitionism and British Foreign Policy, 18o7-1814: Unilateralism
Following passage of the 1807 Act, it quickly became clear that it would be
in Britain's interest to encourage the suppression of slave trading by other
countries as well. If other nations continued to tolerate the trade, the only
effect of Britain's ban would be to shift the trade from British-flagged ships to
the ships of other nations. In addition, the Caribbean colonies of other nations
48. Drescher, supra note 35, at 142.
49. See id. at 142-44.
5o. See id. at 145-48.
51. Act for the Abolition of the Slave Trade, 1807, 47 Geo. 3, c. 36 (Eng.) (repealed 1824).
52. See David Eltis, The Nineteenth-Century Transatlantic Slave Trade: An Annual Time Series of
Imports into the Americas Broken Down by Region, 67 HiSP. AM. HIST. REV. 109, 136 tbl.V
(1987).
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would continue to receive infusions of new slaves, putting British possessions
that could not receive such reinforcements at an economic disadvantage. Thus,
the British West Indian planters, who had been the strongest opponents of the
1807 Act, quickly became supporters of British efforts to stamp out the slave
trade carried out by other nations.
At the time, other countries showed little interest in implementing an
effective ban on the trade. Though there had been abolition movements in
France and the United States, abolitionists were not sufficiently influential in
domestic politics in either of those countries in 1807 to force their governments
to devote significant resources to the suppression of the slave trade, particularly
on the high seas. Like Britain, France initially drew a distinction between
slavery in its colonies and slavery on French soil. Long before the much-
celebrated decision by the British court in Somerset, French admiralty courts
had granted numerous petitions for freedom on behalf of slaves who had been
brought within the French mainland. 3 In 1794, the revolutionary government
in France abolished slavery in its colonies,5 4 and the French slave trade was
temporarily dampened."5 This abolition effort was short-lived, however, for the
trade was never effectively suppressed and Napoleon reauthorized slavery in
French colonies in 1803.56
The United States had prohibited the outfitting of slave ships in American
ports in 179417 and enacted legislation completely banning the slave trade
under the American flag and into American ports in March 1807. That
legislation took effect in 18o8, the earliest date allowed by the Constitution. 
8
Within a decade, the United States had effectively suppressed slave imports
53. See PEABODY, supra note 40, at 23-40, 88-93. Alarm about the number of blacks in Paris,
however, led Louis XVI to enact a measure in 1777 prohibiting the entry of new blacks (free
or slave) into France, requiring the registration of those already present, and prohibiting the
Admiralty Court from hearing any further freedom petitions. The new law was not well
enforced, and the Admiralty Court began granting freedom petitions again as early as 1778.
See id. at 120-33.
54. See DAVIS, AGE OF REVOLUTION, supra note 13, at 29.
55. See Roger Anstey, The Slave Trade of the Continental Powers, 176o-1820, 30 ECON. HIST. REV.
259, 263-64 (1977).
56. See DAVIS, AGE OF REVOLUTION, supra note 13, at 29-31.
57. See WARREN S. HOWARD, AMERICAN SLAVERS AND THE FEDERAL LAw 1837-1862, at 25-27
(1963).
58. Article I, Section 9 of the U.S. Constitution reflected a compromise between Northern and
Southern states and provided that "[t]he Migration or Importation of such Persons as any
of the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the
Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight...."
117: 55o0 20o8
ANTISLAVERY COURTS
into its own territory. 9 But in the face of sectional divisions between North
and South, the United States devoted few resources to enforcing the ban
against U.S.-flagged ships on the high seas."
Abolitionist movements had even less power in Spain and Portugal, the
other major maritime powers with significant plantation colonies in the New
World.6" Both of those countries permitted the trade to continue unrestricted
under their flags, and the slave trade from Africa to Cuba and Brazil flourished.
Britain thus resorted initially to unilateral military action to suppress the
slave trade. The 1807 Abolition Act was enacted during the Napoleonic Wars,
during which Britain claimed the right under the law of nations to search ships
on the high seas to determine whether they were enemy ships or, if neutral
ships, whether they were violating principles of neutrality by, for example,
carrying contraband for the enemy or running a blockade. Although the
primary efforts of the British Navy were in pursuance of the war effort, Britain
also began using this search right, derived from international law, as a method
to suppress the slave trade. Ships found carrying cargoes of slaves were
brought into British vice admiralty courts around the Atlantic for
condemnation as prizes under the law of nations.62
The British appellate courts first addressed this issue in the case of The
Amedie.63 While sailing under the flag of the United States from Africa to Cuba
with a cargo of 1O5 slaves, The Amedie was captured by a British warship in
18o8. Though the United States was a neutral in the war at that time, its ships
were arguably subject to search under the law of nations to ensure that they
were not violating neutrality. The British vice admiralty court in Tortola
condemned the ship as a lawful prize, and the court in London affirmed. The
court observed that the British Parliament had clearly "declared the African
slave trade is contrary to the principles of justice and humanity.' 64 While
noting that the United States had also banned the trade as a matter of domestic
law, the court acknowledged that the positive law of nations, either by treaty or
custom, did not completely ban the slave trade:
5g. See Eltis, supra note 52, at 136 tbl.V.
6o. See Du Bois, supra note 18, at lO8-O9.
61. See, e.g., BETHELL, supra note 5, at 6 (noting that the Portuguese Foreign Minister responded
to British overtures about banning the slave trade in 1807 by saying it was "utterly
impracticable" for Portugal even to discourage, let alone ban, the slave trade).
6z. See Tara Helfman, Note, The Court of Vice Admiralty at Sierra Leone and the Abolition of the
West African Slave Trade, 115 YALE L.J. 1122 (2006).
63. The Amedie, (18lo) 12 Eng. Rep. 92 (P.C.).
64. Id. at 96.
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[W]e cannot legislate for other countries; nor has this country a right
to controul any foreign legislature that may think proper to dissent
from this doctrine and give permission to its subjects to prosecute this
trade. We cannot, certainly, compel the subjects of other nations to
observe any other than the first and generally received principles of
universal law.6"
Using the same natural law reasoning as the court in Somerset, however, the
court concluded that it was entitled to presume the slave trade unlawful unless
some positive law authorized it. Having found the trade presumptively illegal,
the court put on the claimant "the whole burden of proof.., to shew that by
the particular law of his own country he is entitled to carry on this traffic."66
Even where the claimant was able to demonstrate domestic legal authority, the
court intimated that "persons engaged in such a trade cannot, upon principles
of universal law, have a right to be heard upon a claim of this nature in any
court" and that, in any event, "no claimant can be heard in an application to a
court of prize for the restoration of the human beings he carried unjustly to
another country for the purpose of disposing of them as slaves." 6' Thus, the
court upheld the condemnation of the ship and its cargo ;68 the slaves were
freed, and the ship itself was awarded as prize to its captor, as was customary.6 9
Throughout the Napoleonic Wars, Britain continued the practice of
seizing foreign slave ships, including American, Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch,
and French vessels. 0 Other nations protested Britain's heavy-handed search
tactics," both in relation to captured slave ships and in relation to maritime
commerce more generally, as exceeding permissible bounds under the law of
nations. Indeed, British search and seizure of American ships, though not
specifically slave ships, was one of the main bones of contention that led to the
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 96-97.
68. Id. at 97.
69. Id. at 92. Under prevailing practice in the nineteenth century, the proceeds from a ship
condemned as a prize were shared between the government and the crew of the ship that
made the capture. The precise division of the proceeds was set by statute and periodically
was amended.
70. For other cases, see, for example, Donna Marianna, (1812) 165 Eng. Rep. 1244 (Adm. Ct.);
Fortuna, (1811) 165 Eng. Rep. 1z4o (Adm. Ct.); Africa, (181o) 12 Eng. Rep. 156 (P.C.); and
Anne, (181o) 12 Eng. Rep. 158 (P.C.). See also Helfman, supra note 62 (discussing cases tried
before the vice admiralty court in Sierra Leone).
71. See LLOYD, supra note 23, at 62-63 (describing Portuguese diplomatic protests in 1813 related
to capture of Portuguese-flagged slaving vessels off the coast of Africa).
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War of 1812.72 But Britain persisted in these unilateral seizures through the end
of the Napoleonic Wars. As the following tables show, Britain captured a
nontrivial number of ships during this period.
Table i.










72. See DONALD R. HICKEY, THE WAR OF 1812: A FORGOTrEN CONFLICT 11-13 (1989).
73. Data on known slave voyages in this and other numerical charts in this Article are derived
from David Eltis et al., The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade: A Revised and Enlarged Database
(forthcoming 2008) [hereinafter Eltis, Slave Trade Database]. The online version of the
database is a much-expanded version of the database that was published in 1999. See DAVID
ELTIS ET AL., THE TRANs-ATLANTIc SLAVE TRADE: A DATABASE ON CD-ROM (Cambridge
Univ. Press, rel. 1999). This chart was created from raw data by using the year of departure
variable ("YEARDEP") for year and the variable describing the outcome of the voyage
("FATE") to count all voyages adjudicated in vice admiralty courts each year as well as the
total number of voyages of any outcome in that year. The author is extremely grateful to
David Eltis for providing the most recent version of the database for use in this Article. For a
discussion of this data, and its limits, see infra text accompanying notes 2o8-210.
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In one sense, the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1814-15 was a peculiar time
for Britain to change the direction of its antislavery policies. After all, Britain
won the war, and, more than that, had established itself as the dominant
maritime power. But with the end of hostilities, Britain's unilateral actions
became more suspect. The right to search foreign-flagged vessels was linked
under the law of nations to a state of warfare, and its scope was controversial
even in that context. It was clear that there was no general right of peacetime
search, aside from cases of piracy. Although the British courts would not begin
to invalidate the peacetime search and seizure of foreign-flagged slaving vessels
until 1817, the writing was already on the wall. Unilateral British suppression
efforts in peacetime would not be perceived as legitimate by its own courts, let
alone by other countries, many of which had already insinuated that Britain
was not interested in the slave trade at all, but was simply using the
humanitarian cause as a cover for its self-interested efforts to dominate
maritime commerce.
74
In July 1816, the British government acknowledged that the peacetime
searches were illegal under international law, 75 and the following year, British
courts began invalidating seizures of slave ships, starting with the case of Le
Louis, issued on December 15, 1817.76 Le Louis involved a French vessel seized in
1816 and condemned by the British vice admiralty court at Sierra Leone. The
condemnation was reversed on appeal in an opinion authored by Sir Walter
Scott.' Although the court acknowledged that French law prohibited the slave
trade, the court found that Britain had no legal authority to search the ship on
the high seas. 7' Noting that the customary law of nations provided no
generalized right to search in peacetime, the court concluded that Britain could
not search or seize a French ship in conditions of peace unless the ship was
engaged in piracy or the search was directly authorized by a treaty with France.
The court found, first, that the slave trade was not piracy under the general law
of nations. Second, the court concluded that the 1815 treaty in which France
had agreed to ban the slave trade was not sufficient to confer a right of
peacetime search. Thus, there was no legal basis for the search and seizure. 79 In
74. See HOWARD, supra note 57, at 4-6.
75. See ELTIS, supra note io, at 1o9.
76. See Le Louis, (1817) 165 Eng. Rep. 1464 (Adm. Ct.).
77. Id. at 1473.
78. Id. at 1475.
7g. Id. at 1482. For an interesting similar turn-about in American case law, compare Justice
Story's decision upholding an American ship's capture of a French slave vessel on Somerset-
type reasoning in United States v. La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832, 846-48 (C.C.D. Mass.
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the face of this positivist, formal view of the status of international law on the
slave trade, it was clear that if Britain wanted to suppress the slave trade, it
would need to persuade other countries to commit to the project and to enter
into treaties that would give legal legitimacy to its actions.
C. British Foreign Policy at the End of the Napoleonic Wars:
A Network of Treaties
The end of the Napoleonic Wars not only made it something of a necessity
for Britain to address the slave trade issue on a multilateral basis, but also
presented an opportunity for the British government to make the issue a
bargaining chip in the series of diplomatic negotiations and realignments that
inevitably followed the war. In the years following the Napoleonic Wars,
Britain successfully negotiated for clauses related to the slave trade in a number
of multilateral and bilateral treaties. Although the multilateral treaties
ultimately included only statements of principle against the slave trade with no
enforcement mechanisms, several of the bilateral negotiations ultimately
resulted in treaties that not only banned the slave trade but also provided for
enforcement of the ban in international mixed courts.
The British government faced strong domestic political pressure to make
abolition a central feature of the immediate postwar negotiations. When the
Foreign Secretary, Viscount Castlereagh, returned from the initial peace treaty
negotiations in France in the summer of 1814, he was greeted with euphoria
and praise for having brought the long war to a successful conclusion. These
accolades, however, were quickly supplanted by criticism for having agreed to a
provision in the treaty that allowed France to renew its participation in the
slave trade (participation that had been dampened or eliminated during the
war) for five more years."0 Wilberforce, the leader of the abolition movement
in Parliament, immediately described the treaty provision as the "death-
warrant of a multitude of innocent victims, men, women and children.""' Lord
Canning pointed out that Castlereagh had opposed the 1807 Act abolishing the
1822) (No. 15,551) with Justice Marshall's invalidation of a similar seizure with Le Louis-type
reasoning in The Antelope, 23 U.S. (so Wheat.) 66, 122 (1825).
so. See Drescher, supra note 35, at 159; see also Additional Article to the Definitive Treaty of
Peace Between Great Britain and France, Gr. Brit.-Fr., May 30, 1814, 3 B.S.P. 890
(acknowledging that the slave trade is "repugnant to the principles of natural justice and of
the enlightened age in which we live" and pledging to cooperate with Britain at the
upcoming Congress to induce agreement for abolition of the trade, as well as committing to
abolish the trade in the course of five years, but preserving the tight of France to engage in
the trade in the interim).
81. Drescher, supra note 35, at 159.
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trade, thereby implying that he had not pursued the issue with sufficient
diligence in the peace negotiations.s2
Abolitionist leaders reached out to the public for support. In what may
have been the largest popular petition campaign in Britain's history, more than
three-quarters of a million people (out of a national population of
approximately twelve million) signed petitions denouncing this provision of
the peace treaty with France.8 ' Debates over the slavery article tainted local
victory celebrations around the country, with pictures of Africans in chains
being displayed at some festivals.8 4 In his correspondence, the Duke of
Wellington commented on the "degree of frenzy" in London about the slave
trade, noting that "[p]eople in general appear to think that it would suit the
policy of this nation to go to war to put an end to that abominable traffic."" s
Both the House of Commons and the House of Lords passed resolutions
urging that the slave trade issue be brought up at the upcoming Congress of
Vienna, where the countries involved in the just-concluded war hoped to
transform the initial peace agreement into an arrangement for long-term
stability in Europe.86
Canning's suspicions about Castlereagh were largely correct: Castlereagh
did not view abolition as a proper element of British foreign policy, suggesting
in private that it was wrong "to force it upon nations, at the expense of their
honour and of the tranquility of the world. Morals were never well taught by
the sword."17 But stung by the public outcry, Castlereagh and Prime Minister
82. See id. at 159-6o; see also House of Commons, TutEs (London), June 7, 1814, at 2 (describing
the reaction to Lord Castlereagh's presentation of the peace treaty).
83. See HOCHSCHILD, supra note 9, at 316-17; Drescher, supra note 35, at 16o; Nelson, supra note
11, at 194 (noting that more than six hundred petitions from various towns and associations
were submitted to Parliament in July 1814).
84. See Drescher, supra note 35, at 161.
8s. See id. at 164 (quoting Letter from Arthur Wellesley, Duke of Wellington, to Viscount
Castlereagh (June 17, 1814); Letter from Arthur Wellesley, Duke of Wellington, to Viscount
Castlereagh (July 6, 1814)).
86. See Address of the House of Commons to the Prince Regent of Great Britain (May 3, 1814),
in 3 B.S.P. 893, 893-94 (185-16) (urging that "His Majesty's Government would employ
every proper means to obtain a Convention of the Powers of Europe for the immediate and
universal abolition of the African Slave Trade" at the Congress which "afford[s] a most
auspicious opportunity for interposing the good offices of Great Britain to accomplish the
above noble purpose"); see also Nelson, supra note ii, at 194.
87. BETHELL, supra note 5, at 12.
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Liverpool felt compelled to instruct British negotiators to redouble their efforts
to conclude antislavery treaties with France, Spain, and Portugal.88
Castlereagh directed the Duke of Wellington, who had been sent to Paris,
immediately to reopen the issue with the French government. Wellington was
instructed to press for immediate abolition of the slave trade by the French, as
well as rights of reciprocal search on the high seas to enforce the ban.
Recognizing that this proposal would not go over well with the French
government, Castlereagh noted that "[t]o soften the exercise of this power,
perhaps it might be expedient to require the Sentence of Condemnation to be
passed in the Courts of Admiralty of the Country to which the Ship detained
belongs."8 9
The French negotiator rebuffed Wellington's initial approach, pointing out
that the public sentiment against the trade in France was not as strong as in
Great Britain.9" Castlereagh then sent word to Wellington that he should offer
France a material inducement for cooperation on the slavery issue-either a
cash payment or an island in the West Indies.9 This offer, too, was rejected. 92
While negotiations with France were momentarily stalled, Britain proved
more successfiil in its negotiations with the Netherlands, which in August 1814
formalized by treaty the promise it had made in June 1814 to prohibit the slave
trade.93 Negotiations with the United States ending the War of 1812 also
included discussion of the slave trade. The United States, which had already
banned the slave trade by statute,94 was amenable to including a provision on
the topic in the peace treaty. Thus the Treaty of Ghent, signed between Great
88. Castlereagh was apparently quite susceptible to public opinion. He ended up committing
suicide in 1822, partly in reaction to his perception of his unpopularity. See generally J.A.R.
MARRIOTT, CASTLEREAGH: THE POLITICAL LIFE OF ROBERT, SECOND MARQUEES OF
LONDONDERRY (1936).
89. Letter from Viscount Castlereagh to the Duke of Wellington (Aug. 6, 1814), in 3 B.S.P. 891,
893 (1815-16).
go. Letter from the Duke of Wellington to Viscount Castlereagh (Aug. 25, 1814), in 3 B.S.P. 9O1,
902 (1815-16).
91. Letter from Viscount Castlereagh to the Duke of Wellington (Oct. 4, 1814), in 3 B.S.P. 907,
907 (1815-16).
92. Letter from the Duke of Wellington to Viscount Castlereagh (Nov. 5, 1814), in 3 B.S.P. 913,
913 (1815-16).
93. Convention Between Great Britain and the Netherlands Relative to the Dutch Colonies;
Trade with the East and West Indies art. VIII, Gr. Brit.-Neth., Aug. 13, 1814, 2 B.S.P. 370,
374-75 (promising to forbid subjects from "taking any share whatsoever in such inhuman
Traffic"). Sweden, too, was persuaded to enter into a treaty banning the trade, but Sweden
was not a major maritime power.
94. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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Britain and the United States on December 24, 1814, declared that "the traffic in
slaves is irreconcilable with the principles of humanity and justice," and both
nations pledged to "use their best endeavours" to abolish the trade, though the
treaty did not include particular mechanisms for enforcing this promise. 9
Throughout the summer and fall of 1814, the British government tried to
obtain similar agreements from Spain and Portugal. Britain's emissary in
Madrid, Sir Henry Wellesley, initially sent word that he was not optimistic
about obtaining any abolition agreement whatsoever from the Spanish
government. 96 Following the British public outcry in reaction to the French
treaty, Wellesley told his Spanish counterpart, the Duke of San Carlos, that any
treaty they might conclude would not be well-received in London unless it
included an abolition clause. San Carlos responded that the continuance of the
slave trade was essential to the viability of Spain's colonies and its abolition
was inconceivable in the immediate future. Wellesley only managed to secure a
provision agreeing to limit the traffic under the Spanish flag to Spanish citizens
and to Spanish possessions.
97
This concession was unsatisfactory to the government in London, which
faced continuing pressure to show some progress on the issue. Wellesley thus
received instructions to use the cash-incentive approach. He offered the
Spanish government a loan of 1o,ooo,ooo Spanish dollars in exchange for the
immediate abolition of the slave trade.98 The Spanish government, though in
serious need of the money, declined the offer.99 A month later, the Spaniards -
perhaps still hoping for the money -made a counteroffer, suggesting that they
would immediately ban the trade everywhere except in the zone from the
equator to ten degrees north of the equator.00 Anything short of total
abolition, however, remained unacceptable to London.'
95. Treaty of Peace and Amity Between His Britannic Majesty and the United States of America
art. X, Gr. Brit.-U.S., Dec. 24, 1814, 2 B.S.P. 357, 364.
96. Letter from Sir Henry Wellesley to Viscount Castlereagh (June 17, 1814), in 3 B.S.P. 920
(1838).
97. Letter from Sir Henry Wellesley to Viscount Castlereagh (July 6, 1814), in 3 B.S.P. 920
(1838).
g8. Letter from Sir Henry Wellesley to Viscount Castlereagh (Aug. 25, 1814), in 3 B.S.P. 926
(1838).
99. Letter from Sir Henry Wellesley to Viscount Castlereagh (Sept. 20, 1814), in 3 B.S.P. 931
(1838).
1oo. Letter from Sir Henry Wellesley to Viscount Castlereagh (Oct. 23, 1814), in 3 B.S.P. 932
(1838).
101. Letter from Earl Bathurst to Sir Henry Wellesley (Nov. ii, 1814), in 3 B.S.P. 934 (1838).
117:550 20o8
ANTISLAVERY COURTS
Negotiations with Portugal proved more promising. Before the war had
begun, the Portuguese government had grudgingly agreed to a treaty in 181o in
exchange for British support against the French. That treaty committed
Portugal to the gradual abolition of the slave trade, and, in particular, limited
the trade of slaves by Portuguese subjects to that carried on between the
mainland and Portuguese ports in Africa and Brazil.' 2 During the war,
Portugal had become indignant when Britain had invoked the treaty as an
excuse to unilaterally seize and condemn Portuguese ships in its vice admiralty
courts, and the issue remained an irritant in Anglo-Portuguese relations at the
end of the war. But Portugal was heavily dependent on England for military
and financial support, and, in January 1815, Britain finally succeeded through a
combination of bribery and threats in persuading Portugal to enter into new
treaties restricting the slave trade. In the first of these treaties, the Convention
of January 21, 1815, Britain agreed to pay Portugal £300,000, ostensibly as
compensation for Portuguese ships illegally condemned by British vice
admiralty courts.' 3 In a companion treaty, signed on January 22, 1815, Britain
forgave the remainder of a £6oo,ooo loan made earlier to Portugal, and
Portugal agreed to ban the slave trade north of the equator and to adopt
measures necessary to enforce the ban.'0 4 Although this was progress, it was
not a great victory, since the majority of Portugal's slave trade was destined for
Brazil, which lies south of the equator.
While pursuing these various bilateral negotiations, Britain was
simultaneously trying to obtain a multilateral agreement on the slave trade at
the Congress of Vienna, where representatives of all the European powers had
gathered to sort out a wide variety of issues related to the settlement of the
war.0' Beginning in December 1814 and throughout January and February
1815, the diplomatic representatives meeting in Vienna intermittently discussed
the slave trade. , 6 While Russia, Austria, and Prussia were quite supportive of
lo2. See BETHELL, supra note 5, at 7-9.
1o3. Convention Between Great Britain and Portugal Relative to the Indemnification of
Portuguese Subjects for Certain Detained Slave-Trade Vessels, Gr. Brit.-Port., Jan. 21, 1815,
2 B.S.P. 345-48.
1o4. Treaty Between Great Britain and Portugal, for the Restriction of the Portuguese Slave
Trade; and for the Annulment of the Convention of Loan of 18o9, and Treaty of Alliance of
18lo, Gr. Brit.-Port., Jan. 22, 1815, 2 B.S.P. 348-55.
105. See generally Jerome Reich, The Slave Trade at the Congress of Vienna -A Study in English
Public Opinion, 53 J. NEGRO HIST. 129 (1968).
io6. See generally BRITISH DIPLOMACY 1813-1815: SELECT DocuMENTs DEALING WITH THE
RECONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE (C.K. Webster ed., 1921) [hereinafter BRITISH DIPLOMACY];
10 CORRESPONDENCE, DISPATCHES, AND OTHER PAPERS OF VISCOUNT CASTLEREAGH, SECOND
MARQUEES OF LONDONDERRY 213-61 (Charles William Vane ed., London, William Shoberl
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Britain's proposals related to the slave trade, none of these countries had
significant maritime empires. France, Portugal, and Spain were as recalcitrant
in the multilateral negotiations as they had been separately.
It appears that the idea of an international body aimed at suppression of the
slave trade first emerged during these negotiations at Vienna. And while no
permanent international legal structures were created as a result of either the
Congress of Vienna or the subsequent meetings between the great European
powers, the idea of such structures was very much on the table. The Russian
Czar Alexander I had some grandiose ideas about a permanent international
league of like-minded Christian monarchs that would preserve peace and order
in Europe.' This line of thinking culminated in the Holy Alliance initially
signed between Russia, Prussia, and Austria in the fall of 1815 and later joined
by most of the "crowned heads" of Europe. w
8
Britain stayed out of the Holy Alliance-which Castlereagh privately
pronounced a "piece of sublime mysticism and nonsense."10 9 But Britain did
spearhead the more limited and less metaphysical November 1815 treaty of the
Quadruple Alliance, which established a mutual security and cooperation
system for Europe and provided for regular meetings among the major
powers."' Consistent with the overall discussion at Vienna of creating stable
frameworks for cooperation, Britain firmly supported the creation of some
kind of permanent international commission to deal specifically with the slave
trade, although it was not yet clear what the powers and responsibilities of
such a commission would be."'
The effort to address the slave trade issue at the Congress of Vienna ended
on February 8, 1815, with the delegates adopting a nonbinding declaration that
condemned the slave trade, but placed no firm time limit on its abolition:
Having taken into consideration that the commerce, known by the
name of "the Slave Trade" has been considered, by just and enlightened
men of all ages, as repugnant to the principles of humanity and
universal morality;
1852); HILDE SPIEL, THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA: AN EYEWITNESS AccouNT (Richard H.
Weber trans., Chilton Book Co. 1968) (1966).
107. See TIM CHAPMAN, THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA: ORIGINS, PROCESSES AND RESULTS 60-61
(1998).
1o8. See id. at 61.
iog. Letter from Viscount Castlereagh to the Earl of Liverpool (Sept. 28, 1815), in BRITISH
DIPLOMACY, supra note 1o6, at 383.
iio. See CHAPMAN, supra note 107, at 61-62.
iii. See Letter from Viscount Castlereagh to the Earl of Liverpool (Nov. 21, 1814), in BRITISH
DIPLOMACY, supra note 1o6, at 233-35; see also Reich, supra note 1O5, at 135-36.
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... [T]he Plenipotentiaries ... proclaim[], in the name of their
Sovereigns, their wish of putting an end to a scourge, which has so long
desolated Africa, degraded Europe, and afflicted humanity; ... Too
well acquainted, however, with the sentiments of their Sovereigns, not
to perceive, that however honorable may be their views, they cannot be
attained without due regard to the interests; the habits, and even the
prejudices of their subjects; the said Plenipotentiaries at the same time
acknowledge that this general Declaration cannot prejudge the period
that each particular Power may consider as most advisable for the
definitive Abolition of the Slave Trade." 2
In modern international relations terms, this would be classified as soft law
at best, and "cheap talk" at worst. Soon thereafter, the allies had more pressing
problems to worry about. Napoleon returned with his army from exile, and the
war restarted. Oddly enough, the renewal of the war proved to be a good thing
for the abolitionist cause. In an apparent bid for English support, Napoleon did
what the restored royal government had refused to do and issued a
proclamation completely banning the slave trade on March 29, 1815 ."1 Though
clever, this was not enough to win British support. Napoleon met final defeat
before Wellington's army at Waterloo in June 1815.
Napoleon's return broke the diplomatic impasse with France on the slave
trade issue. On July 30, 1815, Talleyrand informed the British government that
Louis XVIII had issued a complete and immediate ban on the slave trade.
1 4
The final peace treaty signed in Paris on November 20, 1815, included the
ban."1
5
While the French agreement served to assuage British public opinion
somewhat, it was clear to the British government that a substantive ban on the
slave trade was likely to be ineffective without some provision for mutual
rights of search and seizure." ' British colonial officials in Sierra Leone (the site
112. Reich, supra note 105, at 139-40 (quoting delegates to the Declaration of the Powers on the
Abolition of the Slave Trade (Feb. 8, 1815), in 32 PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES 200-01 (T.C.
Hansard ed., London 1816)).
113. See Martha Putney, The Slave Trade in French Diplomacy from 1814 to 1815, 6o J. NEGRO HIST.
411,424-25 (1975).
114. See id. at 426.
115. See id. at 427. As noted in the British press, the treaty was implemented by way of a French
ordinance prohibiting the slave trade and providing for confiscation of any vessels
importing slaves into the French West Indian possessions. French Papers, TIMEs (London),
Feb. 7, 1817, at 2.
116. See Answers from Sierra Leone to the Queries of Viscount Castlereagh (April 1817), in 6
B.S.P. 38,45 (1818-19).
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of the most active vice admiralty courts during the Napoleonic Wars)
responded to an inquiry from Castlereagh about the state of the slave trade and
the most effective means of suppressing it by noting the need for such treaty
provisions. They also noted that any scheme for enforcement of the ban was
"less liable to objection" if the captured vessels were to be condemned "either
by the Courts of his own Country, or by a Tribunal to be specially appointed for
that purpose.""1
7
The idea of mixed arbitral commissions to settle disputes between nations
had already become an established part of international diplomacy. The 1794
Jay Treaty between Britain and the United States had ushered in the modern
era of international arbitration by including provisions for the establishment of
an arbitral commission consisting of representatives from each country to settle
claims arising out of the American Revolutionary War."' More recently, the
November 1815 peace treaty with France had included a provision for
arbitration of public and private claims arising out of the Napoleonic Wars. 9
The previous arbitration commissions had all been created to settle past claims;
none had prospective jurisdiction over future disputes. But the talk of forward-
looking international cooperation mechanisms at Vienna combined with the
concept of mixed commissions to adjudicate disputes to form the idea for the
antislavery courts.
Continuing negotiations finally bore fruit in 1817 when Britain successfully
concluded agreements with the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain that allowed
for mutual rights of search and established mixed courts to try and condemn
captured slave ships. The Anglo-Portuguese Treaty was signed on July 28, 1817,
the Anglo-Spanish Treaty on September 23, 1817, and the Anglo-Dutch Treaty
on May 4, 1817.120 Unlike all of the previous, retrospective arbitration
commissions, the courts set up by the new treaties would have prospective
jurisdiction, that is, jurisdiction to adjudicate cases that might arise in the
indefinite future.
117. Id. (emphasis added).
18. Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-U.K., Nov. 19, 1794, 8 Star. 116.
ig. See Convention Relative to the Claims of the Subjects of the Allied Powers upon France art.
V, Nov. 20, 1815, 3 B.S.P. 315, 321-26; see also Letter from Viscount Castlereagh to the Duke
de Richelieu (Oct. 27, 1818), in 6 B.S.P. 59 (1818-19) (noting that the provisions for judge
and arbitrator were like those in a previous convention between Great Britain and France for
adjudicating private claims); Memorandum of the British Government, enclosed in Letter
from Viscount Castlereagh to Earl Bathurst (Nov. 28, 1818), in 6 B.S.P. 77, 83 (1818-19)
(similar).
izo. See infra notes 122-126 and accompanying text.
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It is not entirely clear what induced these three countries to agree to this
novel scheme, nor whether they fully understood just how novel it was at the
time. The Netherlands, which had agreed easily to the treaty banning the trade
in 1814, appeared to need little persuasion to take additional steps to make the
paper ban effective in practice. For their part, Spain and Portugal seemed
motivated by financial incentives, though the amounts they were paid did not
come close to compensating them for the economic losses that would
accompany real abolition of the trade. Britain agreed in the 1817 treaty to pay
Spain £400,ooo, ostensibly to settle claims for vessels captured during the
years of unilateral antislavery activity by Britain, as well as to compensate
Spain "for the losses which are a necessary consequence of the abolition of the
said Traffic." 2 Britain had already agreed in the 1815 treaties to pay Portugal
£300,000 in cash and forgive £6oo,ooo in loans. Apparently, however, Britain
had never made good on these earlier promises. In the 1817 Anglo-Portuguese
Treaty, Britain agreed to pay the £300,000 owed under the 1815 treaty in two
installments along with interest." But as discussed more fully below, the
United States resisted joining the mixed court system until 1862. France never
participated.
The scope of each treaty was slightly different. The Spanish treaty banned
the trade throughout the Spanish empire as of May 30, 1820, with a five-month
grace period for vessels that had "cleared out" lawfully prior to that date.'23
Slave trading from ports on the coast of Africa north of the equator was banned
immediately as of the date of ratification, again with a grace period for the
completion of voyages already underway." 4 The Portuguese agreement
reiterated the limits in the 1815 treaty, namely that the prohibition extended
only to Portuguese ships trading north of the equator or to non-Portuguese
121. Treaty for the Abolition of the Slave Trade arts. III-IV, Gr. Brit.-Spain, Sept. 23, 1817, 4
B.S.P. 33, 36-37 [hereinafter Anglo-Spanish Treaty of 1817]. Not everyone in London was
thrilled with this concession. "Why," asked one newspaper writer, "should England pay
Spain for performing an act of humanity and justice?" TIMES (London), Oct. 13, 1817, at 2.
1z2. British diplomats would not let their Spanish and Portuguese counterparts soon forget
about the cash payments; for years to come, when Spain and Portugal were less than
enthusiastic about enforcing the treaties, the British would remind them that they had been
paid in advance for their cooperation. See, e.g., Draft of a Note To Be Presented by Lord
Howard de Walden to the Portuguese Government, enclosed in Letter from Viscount
Palmerston to Lord Howard de Walden (Apr. 20, 1839), in CORRESPONDENCE wrrH
FOREIGN POWERS RELATING TO THE SLAvE TRADE, class B, at 71, 76-78, in 17 BRITISH
PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1968) (1839).
123. Anglo-Spanish Treaty of 1817, supra note 121, art. I.
124. Id. art. II.
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possessions. 125 The Dutch had already agreed in 1814 to ban the trade
completely, and the new treaty simply created an international enforcement
mechanism.
Most significant, these treaties, unlike earlier declarations and treaties, were
not merely "cheap talk." They contained robust enforcement mechanisms to
carry out the promised ban on the trade. Each of the new treaties provided for
the mutual right of search and seizure of suspected slave vessels and the vessels'
trial and condemnation before the courts of mixed commission. The treaties
declared that:
In order to bring to adjudication with the least delay and
inconvenience, the Vessels which may be detained for having been
engaged in an illicit Traffic of Slaves, there shall be established ... 2
Mixed Commissions, formed of an equal number of Individuals of the 2
Nations, named for this purpose by their respective Sovereigns.126
These new courts were empowered to "judge without Appeal, according to the
letter and spirit of the Treaty of this date."'
127
In addition, all three treaties were explicitly humanitarian in nature. The
opening paragraph of the Anglo-Spanish treaty, for example, stated that "His
Catholic Majesty concurs in the fullest Manner in the sentiments of His
Britannic Majesty, with respect to the injustice and inhumanity of the Traffic in
Slaves. '1128 And so in 1817, the world's first international human rights courts
were created. 9
125. Anglo-Portuguese Treaty of 1817, supra note 2, art. II.
126. Anglo-Spanish Treaty of 1817, supra note 121, art. XII. The presence of Spanish and
Portuguese judges under instructions from their governments did not render the courts
"cheap talk." At most this would have meant acquittal in half the cases, given the system for
breaking tie votes. See infra text accompanying note 132.
127. Regulation for the Mixed Commissions, Which Are To Reside on the Coast of Africa, and in
a Colonial Possession of His Catholic Majesty art. I [hereinafter Regulation for the Mixed
Commissions], appended to Anglo-Spanish Treaty of 1817, supra note 121.
128. Id. pmbl.
129. Multilateral negotiations regarding the slave trade also continued for several years. At the
Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818, the Russian government pushed for a permanent
international institution "composed of elements drawn from all civilized States" including "a
directing Council, and a judicial system" that would form "a Body Politic, neutral in its
character, but exercising these High authorities over all States." Memorandum of the British
Government (enclosure 5), enclosed in Letter from Viscount Castlereagh to Earl Bathurst
(Nov. 23, 1818), in 6 B.S.P. 65, 79 (1818-19). In its most ambitious iterations such an
organization would have criminal as well as civil jurisdiction over persons engaged in the
illegal slave trade and would have at its disposal an international naval force with the right
to visit and search ships flying all flags. Id. By late 1818, however, the British government
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In sum, in the years following the Napoleonic Wars, Britain had effected a
sea change in the status of the slave trade under international law. Just a few
years earlier, the trade had been presumptively lawful under the law of nations.
Now, the most powerful nations in the world had all agreed in principle to its
suppression. Britain had moved beyond unilateral action based on vague
conceptions of natural law toward concrete, positive treaty obligations and
international enforcement mechanisms. Even when, in later years, Britain was
sometimes forced to turn back to unilateral action, it was able to do so with
greater legitimacy because it could point to the international commitments
embodied in these treaties and argue that the treaties justified its actions.
II. THE COURTS OF MIXED COMMISSION FOR THE ABOLITION OF
THE SLAVE TRADE
A. Overview of Court Operations
Under each of the treaties, one court was to be set up in a British
possession, and another in a Spanish, Portuguese, or Dutch possession,
respectively. Thus, courts were set up in Freetown, Sierra Leone; Havana,
Cuba; Rio de Janeiro, Brazil; and Suriname 3 ° Annexes to the treaties provided
detailed regulations for the courts. These provided the basic procedural rules
under which the courts operated, but as with contemporary international
courts, their procedures evolved over time in light of practical circumstances
and as the treaties were amended to close loopholes. Pursuant to the treaties,
each nation appointed a commissioner, sometimes referred to as the
"commissary judge." Each nation also appointed a "commissioner of
arbitration" or "arbitrator." (These two officers were often collectively referred
to as the "commissioners.") Finally, the government of the territory in which
the court sat appointed a registrar, who acted as the court's chief administrator
and assisted in the taking of evidence.131
(perhaps because of its unsuccessful attempts to convince France to agree to courts of mixed
commission) was skeptical of the "practicality of founding, or preserving in activity, so
novel and so complicated a system" and thought it might be more feasible to treat slave
traders as pirates, subject to trial in national legal systems. Id.
130. In terms of structure, the anti-slave trade treaty regime cannot be neatly characterized as
bilateral or multilateral. Formally, the courts were bilateral institutions. But they functioned
as part of a defacto multilateral treaty network, organized as a hub-and-spoke system with
Britain at the center. Some nations had more effective bilateral treaties with Britain than
others, but many were simultaneously party to multilateral agreements against the slave
trade, such as the agreement at the Congress of Vienna.
131. See, e.g., Regulation for the Mixed Commissions, supra note 127, art. II.
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In the event that the two judges could not agree on the outcome of the case,
one of the two arbitrators would be selected by lottery to cast the deciding
vote.'32 As it happened, on many occasions, one or more of the judges or
arbitrators was absent. Due to the prevalence of tropical diseases in the
locations where the courts sat, it was not uncommon for the European officials
to fall ill, and many died in the course of duty.'3 While Britain promptly
replaced its fallen representatives, many other nations did not, leaving very
long stretches in each of the courts where at least one and sometimes both of
the non-British slots remained vacant.'" After some initial confusion and
132. Id. art. III.
133. See, e.g., Letter from Oct. Temple & H.W. Macauley, Comm'rs at Sierra Leone, to Viscount
Palmerston (June 30, 1834), in CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE BRITISH COMMISSIONERS AT
SIERRA LEONE, THE HAVANA, Rio DE JANEIRO, AND SURINAM, RELATING TO THE SLAVE
TRADE, class A, at 63, in 14 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish Univ.
Press 1968) (1835-36) (reporting the death of a Brazilian judge); Letter from H.W.
Macaulay, Comm'r at Sierra Leone, to Viscount Palmerston (Aug. 14, 1834), in
CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE BRITISH COMMISSIONERS AT SIERRA LEONE, THE HAVANA, Rio
DE JANEIRO, AND SURINAM, RELATING TO THE SLAVE TRADE, class A, at 8, in 14 BRITISH
PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1968) (1835-36) ("informing your
Lordship of another loss which the Courts of Mixed Commission and his Majesty's service
have sustained" in the death of the Lieutenant-Governor of the Colony and Commissary
Judge ad interim); Letter from J. de Aranjo Ribeiro to the Duke of Wellington (Dec. 18,
1834), in CORRESPONDENCE WITH FOREIGN POWERS RELATING TO THE SLAVE TRADE, class B,
at 37, in 14 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1968) (1835-
36) (reporting the appointment of a new Brazilian judge at Sierra Leone, approximately six
months after the death of the preceding judge); Letter from W. Fergusson & M.L. Melville,
Comm'rs at Sierra Leone, to Earl of Aberdeen (Jan. 23, 1842), in CORRESPONDENCE WITH
BRITISH COMMISSIONERS RELATING TO THE SLAVE TRADE, class A, at io, in 23 BRITISH
PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1969) (1843) (reporting the death
of a judge); Letter from Jos. T. Crawford, Acting Comm'r at Havana, to Viscount
Palmerston (July 17, 1847), in CORRESPONDENCE WITH BRITISH COMMISSIONERS AT SIERRA
LEONE, HAVANA, RIO DE JANEIRO, SURINAM, CAPE OF GOOD HOPE, JAMAICA, LOANDA, AND
BOA VISTA, PROCEEDINGS OF BRITISH VICE-ADMIRALTY COURTS, AND REPORTS OF NAVAL
OFFICERS, RELATING TO THE SLAVE TRADE, class A, at 88, in 34 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY
PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1969) (1847-48) (reporting the death of a judge).
134. For example, of the lo9 cases heard by the Anglo-Brazilian court at Sierra Leone, only
twenty-eight were decided with the participation of Brazilian judges, while the remaining
eighty-one were decided by British judges alone. Of the cases in which a Brazilian judge was
present, in eighteen the British and Brazilian judges agreed on the outcome, while in the
other ten, the judges did not agree and the case was decided by the arbitrator. In each of
these cases, the arbitrator selected voted with the judge from their own nation. See Return of
Vessels Adjudicated in the British and Brazilian Court of Mixed Commission at Sierra
Leone, enclosed in Letter from James Hook & N.W. MacDonald, Comm'rs at Sierra Leone, to
Viscount Palmerston (Apr. 6, 1847), in CORRESPONDENCE WITH BRITISH COMMISSIONERS AT
SIERRA LEONE, HAVANA, RIO DE JANEIRO, SURINAM, CAPE OF GOOD HOPE, JAMAICA, LOANDA,
AND BOA VISTA, PROCEEDINGS OF BRITISH VICE-ADMIRALTY COURTS, AND REPORTS OF NAVAL
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controversy, the governments generally agreed that in the absence of one or
more officials, the courts should proceed with whoever was present.13
The judges and arbitrators were not always lawyers.36 Sometimes they held
other public offices contemporaneously; for example, the Governor of Sierra
Leone and other colonial officials were occasionally called upon to serve as the
British judge or arbitrator on the mixed courts after the incumbent died and
until a replacement could arrive from London. 
7
Pursuant to the treaties, ships of each nation's navy were to be provided
with "special Instructions" entitling them to "visit such Merchant Vessels of
the 2 Nations as may be suspected, upon reasonable grounds, of having Slaves
on board. "138 The instructions were quite detailed, specifying that the searches
should be conducted "in the most mild manner, and with every attention
OFFICERS, RELATING TO THE SLAVE TRADE, 1847-48, class A, at 22-30, in 34 BRITISH
PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1968) (1847-48). The Brazilian
judges' absences were intermittent, as was the court's caseload. Brazilian judges did not
participate in decisions from September 1828 through April 1829; February 1837 through
January 1842; September 1843 through May 1844; and April 1845 through the close of the
commission in July 1845. In many years when judges were present, however, no cases were
decided at all. Compare id. with Letter from Oct. Temple & H.W. Macaulay, Comm'rs at
Sierra Leone, to Viscount Palmerston (June 30, 1834), in CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE
BRITISH COMMISSIONERS AT SIERRA LEONE, THE HAVANA, RIO DE JANIERO, AND SURINAM,
RELATING TO THE SLAVE TRADE, 1835, class A, at 63, in 14 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS
(photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1968) (1835-36) (reporting the death of a Brazilian judge
who had served for six years, in which few cases were decided).
135. See Letter From George Canning, Sec'y, to Comm'rs at Sierra Leone (Nov. 26, 1822), in
CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE BRITISH COMMISSIONERS AT SIERRA LEONE, THE HAVANNAH,
RIO DE JANEIRO, AND SURINAM RELATING TO THE SLAVE TRADE, 1822-23, class B, at 5, in 9
BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1969) (1823-24).
136. For example, some of the Spanish judges at the court in Havana were prominent
landowners and businessmen. See LuIs MARTINEZ-FERNANDEZ, FIGHTING SLAVERY IN THE
CARIBBEAN: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF A BRITISH FAMILY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY HAVANA 47
(1998).
137. See Letter from H.W. Macaulay, Comm'r at Sierra Leone, to Viscount Palmerston (Aug. 14,
1834), in CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE BRITISH COMMISSIONERS AT SIERRA LEONE, THE
HAVANA, RIO DE JANIERO, AND SURINAM, RELATING TO THE SLAVE TRADE, Class A, at 8, in 14
BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1968) (1835-36)
(describing how the Lieutenant-Governor had replaced the British judge-who was on leave
for health reasons -until the Lieutenant-Governor died, at which time he was replaced by
the Colonial Secretary, who simultaneously became Acting Governor and Acting
Commissary Judge); Letter from M.L. Melville, Comm'r at Sierra Leone, to the Earl of
Aberdeen (Feb. 2, 1842), in CORRESPONDENCE WITH BRITISH COMMISIONERS RELATING TO
THE SLAVE TRADE, class A, at io, in 23 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish
Univ. Press 1969) (1843) (recording the swearing in of the governor of the colony as acting
commissioner following the death of the incumbent).
138. Anglo-Spanish Treaty of 1817, supra note 121, art. IX.
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which is due between allied and friendly Nations." To avoid insult, the search
was to be conducted by officers of suitable rank.'39 If the ship was in violation
of the treaty, the captor had authority to "detain and bring away such Vessels,
in order that they may be brought to trial before the Tribunals established for
this purpose."
140
British naval vessels captured the vast majority of ships. 4 ' In addition to
the overall commitment of the Royal Navy to the antislavery patrol, individual
officers had a financial incentive to capture slave ships since they were entitled
to a share of the prize money. 142 In addition, many captains of ships in the
antislavery patrol were horrified by what they found aboard slave vessels and
pursued their duty with moral zeal. As one British naval officer testified before
Parliament of his experience on boarding a slave ship:
[A] great many of the slaves had confluent small-pox; the sick had been
thrown down in the hold in one particular spot, and they appeared on
looking down to be one living mass; you could hardly tell arms from
legs, or one person from another, or what they were; there were men,
women and children; it was the most horrible and disgusting heap that
could be conceived.
4 3
Similarly, Capt. Joseph Denman-an officer who spent many years trying to
influence the British government's slave trade policies -explained that he had
become interested in suppression of the trade fifteen years earlier, when as a
young lieutenant he was placed in charge of a captured slave ship that had to be
sailed first to Rio and then to Sierra Leone for trial: "I was ... altogether 4
months on board of her, where I witnessed the most dreadful sufferings that
139. Regulation for the Mixed Commissions, supra note 127, art. V ("Instructions for the British
and Spanish Ships of War employed to prevent the illicit Traffic in Slaves").
140. Id. art. IX. One of the major changes later made to the treaties was an amendment of this
clause to allow the detention of ships that did not have slaves onboard but were outfitted for
the slave trade.
141. Bethell, supra note 3, at 83.
142. See LLOYD, supra note 23, at 83 (describing payments made to the crew of one "fast and
successful" ship between 1839 and 1843 as including £2628 for the commander, £1359 for
the flag officer, and more than £2000 shared among other crew members).
143. FIRST REPORT FROM THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON SLAvE TRADE, HOUSE OF COMMONS 102
(1848) (testimony of Cdr. Henry James Matson), reprinted in 4 BITISH PARLAMENTARY




human beings can endure.... Those sufferings have given me the deepest
interest in the subject .... 44
In each case, after determining that the ship under search was indeed
engaged in the illegal slave trade and fell within one of the treaties, the
commander of the capturing ship would typically place a junior officer and a
small prize crew onboard the captured ship to sail it into the nearest port where
a commission sat.145 Sometimes the captor would send its ship's surgeon
aboard the captured ship to try to provide medical treatment, or sick slaves
might be taken aboard the captor ship to be treated and to relieve
overcrowding. 146 If many of the slaves were too sick to make the voyage at all,
the sickest would be landed at the nearest available port.
147
Almost invariably, some of the slaves died between the time of capture and
the time of adjudication. 14 Once they arrived at the site of the court, the slaves
144. SELECT COMMITTEE OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS To CONSIDER THE BEST MEANS WHICH GREAT
BRITAIN CAN ADOPT FOR THE FINAL EXTINCTION OF THE AFRICAN SLAVE TRADE 321 (1849)
(testimony of Capt. Joseph Denman), reprinted in 6 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo.
reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1968) (185o). Denman was also the son of the Lord Chief Justice,
who was an influential abolitionist member of the House of Lords.
145. Regulations for the Guidance of the Commissions Appointed for Carrying Into Effect the
Treaties for the Abolition of the Slave Trade 6 (1819) (on file with the British National
Archives, F.O. 313/1) [hereinafter Commission Regulations] ("It is not absolutely necessary
that the Affidavit should be made by the Commander of the capturing ship, the Officer in
charge of the ship captured is equally competent thereto."); see also Letter from the Earl of
Aberdeen to Comm'rs at Havana (Sept. 18, 1828), in CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE BRITISH
COMMISSIONERS AT SIERRA LEONE, THE HAVANA, RIO DE JANIERO, AND SURINAM, RELATIVE
TO THE SLAVE TRADE, class A, at 128, in 12 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo. reprint,
Irish Univ. Press 1968) (1829-31) (instructing that the captain of the captor ship need not be
present at the adjudication).
146. See, e.g., Report of the Case of the Portuguese Barque "Maria da Gloria," enclosed in Letter
from Win. Smith & H.W. Macaulay, Comm'rs at Sierra Leone, to Viscount Palmerston
(Mar. 31, 1834), in CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE BRITISH COMMISIONERS AT SIERRA LEONE,
THE HAVANA, RIO DE JANIERO, AND SURINAM, RELATING TO THE SLAVE TRADE, class A, at 32,
37, in 14 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1968) (1834)
(describing the removal of sick Africans from a captured slave vessel and their treatment by
a British ship's surgeon). One British captain described in horrifying terms his capture of a
ship with 560 slaves: "I had to remove the children on board of my own vessel; 200 of
them," who ranged in age "[flrom a few days old and upwards; some of them had been
born on board" and most were "suffering from dysentery." FIRST COMMONS REPORT, supra
note 143, at 156-57 (testimony of Cdr. Thomas Francis Birch).
147. See, e.g, Anglo-Spanish Treaty of 1817, supra note 121, Annex, Instructions for the British and
Spanish Ships of War Employed To Prevent the Illicit Traffic in Slaves, art. VI; see also
Commission Regulations, supra note 145, at S ("Form of Certificate of the necessity of
Disembarking Slaves from a Captured Vessel").
148. See, e.g., Return of Portuguese Vessels Adjudicated by the British and Portuguese Court of
Mixed Commission, Established at Sierra Leone, Between the 3oth Day of June and the 31st
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would often be kept onboard the ship while the court decided the case, with
often devastating consequences for the health of the slaves if the adjudication
were prolonged for any reason. This provoked frequent concern on the part of
the naval captains and the commissioners alike.'49 At Sierra Leone, the judges
would often successfully petition the colonial Governor to allow the slaves to
disembark.'5 Local governments in Havana and Rio, however, generally did
not allow the slaves go ashore, viewing their presence as a security risk.'
5'
Eventually, the British stationed special ships in the harbors of Havana and Rio
Day of December, 1838, enclosed in Letter from H.W. Macaulay & R. Doherty, Comm'rs at
Sierra Leone, to John Backhouse (Dec. 31, 1838), in CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE BRITISH
COMMISSIONERS AT SIERRA LEONE, THE HAVANA, AND RIO DE JANIERO, RELATING TO THE
SLAVE TRADE, class A, at 93-94, in 17 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish
Univ. Press. 1968) (1839) (noting that some slaves died on all ten ships brought in for
adjudication, with death tolls ranging from two to thirty-one).
149. See, e.g., Letter from G. Shee to Comm'rs at Sierra Leone (Dec. 9, 1830), in
CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE BRITISH COMMISSIONERS AT SIERRA LEONE, THE HAVANA, RIO
DE JANIERO, AND SURINAM, RELATING TO THE SLAVE TRADE, class A, at 11, in 12 BRITISH
PRLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1968) (1829-31) (relaying that the
Admiralty Office had ordered captains to place a medical officer when possible onboard
captured slave ships on their way to adjudication in Sierra Leone); Letter from Robert
Hasketh & Frederick Grigg, Comm'rs at Rio, to Hamilton (Dec. 6, 1841), in
CORRESPONDENCE WITH SPAIN, PORTUGAL, BRAZIL &C &C, RELATIVE TO THE SLAVE TRADE,
class B, at 3o6, in 23 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press
1969) (1843) (describing concern for expediting proceedings when a ship is captured with
slaves onboard). For example, Cdr. Keith Stewart of HMS Ringdove sent one prize to
Havana with a note imploring the court to remove the Africans from the ship immediately;
most of the slaves were emaciated children between the ages of ten and fifteen, and
Commander Stewart pronounced the ship "the most miserable craft I ever saw in the shape
of a slaver." Letter from Capt. Keith Stewart to James Kennedy (Jan. 1, 1841), in
CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE BRITISH COMMISSIONERS AT SIERRA LEONE, THE HAVANA, Rio
DE JANEIRO, AND SURINAM, RELATING TO THE SLAVE TRADE, class A, at 178, in 21 BRITISH
PARLIAMENTARYPAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1968) (1842).
150. See, e.g., Letter from William Hamilton to Comm'rs at Sierra Leone (Nov. 13, 1821), in
FURTHER PAPERS RELATING TO THE SLAVE TRADE VIZ. CORRESPONDENCE WITH FOREIGN
POWERS, AND WITH HIS MAJESTY'S COMMISSIONERS, 1821, 1822, at 72, in 64 BRITISH
PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1969) (advising commissioners to
"request the assistance of the Governor of Sierra Leone, in all cases in which any delay in
landing the slaves might be attended with fatal consequences to those suffering
individuals").
151. Letter from George Villiers to Viscount Palmerston (Oct. 14, 1835), in FOREIGN POWERS,
RELATING TO THE SLAVE TRADE, class B, at lo, in 14 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo.
reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1968) (1835-36) (noting the opinion of the Spanish government
that "the great number of liberated negroes at the Havana are considered to be dangerous to
the tranquility of the slave population of Cuba").
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to provide more humane housing for the slaves during the pendency of cases
before the courts.5 2
The treaties specified that cases should ordinarily be resolved in twenty
days.5 3 In reality, adjudication of cases took anywhere from a few days to
several months, with the court at Sierra Leone typically working most
efficiently.5 4 The proceedings began with the capturing officer turning over
the captured ship's papers along with an affidavit describing the circumstances
of the capture. 5 The registrar would then administer a standard set of
interrogatories to witnesses from both ships, recording a summary of their
responses. 6 The lengthy list of questions ranged from the identity of the
witness and how he came to serve on the captured ship, to questions about the
ship's owners, its course during the current voyage, the circumstances of
152. See Letter from George Jackson & Frederick Grigg, Comm'rs at Rio, to Viscount Palmerston
(Feb. 12, 1839), in CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE BRITISH COMMISSIONERS, class A, at 144, in
17 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1968) (1839)
(acknowledging that a British vessel would be sent to Rio to house Africans from ships
awaiting trial); Letter from J. Kennedy & Campbell J. Dalrymple, Comm'rs at Havana, to
Viscount Palmerston (July 1, 1841), in CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE BRITISH COMMISIONERS
AT SIERRA LEONE, THE HAVANA, RIO DE JANEIRO, AND SURINAM RELATING TO THE SLAVE
TRADE, 1842, class A, at 229, in 21 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish
Univ. Press 1969) (1842) (describing captured slaves put on board HMS Romney in
conjunction with commission trials).
153. See, e.g., Regulation for the Mixed Commissions, supra note 127.
154. See Letter from H.S. Fox to Viscount Palmerston (July 24, 1834), in CORRESPONDENCE WITH
FOREIGN POWERS, 1835, class B, at 28, in 14 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo. reprint,
Irish Univ. Press 1968) (1835-36) (discussing negotiations with the Brazilian government
about speeding up operation of the courts); Letter from George Jackson & Fred. Grigg,
Comm'rs at Rio, to Viscount Palmerston (June 5, 1841), in CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE
BRITISH COMMISSIONERS AT SIERRA LEONE, THE HAVANA, RIO DE JANIERO, AND SURINAM
RELATING TO THE SLAvE TRADE, 1843, class A, at 333, in 21 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS
(photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1969) (1842) (discussing delays in adjudication, based on
observance of Brazilian holidays); Letter from W. Fergusson & M.L. Melville, Comm'rs at
Sierra Leone, to the Earl of Aberdeen (Jan. 8, 1842), in CORRESPONDENCE WITH BRITISH
COMMISSIONERS RELATING TO THE SLAVE TRADE, 1842, class A, at 65, 68, in 23 BRITISH
PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1969) (1843) (noting that "in no
one of the several Mixed Commissions has there been a more prompt adjudication of cases
than in the Courts at Sierra Leone").
155. Commission Regulations, supra note 145, at 5.
156. See, e.g., Interrogatories for the Use of the British Commissioners, To Be Administered to
Witnesses Belonging to the Vessel Taken (1819) (on file with the British National Archives,
F.O. 313/1); Letter from W. Fergusson & M.L. Melville, Comm'rs at Sierra Leone, to the Earl
of Aberdeen (Jan. 8, 1842), in CORRESPONDENCE WITH BRITISH COMMISSIONERS RELATING
TO THE SLAvE TRADE, 1842, class A, at 65-68, in 23 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo.
reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1969) (1843) (describing a disagreement with new Brazilian judges
about whether to continue the practice of having the registrar take the depositions).
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capture, and whether any of the ship's papers were missing or destroyed. S7
The registrar would then turn over the file of evidence to the two commissary
judges, who were not generally present at the initial examination of the
witnesses. 158 "Proctors" (who were not always attorneys) representing the two
parties would then argue the case. On occasion, the judges might ask to hear
further evidence from one of the witnesses, or from an additional witness.
Many of the trials were quite summary in nature. For example, if a
Brazilian ship was caught on the high seas with slaves onboard, the British and
Brazilian judges would have little difficulty agreeing that it should be
condemned.' s9 Other cases presented more complex factual and legal issues.
For example, in many cases the courts had to determine the true nationality of
a ship. Quite often - and in violation of the law of nations - slave ships carried
more than one flag and set of papers, with the hope of deploying whichever
seemed most expedient to avoid seizure and condemnation. Thus, a slave ship
might carry both a French and a Portuguese flag, hoisting the Portuguese flag
157. In their use of written depositions rather than live testimony in front of the judges, the
commissions' procedures were more similar to those of British admiralty courts than to
those of ordinary common law courts. See Letter from W. Fergusson & M.L. Melville,
Comm'rs at Sierra Leone, to the Earl of Aberdeen (Jan. 8, 1842), in CORRESPONDENCE WITH
THE BRITISH COMMISSIONERS, class A, at 65, 67, in 23 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS
(photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1969) (1843) (noting that the "[t]he intention of the
parties who framed the Treaties and the 'Regulations' ... being, as is understood, and
indeed stated, in the latter document, to assimilate the practice of these Courts as nearly as
possible to that of the High Court of Admiralty, the mode of taking examinations in use in
that Court was adopted in the Mixed Commissions"). However, the courts declined to
borrow other domestic judicial procedures that were deemed incompatible with the treaties,
such as Spanish and Brazilian modes of appeal. See, e.g., Letter from George Jackson &
Frederick Grigg, Comm'rs at Rio de Janeiro, to Viscount Palmerston (Jan. 22, 1839), in
CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE BRITISH COMMISSIONERS, 1839, class A, at 138, in 17 BRITISH
PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1968) (1839) (discussing a
disagreement with Brazilian judges about the availability of "embargoes," a form of appeal
allowed under local law, in cases heard by the commission); Letter from Marques Lisboa to
Viscount Palmerston (Apr. 8, 1839), in CORRESPONDENCE WITH FOREIGN POWERS, 1838-39,
class B, at 128, in 17 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1968)
(1839) (announcing the decision of the Brazilian government not to allow "embargoes" in
Mixed Commission cases).
158. See Letter from W. Fergusson & M.L. Melville, Comm'rs at Sierra Leone, to the Earl of
Aberdeen (Jan. 8, 1842), in CORRESPONDENCE WITH BRITISH COMMISSIONERS, 1842, class A,
at 65, in 23 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1969) (1843).
159. See, e.g., Letter from Alex Finley & Wm. Smith, Comm'rs at Sierra Leone, to the Earl of
Aberdeen (May 4, 1830), in CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE BRITISH COMMISSIONERS AT SIERRA
LEONE, THE HAVANA, RIO DE JANIERO, AND SURINAM, RELATING TO THE SLAvE TRADE, 1830,
class A, at 59-60, in 12 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press




when a French man-of-war appeared on the horizon (since no treaty
authorized the French to search Portuguese ships) and the French flag when a
British or Portuguese cruiser was spotted. In other cases, the ship's papers
might seem irregular or forged, and the court would determine that the ship
was for that reason not entitled to the protection of the flag it claimed. In so
doing, the judges often drew upon the broader law of nations of the time
period, invoking doctrines from admiralty courts that based a ship's
entitlement to a particular nationality on its ownership and course of trade and
not merely the papers it carried.160 The courts' opinions were brief, but often
included citations to precedents from the mixed courts or to the decisions of
British vice admiralty courts. They were not published in separate law reports,
though they did appear in annual printed reports to Parliament.
Particularly during the years when the coverage of the various treaties
varied (for example, during the years when the Anglo-Spanish treaties were
broader than the Anglo-Portuguese treaties), the determination of the ship's
nationality was often dispositive of the case.161 For example, until 1842, trade
160. See Judgment Given in the Case of the Spanish Brig Diligente (Oct. 12, 1838), enclosed in
Letter from H.W. Macaulay & R. Doherty to Viscount Palmerston (Oct. 20, 1838), in
CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE BRITISH COMMISSIONERS, 1838-39, class A, at 17-24, in 17
BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1968) (1839) (discussing
case law); Letter from Viscount Palmerston to George Jackson & Frederick Grigg, Comm'rs
at Rio (Oct. 8, 1834), in COR.RESPONDENCE WITH BRITISH COMMISSIONERS, 1835, class A, at
147, in 14 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1968) (1835-36)
(noting that "it is a principle of the Law of Nations, that the national character of a
merchant is to be taken from the place of his residence of his mercantile establishment, and
not from the place of his birth," and instructing them to apply this rule in future cases);
Letter from George Jackson & Fred. Grigg, Comm'rs, to Viscount Palmerston (Nov. lo,
1835), in CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE BRITISH COMMISSIONERS, 1836, class A, at 309-10, in
14 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1968) (1835-36)
(reporting the agreement of the Brazilian government on this point).
161. See, e.g., Report of the Case of the Spanish Schooner "Opposiqao," enclosed in Letter from
H.W. Macaulay & R. Doherty, Comm'rs at Sierra Leone, to Viscount Palmerston (Aug. 15,
1838), in CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE BRITISH COMMISSIONERS, 1838-39, class A, at 6, 9, in
17 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1968) (1839)
(condemning as Spanish a ship with a Portuguese flag and papers that was equipped for the
slave trade as Spanish, based on the principle "[t]hat the national character of a merchant is
to be taken from the place of his residence, and of his mercantile establishment, and not
from the place of his birth"); Report of the Case of the Brig Diligente (Oct. 12, 1838), enclosed
in Letter from H.W. Maculay & R. Doherty, Comm'rs at Sierra Leone, to Viscount
Palmerston (Oct. 20, 1838), in CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE BRITISH COMMISSIONERS, 1838-
39, class A, at 13, in 17 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press
1968) (1839) (condemning as Spanish a Portuguese-flagged ship); Report of the Case of the
Schooner Sirse, enclosed in Letter from H.W. Macaulay & R. Doherty, Comm'rs at Sierra
Leone, to Viscount Palmerston (Dec. 22, 1838), in CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE BRITISH
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under the Portuguese flag was prohibited by treaty only in latitudes north of
the equator, while Spanish trade was prohibited in all latitudes as of 1820.62
Similarly, the Spanish government agreed in 1835 to an amendment covering
ships that were equipped for the slave trade but that had not yet taken any
slaves on board, while the Portuguese treaty was not amended to include an
"equipment clause" until 1842.63 Given the discrepancies between the
Portuguese and Spanish treaties, many trials turned on where precisely the
ship had been sailing before it was caught and whether it was really Portuguese
or Spanish.1
64
The trials also became factually more complicated after the treaties were
modified -first, to cover cases where there was evidence that slaves had been
onboard earlier in the voyage, 61 and second, to cover ships that were equipped
COMMISSIONERS, 1838-39, class A, at 26, in 17 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo.
reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1968) (1839) (same, based on the course-of-trade test).
16a. E.g., Letter from Win. Smith & H.W. Macauley, Comm'rs at Sierra Leone, to Viscount
Palmerston (Mar. 22, 1834), in CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE BRITISH COMMISSIONERS, class
A, at 31, in 14 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1968)
(1839) (noting that the Court was "reluctantly compelled" to restore the Portuguese ship,
the Maria da Gloria, because it was captured south of the equator). Compare Anglo-Spanish
Treaty of 1817, supra note 121, art. I, with Anglo-Portuguese Treaty of 1817, supra note 2, art.
II.
163. See Treaty Between Great Britain and Portugal, for the Suppression of the Traffic in Slaves
art. 5, July 30, 1842, 30 B.S.P. 527 [hereinafter Anglo-Portuguese Treaty of 184 2]; Treaty
Between Great Britain and Spain, for the Abolition of the Slave Trade art. X, June 28, 1835,
23 B.S.P. 343 [hereinafter Anglo-Spanish Treaty of 1835].
164. See, e.g., Letter from H.W. Macauley & R. Doherty, Comm'rs at Sierra Leone, to Viscount
Palmerston (Dec. 22, 1838), in CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE BRITISH COMMISSIONERS, 1838-
39, class A, at 26, in 17 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press
1968) (1839) (noting that "[o]f illegal equipment for the Slave Trade there could be no
doubt: but this fact could only avail in the case of a Spanish vessel" and reporting that
Commission found the Sirse to be Spanish based on its course of trade, notwithstanding its
Portuguese flag and papers); Letter from M.L. Melville, Comm'r at Sierra Leone, to the Earl
of Aberdeen (Dec. 31, 1841), in CORRESPONDENCE WITH BRITISH COMMISSIONERS, 1842, class
A, at 29-32, in 23 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1968)
(1842) (reporting the cases of the Recurso, San Paulo de Loando, Boa Uniao, Josephina, Erculos,
and Paz, all of which bore a Portuguese flag and papers but were found to be Spanish and
condemned); Letter from M.L. Melville, Comm'r at Sierra Leone, to the Earl of Aberdeen
(Dec. 31, 1841), in CORRESPONDENCE WITH BRITISH COMMISSIONERS, 1842, class A, at 6o, 61,
in 23 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1969) (1843)
(reporting the case of the Bellona, condemned and found to be Brazilian despite its
Portuguese flag).
165. See Explanatory Article to the Treaty Between Great Britain and Spain for the Abolition of
the Slave Trade of Sept. 23, 1817, adopted Dec. 1O, 1822, 1O B.S.P. 87; Additional Articles to




for the slave trade but that had not yet boarded their human cargo.166 In the
first set of cases, the judges would base their decision on the ship's papers,
testimony of witnesses, the circumstances of capture, items found aboard the
ship, and even the well-known stench of a ship that had recently carried
hundreds of slaves.167 In the "equipment clause" cases, the court would
examine evidence such as the presence of manacles and chains or wood planks
for a slave deck, or the fact that a ship was carrying much more food and water
than necessary for its crew."' In some cases, the evidence of a ship's illegal
mission was quite obvious, but in others it was less so, particularly as slave
traders became more sophisticated.
In simple cases, the judges usually were unanimous. 6 ' When the judges
disagreed and an arbitrator was drawn, the arbitrator often agreed with the
166. See Anglo-Portuguese Treaty of 1842, supra note 163; Anglo-Spanish Treaty of 1835, supra
note 163. Although the Anglo-Brazilian Treaty was not amended to include an equipment
clause, it was reinterpreted by the judges to allow the condemnation of such ships. See, e.g.,
Return of Vessels Adjudicated by the British and Brazilian Court of Mixed Commission,
Established at Sierra Leone, Between the 1st Day of July and the 31st Day of December,
1840, enclosed in Letter from H.W. Macauley & R. Doherty, Comm'rs at Sierra Leone, to
Viscount Palmerston (Nov. IS, 1839), in CORRESPONDENCE WITH BRITISH COMMISSION
RELATIVE TO THE SLAVE TRADE, class A, at 123, in 2o BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo.
reprint, Irish Univ. Press. 1969)(1841) (reporting several cases of condemnation of ships
with no slaves onboard at the time of capture).
167. See, e.g., Report of the Case of the Paquete do Sul, enclosed in Letter from George Jackson &
Fred. Grigg to Viscount Palmerston (Jan. 30, 1834), in CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE BRITISH
COMMISSIONERS, 1835, class A, at 133, in 14 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo. reprint,
Irish Univ. Press 1968) (1839).
168. See, e.g., Report of the Case of the Schooner Sirse, enclosed in Letter from H.W. Macaulay &
R. Doherty to Viscount Palmerston (Dec. 22, 1838), in CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE BRITISH
COMMISSIONER, 1838-39, class A, at 26-32, in 17 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo.
reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1968) (1839).
169. See supra note 134 (noting that of twenty-eight cases decided with both judges present in the
Anglo-Brazilian court at Sierra Leone, in eighteen cases the judges were unanimous while in
ten they disagreed, with the British judge voting for condemnation and the Brazilian judge
for acquittal in the cases where there was disagreement; in all ten of the cases the arbitrator
voted with the judge from his nation). The judges often referred to the courts' unanimity in
easy cases. See, e.g., Letter from George Jackson & Frederick Grigg, Comm'rs at Rio, to
Viscount Palmerston (Jan. 15, 1839), in CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE BRITISH
COMMISSIONERS, class A, at 132, in 17 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish
Univ. Press 1968) (1839) ("[T]he Brazilian Commissary Judge joined Her Majesty's Judge,
without any difficulty, in this sentence [of condemnation.]"); Letter from George Jackson &
Fred. Grigg, Comm'rs at Rio, to Viscount Palmerston (June 30, 1841), in CORRESPONDENCE
WITH THE BRITISH COMMISSIONERS AT SIERRA LEONE, THE HAVANA, RIO DE JANEIRO, AND
SURINAM RELATING TO THE SLAVE TRADE, class A, at 344-45, in 21 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY
PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1969) (1842) (noting that the judges were
unanimous that a ship captured in a territorial creek was not within the court's jurisdiction).
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judge from his own country,' 70 though occasionally, the arbitrator sided with
the judge of the other nationality. 17' Many, though not all, of the non-British
judges appear to have carried out their duties honestly, if not always with great
zeal. 72 When the British government complained to Brazil that its judge at
Sierra Leone was associating with slave traders, for example, the Brazilian
government responded promptly by removing him from office.' 73 British
officials praised one long-serving Spanish judge at Havana, though some later
judges in Havana were men who owned large slave plantations.7 The courts'
decisions were final, and there was no system for appeals to a higher court.
The vast majority of cases resulted in condemnation of the ships, with the
rates of condemnation highest in the courts at Sierra Leone and lowest in the
Anglo-Portuguese courts at Rio and Loanda, Angola. At Sierra Leone, 484
ships were condemned, while twenty-nine were released. In Havana, forty-
eight were condemned and seven were released, while at Rio twenty-five were
condemned and fourteen were released, and at Loanda five were condemned
and six were released. All five cases at Cape Town resulted in condemnation.'
7
1
The greatest disagreement among the judges seems to have occurred in the
Anglo-Brazilian courts at Sierra Leone and Rio where the British judges
adopted a creative reinterpretation of the existing treaties to cover ships
equipped for the slave trade but not yet loaded with slaves. Given that Brazil
170. See supra note 134.
171. See, e.g., Letter from George Jackson & Fred. Grigg, Comm'rs at Rio, to Viscount
Palmerston (Oct. 31, 1840), in CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE BRITISH COMMISSIONERS AT
SIERRA LEONE, THE HAVANA, Rio DE JANIERO, AND SURINAM RELATING TO THE SLAVE TRADE,
at 279, 281, in 21 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1969)
(1842) (reporting a case in which the British arbitrator sided with the Brazilian judge).
172. See, e.g., Letter from H.T. Kilbee, Comm'r at Havana, to George Canning, Sec'y (July 31,
1824), in CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE BRITISH COMMISSIONERS, class A, at 68, in 1O BRITISH
PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1968) (1825-26); see also Bethell,
supra note 3, at 85-86.
173. Letter from W.G. Ouseley to Viscount Palmerston, (Feb. 25, 1839), in CORRESPONDENCE
WITH FOREIGN PowERS RELATING TO THE SLAvE TRADE, class B, at 139, in 17 BRITISH
PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1968) (1839) (describing the
removal of Joaquim Feliciano Gomez). The Portuguese judges at Loanda in 1844-45 were
also notorious participants in the slave trade. ELTIS, supra note lo, at 114. Some British
judges were also less than effective. One critic said of the British judges at Havana that one
spent "his whole time" studying ornithology and the other was a "poor man... too simple to
do good, and too innocent to do harm." MARTINEZ-FERNANDEZ, supra note 136, at 47. One
British commissioner at Rio was also criticized for incompetence and possible corruption.
BETHELL, supra note S, at 201-02.
174. MARTINEZ-FERNANDEZ, supra note 136, at 47.
175. These numbers were calculated from the Revised Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database
using the "FATE" variable.
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had refused to ratify a treaty amendment to that effect, 176 the Brazilian judges
probably had the better legal argument.
If the court held that a ship should be condemned, it would be auctioned
off and the proceeds would be split between the two governments. 77 In later
years, some ships were broken up and sold in pieces to avoid being redeployed
in the slave trade by the persons who purchased them at auction.17 Some of
the money was allocated to the expenses of the courts, and a substantial
portion of the rest was generally awarded as prize money to the captor. 79
The mixed courts themselves had no criminal jurisdiction over the crew of
the slave vessel, but the crew would occasionally be sent to the courts of their
own country for criminal trial. ' 8° In other cases, they fled, were let go in port,
176. BETHELL, supra note 5, at 194-98.
17. See, e.g., Regulation for the Mixed Commission, supra note 127, art. VII. The allocation of
prize money to crews was an important way for the navy to increase the pay for naval
officers without draining the national treasury.
178. See Bethell, supra note 3, at 88 n.33.
179. See LLOYD, supra note 23, at 83. The amount of prize money offered to British ships varied
over the years. Other countries did not always offer prize money to their naval officers.
18o. See Letter from Viscount Palmerston to Lord Howard de Walden (Feb. 14, 1839), in
CORRESPONDENCE WITH FOREIGN POWERS, class B, at 42, 43, in 17 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY
PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1968) (1839) (discussing the Diligente, which had
been captured by the British and condemned at Sierra Leone, and whose crew had been sent
to Lisbon to be tried under Portuguese law); Letter from the Earl of Aberdeen to Comm'rs
at Rio (Sept. 21, 1841), in CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE BRITISH COMMISSIONERS AT SIERRA
LEONE, THE HAVANA, Rio DE JANIERO, AND SURINAM RELATING TO THE SLAVE TRADE, class A,
at 355-56, in 21 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1969)
(1842) (discussing the acquittal by Brazilian criminal courts of crew members declared by
the Mixed Commission to have been engaged in piracy). For example, in one letter the
commissioners at Sierra Leone relate that Lord Palmerston had rejected their suggestion that
slave crews be held in custody at Sierra Leone until they could be sent to their own countries
for punishment, on the grounds that there was no legal authority for such detention. The
commissioners reiterated their suggestion that punishment of slave crews would be likely to
check the slave trade and that crews "at present are invariably thrown loose on the coast, and
help to man many a vessel which otherwise would be unable to carry off her human cargo
for want of hands." Letter from W. Fergusson & M.L. Melville, Comm'rs at Sierra Leone, to
Viscount Palmerston (Sept. 23, 1841), in CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE BRITISH
COMMISSIONERS AT SIERRA LEONE, THE HAVANA, RIO DE JANIERO, AND SURINAM RELATING
TO THE SLAVE TRADE, class A, at 31, in 21 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo. reprint,
Irish Univ. Press 1969) (1842). Later, the mixed courts were authorized to hold slave crews
in custody until they could be transferred to national authorities for trial. See Letter from
George Frere & Frederic R. Surtees, Comm'rs at Cape of Good Hope, to Viscount
Palmerston (Oct. 31, 1846), in CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE BRITISH COMMISSIONERS AT
SIERRA LEONE, HAVANA, RIO DE JANIERO, SURINAM, CAPE OF GOOD HOPE, JAMAICA, LOANDA,
AND BOA VISTA, PROCEEDINGS OF BRITISH VICE-ADMIRALTY COURTS, AND REPORTS OF NAVAL
OFFICERS, RELATING TO THE SLAVE TRADE, class A, at 113, in 34 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY
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or on a few occasions were reportedly left stranded somewhere on the coast of
Africa. 8 ' The emancipated slaves would be given certificates of freedom, and
their personal details (name, age, language, identifying marks) would be
recorded in a logbook. '82 If, on the other hand, the judges agreed that the ship
had been wrongfully seized, they allowed it to continue on its voyage with its
human cargo. The judges had the power to order the captor to pay
compensation to the owner in such cases, though depending on the
circumstances, they did not always do so.
'83
While they were instructed to be mindful of their judicial character and
apply the law neutrally and fairly, 14 the judges and arbitrators were not
independent in the modern sense. The Foreign Office in London provided a
great deal of guidance to the British judges in the field on how they should
carry out their business. The Foreign Office provided regulations for the
operation of the courts, including elaborate instructions on everything from the
form of the captor's affidavit to the oaths for swearing in witnesses and the
form for decisions.S Officials in London would provide detailed praise or
criticism of particular aspects of the commissions' operations, from the speed
PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1969) (1847-48) (acknowledging the opinion of
British law officers that under the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty of 1842, supra note 163, art. XII,
slave crews could be detained in custody by the Mixed Commission until they could be
turned over to their own governments for trial); Letter from Ildefonso Leopoldo Bayard to
Alfredo Duprat, Portuguese Comm'r (May 22, 1847), in CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE
BRITISH COMMISSIONERS AT SIERRA LEONE, HAVANA, RIO DE JANIERO, SURINAM, CAPE OF
GOOD HOPE, JAMAICA, LOANDA, AND BOA VISTA, PROCEEDINGS OF BRITISH VICE-ADMIRALTY
COURTS, AND REPORTS OF NAVAL OFFICERS, RELATING TO THE SLAVE TRADE, class A, at 130,
in 34 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1968) (1847-48)
(instructing the Portuguese commissioner that slave crews should be sent to Loanda or Cape
Verde and "delivered to the respective Governor-Generals, to be dealt with according to
law").
181. See FIRST COMMONS REPORT, supra note 143, at 15-16 (testimony ofViscount Palmerston).
182. See REGISTRY OF SLAVES: SIERRA LEONE (on file with the British National Archives, F.O.
315/31) (original log books).
183. See, e.g., Letter from John Samo & Fred. Grigg, Comm'rs at Rio, to the Earl of Aberdeen
(Sept. 23, 1842), in CORRESPONDENCE WITH BRITISH COMMISSIONERS RELATING TO THE
SLAVE TRADE, class A, at 291-94, in 23 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish
Univ. Press 1969) (1843) (describing a case in which British and Brazilian judges disagreed
about whether the claimant was entitled to indemnity).
184. See BETHELL, supra note 5, at 130 ("British commissioners were specifically instructed that in
reaching a verdict they should never lose sight of their judicial character, and that they
should 'uniformly endeavor to combine a fair and conscientious zeal for the prevention of
the illegal traffic in slaves with the maintenance of the strictest justice towards the parties
concerned.'" (quoting Letter from Viscount Castlereagh to Thomas Gregory (Feb. 19,
1819))).
185. See, e.g., Commission Regulations, supra note 145.
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of their operations down to the color of the ink used in their correspondence. 86
On occasion, the Foreign Office would suggest that a particular decision
involved an incorrect interpretation of the law and urge the judges not to
repeat the mistake. 8 7 For their part, the judges would from time to time
request the opinion of legal officials in London on a point of law. 8 8 In a similar
186. See, e.g., Letter from Viscount Palmerston to Comm'rs at Rio (Mar. 22, 1839), in
CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE BRITISH COMMISSIONERS AT SIERRA LEONE, THE HAVANA, AND
Rio DE JANEIRO RELATING TO THE SLAVE TRADE, 1839, class A, at 136, in 17 BRITISH
PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1968) (1839) (requesting that the
commissioners send more detailed information about every case, including "translation in
full of the deposition made by each witness" and "copies or translations of every paper," "a
statement of the argument which may have been given by each member of the Court," so
that the government could "form a sure opinion upon the merits of each case respectively");
see also Letter from the Earl of Aberdeen to Comm'rs at Sierra Leone (Dec. 28, 1828), in
CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE BRITISH COMMISSIONERS AT SIERRA LEONE, THE HAVANA, RiO
DE JANEIRO, AND SURINAM RELATIVE TO THE SLAVE TRADE, 1829, class A, at 19, in 12 BRITISH
PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1968) (1829-31) (similar); Letter
from the Foreign Office to Comm'rs at Sierra Leone (Dec. 6, 1837) (on file with the British
National Archives, F.O. 315/4, at 573) ("I am directed by Viscount Palmerston to observe to
you that your Dispatches and Reports should be copied in Black Ink, and I am to desire, that
you will not give his Lordship occasion to make this remark again.").
187. See, e.g., Letter from George Lansing, Comm'r at Sierra Leone, to the Foreign Office (Sept.
25, 1822) (on file with the British National Archives, F.O. 315/1, at 241) (disapproving of the
court's decision in the case of the Spanish schooner Rosalia); Letter from Viscount
Palmerston to Comm'rs at Rio (Oct. 8, 1834), in CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE BRITISH
COMMISSIONERS AT SIERRA LEONE, THE HAVANA, RO DE JANEIRO, AND SURINAM, RELATING
TO THE SLAVE TRADE, 1834, class A, at 147, in 14 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo.
reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1968) (1835-36) (stating that the commission was wrong to release
the Maria da Gloria because, although it had a Portuguese flag and papers, it was owned by a
merchant resident in Rio and "it is a principle of the Law of Nations, that the national
character of a merchant is to be taken from the place of his residence and of his mercantile
establishment, and not from the place of his birth," and instructing them to so rule in future
cases).
188. See, e.g., Letter from George Canning, Sec'y, to Comm'rs at Sierra Leone (May 29, 1824), in
CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE BRITISH COMMISSIONERS AT SIERRA LEONE, THE HAVANNAH,
RiO DE JANEIRO, AND SURINAM, RELATING TO THE SLAVE TRADE, 1824-25, class A, at 27, in 1O
BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1968) (1825-26)
(transmitting the opinion of the King's Advocate on what the commissioners ought to do in
the case of the Fabiana); Letter from Viscount Palmerston to Comm'rs at Rio de Janeiro
(Mar. 26, 1836), in CORRESPONDENCE WITH BRITISH COMMISSIONERS RELATING TO THE
SLAVE TRADE AT SIERRA LEONE, THE HAVANA, Rio DE JANEIRO, AND SURINAM, 1835, class A, at
314, in 14 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1968) (1835-36)
(transmitting the opinion of the King's Advocate-General on issues in two cases); Letter
from John Samo & Fred. Grigg, Comm'rs at Rio de Janeiro, to the Earl of Aberdeen (Sept.
20, 1842), in CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE BRITISH COMMISSIONERS AT SIERRA LEONE, THE
HAVANA, RIO DE JANEIRO, AND SURINAM RELATING TO THE SLAVE TRADE, 1842, class A, at 291,
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manner, the non-British judges also took instructions from their own
governments. 189
The courts were but one aspect of the highly coordinated British effort to
suppress the slave trade. The British judges in Cuba might send the Foreign
Office information about ships that had recently set sail for the African coast
equipped for the slave trade, which that office would in turn forward to the
commissioners in Sierra Leone. ' 90 Similarly, useful information received by the
Foreign Office from the navy would be forwarded to the judges, and vice
versa.' 9' Reports from the courts would be sent to British diplomats in various
European capitals, and they would be instructed to bring difficulties with the
courts to the attention of the partner governments.' 92 On some occasions, the
commissioners communicated more or less directly with naval captains,
providing information about the rules for captures or sharing information
about slave vessels or notorious traders.' 93
in 23 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1969) (1843) (asking
for instructions).
189. See Bethell, supra note 3, at 87 (noting that the Brazilian commissioners "on instructions
from their government" objected to the seizures of ships equipped for the slave trade but
without slaves onboard).
19o. See, e.g., Letter from Viscount Palmerston to Comm'rs at Havana (Aug. 11, 1841), in
CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE BRITISH COMMISSIONERS RELATING TO THE SLAVE TRADE, 1841,
class A, at 217, in 21 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1969)
(1842) ("With reference to your Despatches of the 22nd of January and of the 15th of
February last, reporting the state of the Slave Trade at the Havana... I herewith transmit to
you, for your information, a Copy of a Communication which I have received from Her
Majesty's Commissioners at Sierra Leone, containing some Observations upon our
Despatches above mentioned.").
191. See, e.g., Letter from George Canning, Sec'y, to Comm'rs at Sierra Leone (Mar. 16, 1825), in
CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE BRITISH COMMISSIONERS AT SIERRA LEONE, THE HAVANNAH,
RIO DE JANEIRO, AND SURINAM, RELATING TO THE SLAVE TRADE, 1824-25, CLASS A, at 57, in lo
BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1968) (1825-26)
(transmitting "Two Dispatches from the Consul General at Rio de Janeiro, on the subject of
the Brazilian Government regulations on the tonnage of slave" ships).
192. See, e.g., Letter from Viscount Palmerston to G.W.F. Villiers (Oct. 6, 1834), in
CORRESPONDENCE WITH FOREIGN POWERS, RELATING TO THE SLAVE TRADE, 1834, class B, at
12, in 14 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (Irish Univ. Press 1968) (1835-36) (transmitting
reports from the courts at Havana and Sierra Leone to a British diplomat in Madrid).
193. See, e.g., Letter from W.G. Ouseley to Capt. Herbert, R.N. (Jan. 24, 1839), in
CORRESPONDENCE WITH SPAIN, PORTUGAL, AND BRAzIL, RELATIVE TO THE SLAVE TRADE,
1839, class B, at 130, in 17 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press
1968) (1839) (communicating information, via the local British consul, from commissioners




Based on the volume of their correspondence on the topic, it appears that
the slave trade consumed an enormous amount of the time and attention of the
men who served as Foreign Secretary during the years of the suppression
effort, notably Viscount Palmerston and the Earl of Aberdeen (both future
Prime Ministers). The suppression of the slave trade was an issue in British
relations with almost every country, and often proved a source of diplomatic
tension. 1
9 4
B. The Courts in Operation: Impact and Limitations
1. Impact: Volume of Cases
The original courts created by the Anglo-Spanish, Anglo-Portuguese, and
Anglo-Dutch treaties began operations in 1819. These courts sat in Sierra
Leone, Havana, Rio de Janeiro, and Suriname. Over the years, new treaties
added new courts. Brazil agreed to sign onto the treaty regime in 1826 in
exchange for recognition of its independence by Britain. '9 s Thus, an Anglo-
Brazilian court was added to the three courts already in Sierra Leone and the
court in Rio was transformed into an Anglo-Brazilian court. 96 Between 1839
and 1841, Chile, the Argentine Confederation, Uruguay, Bolivia, and Ecuador
also agreed to participate in the mixed commission in Sierra Leone.1 97 In 1842,
a new Anglo-Portuguese treaty was signed and mixed courts were added in
Luanda, Boa Vista, Spanish Town, and Cape Town. ' 98 Finally, in 1862 the
United States -which had long resisted participation in the regime 99- agreed
to the establishment of mixed courts in New York, Sierra Leone, and Cape
Town. °°
Of all the courts created by the treaties, the courts at Sierra Leone were by
far the most active, hearing more than 500 cases in total. Two factors explain
the Sierra Leone courts' preeminence. First, the British Royal Navy's
antislavery patrol was most active in the areas off the west coast of Africa,
194. Generally see the correspondence between Britain and other nations, which runs to
hundreds of pages a year in each of the annual sets of British Parliamentary Papers on the
slave trade.
19s. See Howard Hazen Wilson, Some Principal Aspects ofBritish Efforts To Crush the African Slave
Trade, 1807-1929, 44 AM. J. INT'L L. 505, 509 n.22 (1950).
196. See Bethell, supra note 3, at 82.
197. See id. at 83.
198. See id.
199. See infra text accompanying note 343.
2oo. See BETHELL, supra note 5, at 92.
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where most of the slaves originated. Second, the commissions in Sierra Leone
were strongly supported by the British colonial government there, while the
courts in foreign ports often received only marginal support from the local
government and faced outright hostility from the public."' The courts at
Havana and Rio heard fifty and forty-four cases respectively, and the
remaining courts received only a handful of cases."' The belated Anglo-
American courts never heard any cases at all, although, as discussed below, that
was more a measure of the effectiveness of the Anglo-American treaty than its
weakness, since the slave trade was squelched in the immediate aftermath of
the 1862 treaty.
The Sierra Leone courts led in terms of the number of slaves freed as well.
British logbooks show that the Sierra Leone courts emancipated approximately
65,ooo slaves between 1819 and 1846.203 The Havana courts freed some lo,ooo,
and the Rio courts freed 3000.204 Because the courts eventually gained
jurisdiction over ships equipped for the slave trade even if no slaves were
actually onboard at the time of capture, an unknown number of other
individuals were saved from slavery by the seizure off the African coast of ships
that had not yet been loaded with their unfortunate human cargo. During the
life of the commissions, at least 225 ships were seized and condemned without
slaves onboard. Given that between 183o and 185o, the average cargo is
estimated to have been approximately 400 slaves per ship, that would represent
another 90,000 individuals, though it is impossible without more
sophisticated econometric analysis to estimate how many of those would
actually have been boarded on the captured ships or how many ended up
embarking on other vessels instead.
The courts were most active between 1819 and the mid-1840s. °s During
their peak years of operation in the late 183os and early 184os, an average of one
out of every five or six vessels known to have been engaged in the transatlantic
201. See, e.g., Letter from Henry T. Kilbee, Comm'r at Havana, to George Canning (Dec. 30,
1824), in CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE BRITISH COMMISSIONERS, AT SIERRA LEONE, THE
HAVANNAH, RIO DE JANEIRO, AND SURINAM, RELATING TO THE SLAVE TRADE, 1824-25, class A,
at 140, in lo BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (Irish Univ. Press 1968) (1825-26) (reporting
that the emancipation of the slaves by the mixed commission "has excited considerable
sensation among the inhabitants of this place" who had demanded that the local
government invalidate the commission's verdict); see also Bethell, supra note 3, at 83-84.
2o. See Bethell, supra note 3, at 84.
203. REGISTRY OF SLAVES: SIERRA LEONE, supra note 182.
204. See Bethell, supra note 3, at 89.
2os. See infra Figure i.
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trade was brought for trial in the courts of mixed commission,2, 6 with the
highest annual percentage occurring in 1835, when some thirty-nine percent of
known slave ship voyages departing that year ended up in the mixed courts.
20 7
Both before and after the mixed courts' peak years of operations, the British
also tried a significant number of captured slave vessels in domestic vice
admiralty courts.
The following charts give a rough indication of the number of slave ship
voyages that led to adjudications in the courts of mixed commission and vice
admiralty courts. These charts are based on information from the annual
reports of the British commissioners ,s combined with data from the new
online revised version of the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database.2°9 The
database contains information on close to 35,000 known slave-trading voyages,
or more than eighty percent of all the estimated transatlantic slave-trading
voyages that took place during the four centuries of the traffic. The data is even
more complete for later years in which better records exist.
Two cautions must be given with respect to this data. First, voyages that
ended up in adjudication-in either national or mixed courts-are likely
overrepresented in the data, since court records were one of the sources used to
compile the database. Second, certain nationalities of slave ships are likely
overrepresented in the data because of differences in the quality and
accessibility of historical records in different countries. Nevertheless, for the
purposes of this Article, the quantitative information amply demonstrates
possible trends and rough estimates of magnitude. More precise statistical
analysis would involve complex methodological issues and is well beyond the
scope of this Article. l0
2o6. The average percentage of known voyages of all fates that ended up in the mixed courts
from 1830 to 1845 is 18.8 percent. These calculations from the Revised Trans-Atlantic Slave
Trade Database were calculated using the year of departure variable ("YEARDEP") for the
year, and the variable describing the outcome of each voyage ("FATE") to count ships
adjudicated in mixed commissions as well as the total known voyages for each year.
207. These estimates are consistent with those of other scholars. See ELTIS, supra note io, at 97-
99 (calculating that one in five ships involved in the traffic were intercepted and condemned
in either the mixed courts or in national courts); LLoYD, supra note 23, at 117 (estimating
that one in four slaving vessels was captured).
2o8. These reports appear in the annual volumes of British Foreign and State Papers and the British
Parliamentary Papers: Slave Trade Series. See supra note 2.
2o9. See Eltis, Slave Trade Database, supra note 73.
210. Such a study would require imputation of missing data about slave voyages, as well as
information about a number of variables, including commodity prices, crop failures,
weather, tariffs, free labor costs, elasticity of demand, and other factors in the
interdependent markets for slaves and the commodities produced by plantation slave labor.
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Figure 1.
PERCENTAGE OF KNOWN SLAVE TRADING VOYAGES ADJUDICATED IN MIXED COURTS
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A few observations emerge from the available quantitative data. First,
during the mixed courts' peak years of operation in the 183os and 1840s, it
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appears that they heard cases involving a significant percentage of the total
transatlantic slave trade. Because voyages that ended in adjudication are
overrepresented in the Slave Trade Database, the percentages in the above
charts are likely to be overestimates. Nevertheless, the raw numbers and
estimated percentage of cases suggest that the impact of the courts was
nontrivial. Another general trend apparent from the data is that, beginning in
1839, the British shifted from use of the mixed courts back to the use of the
domestic vice admiralty courts. This shift, precipitated by the reluctance of
Portugal and then Brazil to continue participation in the treaty system, is
discussed further below.
In addition to the quantitative data, first-hand accounts from those who
actually participated in the treaties and court system provide evidence about its
impact on the slave trade. For example, in the late 184os and early 185os, the
British Parliament engaged in a contentious reexamination of the amount of
energy and resources being devoted to suppression of the slave trade. Special
committees were convened in both the House of Commons and the House of
Lords; dozens of witnesses appeared, giving thousands of pages of
testimony.211
Not surprisingly, the witnesses gave conflicting opinions. Some testified
that suppression efforts had increased the cruelty of the traffic by inducing
slavers to pack the slaves in more tightly, and that it would be better to
relegalize and regulate the trade, while others argued that the trade had always
been cruel and the only humane course was to stamp it out." ' Some witnesses
and members of Parliament doubted whether the decades of suppression
efforts had made any difference at all. 13 William Smith, who had served for
several years between 1825 and 1834 as a judge on the mixed court in Sierra
Leone, testified gloomily of the suppression effort "that it is a failure" and
predicted that no system was ever likely to succeed "because the demand for
211. See REPORT FROM THE SELECT COMMITTEE OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS, APPOINTED To
CONSIDER THE BEST MEANS WHICH GREAT BRITAIN CAN ADOPT FOR THE FINAL EXTINCTION
OF THE AFRICAN SLAVE TRADE, 1850, at 1, in 6 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo.
reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1968) (1850) [hereinafter LORDS REPORT 185o]; REPORT FROM THE
SELECT COMMITTEE OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS, APPOINTED To CONSIDER THE BEST MEANS
WHICH GREAT BRITAIN CAN ADOPT FOR THE FINAL EXTINCTION OF THE AFRICAN SLAVE
TRADE, 1849, at I, in 6 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press
1968) (1850) (hereinafter LORDS REPORT 1849].
212. See FIRST COMMONS REPORT, supra note 143, at 2-3 (testimony of Viscount Palmerston)
(stating that suppression efforts had not increased the cruelty of the slave trade); id. at 23
(testimony of Joseph Denman) (stating that they had).
213. See i. at 95 (questions of William Hutt, Chairman of the Select Committee).
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slaves will always create a supply. '21 4 Commodore Charles Hotham-who had
commanded the Africa Squadron from 1846 to 1849 but was criticized for his
ineffectiveness- testified that the slave trade could not be suppressed by any
means he knew and suggested that it would be more realistic to sign a new
treaty with Brazil authorizing the trade for a fixed period of time.1
On the other hand, as described below, many witnesses testified that the
antislavery treaties and Britain's attempts to enforce them had made a
difference. Their views ultimately carried the day, when in March 1850, the
House of Commons voted 232 to 154 to reject a motion that would have called
for Britain to be "released from all the treaty engagements with foreign states
and from maintaining armed vessels on the coast of Africa to suppress the
traffic in slaves.,,16
In the months leading up to that critical vote, Foreign Secretary
Palmerston, a devoted abolitionist during his many years in office, testified
before Parliament that but for the suppression efforts, the slave trade would
have "increased in a vast proportion" and cheap slaves would have been used to
bring huge tracts of Brazilian land into cultivation. 17 Palmerston estimated
that over a ten-year period, the number of slaves that might have been carried
on ships captured without slaves on board was around 190,000.,
8
In addition to the ships that were actually captured and condemned, the
threat of capture made the trade more difficult and expensive, and sometimes
214. SECOND REPORT FROM THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON SLAVE TRADE, 1848, at 15 (testimony of
William Smith), in 4 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press
1968) (1847-48) [hereinafter SECOND COMMONS REPORT]. Smith did believe that entering
into treaties with local chiefs to increase legitimate commerce in Africa would reduce the
supply of slaves. Id. at 18. He also believed that it would be necessary to keep some warships
on the coast to enforce the treaties and protect legitimate commerce. Id. at 20.
215. LORDS REPORT 1849, supra note 211, at 128 (testimony of Commodore Charles Hotham); see
also LLOYD, supra note 23, at 120-22. There appears to be some basis for the criticism of
Hotham. When asked about his knowledge of Africa before taking up command of the
squadron, he answered, "None whatever; I am almost ashamed to say that I had never even
directed my attention to the subject . . . ." LORDS REPORT 1849, Supra note 211, at 110
(testimony of Commodore Charles Hotham). Moreover, once in command, he did not
consult officers of longer experience on the Aftican coast about the best way to carry out the
suppression mission. Almost with pride, he stated that "[diuring the time of my
commanding the African station, I consulted no one who happened to be serving under my
orders at the time" and that, in general, commodores did not seek the opinions of their
inferior officers. Id. at 115-16.
216. LLOYD, supra note 23, at 112-13.
217. FIRST COMMONS REPORT, supra note 143, at 4 (testimony of Viscount Palmerston).




more inhumane, as slave traders were forced to take precautions to evade
capture. A wide array of sources indicates that the price of slaves increased
significantly during the years of the suppression effort.21 9 At times, increased
suppression activity also reportedly increased insurance costs, and at times
made insurance unavailable.22° In addition, some underwriters began including
clauses in their insurance policies exempting ships seized under the treaties
from insurance.221
Individual participants in the suppression effort also testified to its effects
and its limitations. One witness, David Turnbull, was an ardent abolitionist
who served somewhat controversially2 as British consul at Havana from 1840
to 1842 and then as a judge on the mixed court in Jamaica. He testified that,
although he believed the treaties should be revised to expand the power of the
mixed courts, he felt that the existing system, even with its weaknesses, had
reduced the trade.
2 3
Another witness, Capt. Edward Butterfield, had served on the coast of
Africa in command of the Fantome, the Waterwitch, and the Brisk- three of the
fastest boats in the squadron -and had captured an astonishing forty vessels
between 184o and 1842. He testified that he was told by Portuguese merchants
that he had captured at least three-fifths of the slave vessels attempting to sail
from that portion of the coast, and he felt that the slave trade was much
diminished by his frequent captures.2 He noted that the slaves onboard the
last ship he captured had been kept in the barracoons for fourteen months
because no slave ships were able to sail from that port during his blockade. In
one case he boarded a legal merchant ship carrying slave traders back with their
families to Rio because they had given up the trade as unprofitable."
Capt. Christopher Wyvill, who had been stationed on the east coast of
Africa, testified that the trade had dramatically fallen off there between 1844
219. See ELTIS, supra note io, at 262.
220. See SECOND COMMONS REPORT, supra note 214, at 66 (testimony of Capt. George Manuel);
id. at 99 (testimony of Thomas Berry Horsfall); id. at 162 (testimony of John Bramley
Moore).
221. Id. at 99 (testimony of Thomas Berry Horsfall).
222. During his stay in Havana, Turnbull was reportedly involved with plans by free blacks for
insurrection. ELTIS, supra note io, at 118.
223. LORDS REPORT 185o, supra note 211, at 71 (testimony of David Turnbull) ("In the beginning
of my residence in Cuba [the slave trade] was not on the increase; and I think that a great
deal has been done in the way of prevention .... ").
224. FIRST COMMONS REPORT, supra note 143, at 52-53 (testimony of Capt. Edward Harris
Butterfield). Many of Butterfield's prizes, however, were taken to the vice admiralty court in
St. Helena. Id. at 57-58.
225. Id. at 58-59.
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and 1846 because of a treaty with local chiefs, the new treaty with Portugal, and
the presence of British cruisers. 6 Likewise, Capt. Henry James Matson argued
that the trade on the west coast had decreased a great deal following the
adoption of the equipment clause with Spain in 1835. In response to skeptical
questioning from members of Parliament about the basis for his assertion,
Matson responded that he was relying on first-hand knowledge: "I think there
are facts to prove the opinion. I was on the coast during the whole of that time,
or very nearly so.
'217
In response to questioning about whether the possible additional suffering
of slaves on the Middle Passage made the suppression effort a net negative
from a humanitarian perspective, several witnesses asserted that any such
negative had to be weighed against the enormous benefit in terms of individual
lives saved from slavery.2 8 Such a view is reinforced by paging through the
courts' logbooks of tens of thousands of freed slaves, with names, ages, and
descriptions. These were real people, and their lives were made at least a little
bit better because of the efforts to enforce the international treaties against the
slave trade. In sheer human impact, no other international human rights court
has directly affected so many individuals. Indeed, regardless of whether or not
the mixed courts were "successful" in terms of their impact on the overall
transatlantic slave trade, they were successful in their impact on the nearly
8o,ooo individuals who were granted their legal freedom by the courts.
Still, even the witnesses who supported continuation of the effort
recognized that the slave trade had not been suppressed despite forty years of
struggle and a vast expenditure of resources. These witnesses, along with more
hostile witnesses, identified a number of weaknesses and limitations in the
system.
2. Limitation: Nonparticipation
The first major weakness in the treaty regime was the lack of participation
by two of the most significant naval powers of the time, France and the United
States. France never agreed to the mixed courts at all. Although it signed a
treaty with Britain agreeing to mutual search rights in 1831, the treaty provided
aa6. SECOND COMMONS REPORT, supra note 214, at 2 (testimony of Capt. Christopher Wyvill).
227. FIRST COMMONS REPORT, supra note 143, at 95 (testimony of Cdr. Henry James Matson).




that ships were to be tried in the courts of their own nation.229 The United
States eventually joined the court system, but not until 1862.230
Though the absence of both France and the United States from the mixed
courts regime for most of the courts' existence hindered their effectiveness, it
did not prevent a substantial portion of the trade from being suppressed. By
the 183os, the importation of slaves into the United States and into French
possessions in the Caribbean had been effectively squelched by domestic
authorities, and the major remaining trade was to Cuba and Brazil. 31
Trade to Cuba and Brazil by slave traffickers using the French or American
flag was intermittently a serious problem, though agreements with the United
States and France that stopped short of participation in the mixed courts
helped ameliorate the situation. In 1831, France and Britain concluded a treaty
granting mutual rights of search, though it provided for captured ships to be
turned over to their own governments for trial. With the adoption of this treaty
and the prospect of capture by both British and French warships, the French
flag was no longer particularly attractive to slave traders. After 1831, the
number of ships sailing under the French flag was relatively insignificant. It
remained so even after the right of mutual search was rescinded in 1845 due to
domestic political pressure in France and replaced with a new treaty
committing France to maintain a certain number of its own warships off the
coast of Africa.232
As noted previously, the United States had agreed with Britain in the
Treaty of Ghent in 1814 to use its best efforts to suppress the slave trade, but
that treaty had no enforcement mechanism." 3 In the 182os, the United States
rebuffed British efforts to sign a treaty similar to those signed with Spain,
Portugal, and the Netherlands. President James Monroe, while ultimately in
favor of some sort of anti-slave trade treaty, objected to the mixed courts as
"incompatible" with the Constitution and to the right of mutual search for an
229. Even prior to the treaty, British crews did occasionally board French ships. See List of
French Slave-Vessels Boarded by the British Squadron Employed on the Western Coast of
Africa, Between the ist of June and the 14th of December 1827, enclosed in Letter from the
Earl of Dudley to Viscount Granville (Jan. 25, 1828), in CORRESPONDENCE WITH FOREIGN
POWERS, RELATING TO THE SLAVE TRADE, class B, at 123-24, in 12 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY
PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1968) (1829-31) (listing twelve boardings).
230. See infra text accompanying notes 341-343.
231. See Eltis, supra note 52, at 136 tbl.V.
232. See infra Figure 3; see also Lawrence C. Jennings, France, Great Britain, and the Repression of
the Slave Trade, 1841-1845, 10 FRENCH HIST. STUD. 101, 105, 123 (1977) (discussing France's
suspension of the "right to search").
233. See Nelson, supra note ii, at 203-04.
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offense that was "not piratical" as "repugnant to the feelings of the nation."2"
In Monroe's view, there was a more suitable alternative. In 1820, the United
States had by statute declared the slave trade to be piracy and subject to the
death penalty. 3 Under the law of nations, suspicion of piracy was grounds for
search of a ship, whatever its flag. In 1824, President Monroe agreed to a treaty
with the British that would have deemed the slave trade piracy and thereby
triggered the right to mutual search, on the condition that slave traders be tried
by the courts of their own country. The treaty foundered, however, when the
Senate tried to attach conditions to which the British would not agree.3 6
Diplomatic efforts continued without success in the 183Os, when the United
States was repeatedly invited to join the treaty with France and Britain, but
declined to do so.
2 37
Notwithstanding these facts, in the late 183os and early 184os, the mixed
court at Sierra Leone actually condemned a number of American-flagged ships
on the grounds that they could be treated as Spanish under the law of nations,
a move that elicited surprisingly little reaction.23 Moreover, despite the
inability of their governments to agree on a treaty, an informal agreement
between the commander of the American naval squadron on the West Coast of
Africa and the British commander in the region led to a period of joint patrol.
Under the agreement, American ships that came upon a slave ship covered by
234. Letter from President James Monroe to the U.S. Senate- Slave Trade Convention with Gr.
Brit. (May 21, 1824), in THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF JAMES MONROE 328, 330 (James P.
Lucier ed., 2001).
235. Act of May 15, 1820, ch. 113, 3 Star. 600.
236. See BETTY FLADELAND, MEN AND BROTHERS: ANGLO-AMERICAN ANTISLAVERY COOPERATION
125-44 (1972).
237. Letter from Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville (June 3, 1834), in CORRESPONDENCE WITH
FOREIGN POWERS RELATING TO THE SLAVE TRADE, class B, at 52-53, in 14 BRITISH
PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1968) (1835-36) (discussing
negotiations with the United States on the treaty, including U.S. objection to a clause
regarding searches on the coast of America, which the British and French then offered to
remove); Letter from Sir Charles Vaughan to Viscount Palmerston (Aug. 28, 1834), in
CORRESPONDENCE WITH FOREIGN POWERS RELATING TO THE SLAVE TRADE, class B, at 88, in
14 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1968) (1835-36)
(reporting on negotiations).
238. See, e.g., Return of Vessels Adjudicated by the British and Spanish Mixed Court of Justice,
Established at Sierra Leone, Between July 1 and December 31, 1840, enclosed in Letter from
John Jeremie & Walter W. Lewis, Comm'rs at Sierra Leone, to John Backhouse (Dec. 31,
1840), in CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE BRITISH COMMISSIONERS AT SIERRA LEONE, THE
HAVANA, RIO DE JANEIRO, AND SURINAM RELATING TO THE SLAVE TRADE, class A, at 57-58, in
21 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1969) (1842) (noting




one of the British treaties would hand it over to the nearest British ship, while a
British vessel that found a slaver flying the American flag would deliver it to
the closest American warship.3 9 During a brief period of confusion, British
naval captains even brought captured American-flagged slave ships into
American ports, where they were sometimes condemned by U.S. courts.4 °
This period of informal cooperation was short-lived. A combination of
disease and lack of support on the home front hampered the American
squadron in its patrols of the African coast.4 The U.S. government eventually
disavowed the informal agreement between the navies in 1841,2 and U.S.
239. See Agreement Between Cdr. William Tucker of HMS Wolverene and Lt. John S. Paine of
the USS Grampus (Mar. 11, 1840), in CORRESPONDENCE WITH FOREIGN POWERS NOT
PARTIES TO CONVENTIONS GING RIGHT OF SEARCH OF VESSELS SUSPECTED OF THE SLAVE
TRADE, class D, at 76, 76-77, in 20 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish
Univ. Press 1968) (1841); Letter from Viscount Palmerston to A. Stevenson (Aug. 5, 1841),
in CORRESPONDENCE WITH FOREIGN POWERS, RELATING TO THE SLAVE TRADE, class D, at 255,
255-57, in 21 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1969) (1842)
(describing an agreement entered into between the British and American commanding
officers off the coast of Africa).
240. See, e.g., United States v. Morris, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 464 (1840) (discussing an American
criminal prosecution arising out of the capture of the Butterfly by HMS Dolphin); Letter
from Consul James Buchanan to Viscount Palmerston (June lo, 1841), in CORRESPONDENCE
WITH FOREIGN POWERS, RELATING TO THE SLAVE TRADE, class D, at 319, in 21 BRITISH
PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1968) (1842) (discussing the case
of the Butterfly); Letter from the Earl of Aberdeen to Consul James Buchanan (Sept. 30,
1841), in CORRESPONDENCE WITH FOREIGN POWERS, RELATING TO THE SLAVE TRADE, class D,
at 323, in 21 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1968) (1842)
(discussing American courts' condemnation of the Butterfly and the Catherine). In two
notable cases in 1839- that of the Eagle and the Clara - the U.S. government refused to
exercise jurisdiction over two American-flagged ships captured by the British and brought
to New York, based on the conclusion of the American Attorney General that the ships were
actually Spanish. The cases were then submitted to the mixed court at Sierra Leone, which
issued orders of condemnation. See Letter from John Jeremie & Walter W. Lewis, Comm'rs
at Sierra Leone, to Viscount Palmerston (Dec. 31, 1840), in CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE
BRITISH COMMISSIONERS AT SIERRA LEONE, THE HAVANA, RIO DE JANEIRO, AND SURINAM,
RELATING TO THE SLAVE TRADE, class A, at 51-57, in 21 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS
(photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1968) (1842).
241. See Letter from Cdr. William Tucker to More O'Ferrall, HMS Wolverene (Mar. 16, 1841), in
CORRESPONDENCE WITH FOREIGN POWERS, RELATING TO THE SLAVE TRADE, class D, at 246,
in 21 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1968) (1842)
(reporting a meeting with the USS Cyane, and noting that "I still more and very deeply
regret that the American men-of-war remain so very short a time on the coast" though he
believed that "[t]he American men-of-war, I am convinced, have been of service on this
coast, inasmuch as the knowledge of it has prevented many vessels from raising their flag"
and citing examples).
242. See Letter from A. Stevenson to Viscount Palmerston (Aug. 9, 1841), in CORRESPONDENCE
WITH FOREIGN POWERS, RELATING TO THE SLAVE TRADE, class D, at 258, in 21 BRITISH
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
courts began refusing to condemn ships captured by the British. Diplomatic
protests by the United States about the boarding of American ships led to a
crisis in U.S.-British relations, with the Americans claiming the policy was
"alarming to national sovereignty and sensibility, and the friendly relations of
the two countries."' 4 After several months of tense correspondence, '  the
government in London ordered British naval officers to be more deferential to
American-flagged ships." s In 1842, the Webster-Ashburton Treaty committed
PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1968) (1842) (noting, in relation
to the agreement between the British and American commanders to which Palmerston
alluded, that he had no official information and "had no reason to suppose that such
authority had been confided by the American Government to any of its naval officers").
243. See, e.g., Letter from A. Stevenson to the Earl of Aberdeen (Sept. lo, 1841), in
CORRESPONDENCE WITH FOREIGN POWERS, RELATING TO THE SLAVE TRADE, class D, at 263,
266, in 21 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1968) (1842).
244. See, e.g., Letter from Viscount Palmerston to A. Stevenson (Aug. 5, 1841), in
CORRESPONDENCE WITH FOREIGN POWERS, RELATING TO THE SLAVE TRADE, 1842, class D, at
255, in 21 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1968) (1842);
Letter from A. Stevenson to Viscount Palmerston (Aug. 9, 1841), in CORRESPONDENCE WITH
FOREIGN POWERS, RELATING TO THE SLAVE TRADE, 1842, class D, at 258, in 21 BRITISH
PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1968) (1842); Letter from
Viscount Palmerston to A. Stevenson (Aug. 27, 1841), in CORRESPONDENCE WITH FOREIGN
POWERS, RELATING TO THE SLAVE TRADE, 1842, class D, at 260, in 21 BRITISH
PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1968) (1842); Letter from A.
Stevenson to the Earl of Aberdeen (Sept. io, 1841), in CORRESPONDENCE WITH FOREIGN
POWERS, RELATING TO THE SLAVE TRADE, 1842, class D, at 263, 266, in 21 BRITISH
PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1968) (1842); Letter from the Earl
of Aberdeen to A. Stevenson (Oct. 13, 1841), in CORRESPONDENCE WITH FOREIGN POWERS,
RELATING TO THE SLAVE TRADE, 1842, class D, at 267, 269, in 21 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY
PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1968) (1842) (arguing that the "rights which have
been mutually conceded to each other by the Governments of Great Britain and France, can
scarcely be incompatible with the honour and independence of any State upon the face of
the earth.").
245. See Letter from Sir John Barrow to the Commanders in Chief and Senior Officers at the
Cape of Good Hope, Coast of Africa, West Indies, and Brazils (Dec. 7, 1841), in
CORRESPONDENCE WITH FOREIGN POWERS, RELATING TO THE SLAVE TRADE, 1842, class D, at
279, in 21 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1968) (1842)
(ordering naval officers "neither to capture nor interfere with, nor even to visit United
States' vessels, whether they shall have slaves on board or not," yet noting that "it is not
intended to allow vessels of other nations to escape visit and examination by merely hoisting
an United States flag" and suggesting that if there is reason to suspect a vessel is not truly
American, a British ship would be justified in boarding it to examine its papers, but
ordering immediate reports of all such boardings to be sent to London). In the Treaty of
1845, France reportedly agreed with Britain on the right of visit to verify the flag, and one
navy captain argued before Parliament that, with France's backing on this principle of the
law of nations, British ships would be justified in boarding American-flagged slave ships on
the inference that they were really Portuguese, Spanish, or Brazilian. FIRST COMMONS
REPORT, supra note 143, at 23 (testimony of Capt. Joseph Denman).
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the United States to maintaining an antislavery squadron on the African coast,
but did not include a right of search or any provision for trial in mixed
courts.
2 4 6
Notwithstanding the delicate status of slavery in American politics and the
nation's reluctance to enter into slavery-related treaties that it viewed as an
infringement of its sovereignty or the freedom of the seas, at various times the
U.S. government did engage in reasonably vigorous efforts to suppress the
slave trade. Some 103 slave ships were captured by the U.S. Navy and brought
for trial in U.S. courts between 1837 and 1862, most in the years after 1842. The
fact that U.S. law classified the slave trade as piracy subject to the death penalty
also deterred use of the U.S. flag. Criminal proceedings were brought against
more than ioo individuals in U.S. courts, though relatively few of these cases
resulted in convictions and the death penalty actually was imposed in only one
case. 247
At the same time, however, one notable weakness in American law was the
fact that for many years it did not cover ships equipped for the slave trade but
without slaves on board. Because of this loophole, it was reportedly a common
practice for ships to sail into the African coast under the American flag (thereby
evading capture by the British), and then change their colors to those of
another nation once slaves were actually taken onboard (at which point there
was some threat that, if captured by the Americans, they would be tried and
punished).8
British officials involved in the slave trade suppression effort generally
agreed that full participation in the treaty and mixed court system by the
United States and France would have been advantageous, but many
contemporaries did not view those countries' participation as indispensable.
When a member of the House of Commons asked Lord Palmerston whether
the consent of France and America to agree to mutual rights of search was
essential to successful suppression of the trade, Palmerston answered, "My
opinion is, that if the Spanish government, and if the government of Brazil,
would honestly and effectually fulfill their treaty engagements ... the slave
trade would be practically extinct." 4 9 France, Palmerston argued, was
246. See Webster-Ashburton Treaty, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Aug. lo, 1842, 8 Stat. 572.
247. HOWARD, supra note 57, at 202, 214-35.
248. See, e.g., Letter from Comm'rs at Sierra Leone to Viscount Palmerston (Jan. 24, 1842), in
CORRESPONDENCE WITH BRITISH COMMISSIONERS RELATING TO THE SLAVE TRADE, 1842,
class A, at 33, in 23 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1968)
(1842).
249. See FIRST COMMONS REPORT, supra note 143, at 8 (testimony of Viscount Palmerston);
ARTHUR F. CORWIN, SPAIN AND THE ABOLITION OF SLAVERY IN CUBA, 1817-1886, at 96
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effectively enforcing the slave-trade ban against French-flagged ships. 50
Treaties had been concluded with native chiefs in Africa that gave England and
France the right to enforce the slave-trade ban in the chiefs' territories.251 As for
the United States, he contended, "I do not conceive that the mere refusal of the
United States to concur in mutual right of search would, of itself, be sufficient
to defeat the naval police if all other nations had united in the common
league."2 ' Even without the cooperation of the United States, the slave trade to
Brazil and Cuba could be brought "to a very narrow limit indeed."s 3
Palmerston was certainly correct as to Brazil. As it happened, the traffic to
Brazil was effectively suppressed by the Brazilian government itself (under
pressure from the British) beginning in 1850, notwithstanding the absence of
the United States from the mixed court regime until 1862. The available data
on the usage of particular flags in the slave trade also suggests that claims
about the heavy use of the French and American flags in the later years of the
slave trade were somewhat exaggerated. Figure 3 below reflects the available
data on the national registration of ships involved in the slave trade from 1815
to 1865.254
(1967); see also Letter from Rear-Admiral Campbell to Mr. Wood (Dec. 14, 1835), in
CORRESPONDENCE WITH FOREIGN POWERS, RELATING TO THE SLAvE TRADE, 1835, class B, at
40, in 14 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1968) (1835)
(noting that traffic is carried on "to a most extraordinary extent" by Spanish and Portuguese
vessels).
25o. FIRST COMMONS REPORT, supra note 143, at 6 (testimony of Viscount Palmerston); see also,
e.g., Letter from Lord Stuart de Rothesay to Viscount Palmerston (Nov. 26, 1830), in
CORRESPONDENCE WITH FOREIGN PoWERS, RELATING TO THE SLAvE TRADE, 1829-31, class B,
at 165, in 12 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1968) (1829-
31) (reporting criminal sentences against slave traders by the French court in Guadalupe).
251. FIRST COMMONS REPORT, supra note 143, at 17 (testimony ofViscount Palmerston).
252. Id. at 6.
253. Id. at 7. However, other witnesses, including Sir Charles Hotham, who had commanded the
Africa Squadron, viewed the nonparticipation of the United States as a more significant
problem. Id. (responding to Hotham's testimony).
254. Of course, data about the flag used are unavailable for many voyages. This Chart was
compiled from the Revised Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database using the YEARDEP
variable for the year of departure for the voyage and the NATIONAL variable for the
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Notwithstanding the changes to the international legal regime that made
these other flags less attractive, the French flag does not appear to have been a
substantial part of the trade after 1830. Nor does the American flag appear to
have accounted for a dominant portion of the traffic between 183o and 1850,
though it is difficult to say how commonly ships used the flag on the inbound
portion of the voyage to Africa. 5 During these years, the dominant preference
of the slave traders under increasing pressure seems to have been to shift to no
flag at all. Although a ship flying no flag could be boarded, from the slave
traders' perspective, the advantage of this approach may have been to avoid
susceptibility to criminal punishment under the law of their "home" country. 6
As discussed more fully below, the participation of the United States in the
mixed courts regime was more critical to the suppression of the slave trade to
Cuba, which lies a mere ninety miles from Florida. After a sharp decline in the
late 184os, the trade to Cuba began to increase again in the 185os. Unflagged
and American flagged ships dominated this final period of the trade. In 1862,
the United States finally ratified the treaty with Britain granting the right of
255. In addition, some ships carried multiple flags. Thus, the number of ships that carried
American or French flags onboard may be seriously underrepresented in the database.
256. Van Niekerk, supra note 6, at 413.
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mutual search and establishing mixed courts at New York, Sierra Leone, and
Capetown."'
It is possible that even without the American treaty, the trade to Cuba
could eventually have been suppressed by Cuban authorities acting against
slave markets on shore in much the same way it was finally suppressed in
Brazil. As it happened, however, the ratification of the Anglo-American treaty
in 1862 appears to have been the catalyst for the final suppression of the trade
to Cuba. Ratification of the treaty eliminated the final "safe" flag under which
slavers could sail and triggered more active enforcement by Cuban authorities
who began to see the end of the trade as inevitable. To put it somewhat
differently, the Brazilian case shows that the participation of the United States
may not have been a necessary part of the suppression of the slave trade. But
the Cuban case shows that the participation of the United States in the treaty
regime likely was sufficient to end the trade.
3. Limitation: Other Loopholes
Other loopholes in the treaties creating the courts also created serious
impediments to their effectiveness. For example, one significant loophole was
the exclusion from the courts' jurisdiction of certain types of ships, such as
ships that were traveling in some parts of the ocean or that did not actually
have slaves onboard at the time of capture.
The case of the Maria da Gloria provides one good example of such
loopholes in action. A British ship captured the Maria da Gloria with more than
four hundred slaves on board, but the mixed court at Rio de Janeiro rejected
the case on the grounds that the ship was Portuguese, not Brazilian.
Transported back across the Atlantic by a prize crew, the mixed court at Sierra
Leone reluctantly concluded that the ship was immune from condemnation
because it was seized south of the equator, where the slave trade was arguably
still permitted by the Portuguese treaty. The case had a profound impact on the
captain of the British prize crew, Joseph Denman, who, as mentioned
previously, became an ardent abolitionist because of his experiences onboard
the Maria da Gloria."'s The case also left a strong impression on the judges at
the Sierra Leone court. With some dismay, the British judges wrote to
Viscount Palmerston:
257. Id. at 432. For the history of the negotiations behind the 1862 treaty, see A. Taylor Milne,
The Lyon-Seward Treaty of 1862, 38 AM. HIST. REv. 511 (1933).
2s8. See FIRST COMMONs REPORT, supra note 143, at 32 (testimony of Capt. Joseph Denman).
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Although it has been our duty as Judges to restore the "Maria da
Gloria," we cannot forbear expressing to your Lordship our deep regret
on witnessing the sailing of that vessel with her cargo of unhappy
beings, destined to another miserable voyage across the Atlantic.
As men, our feelings have been greatly distressed."'
The judges expressed their hope that the case would enable the British
government to conclude a new, more effective treaty with Portugal that
covered traffic sailing in all latitudes.760
In addition to the exclusion of Portuguese ships sailing south of the
equator, the other significant initial loophole in the treaties was the lack of
authority to condemn ships that were equipped for the slave trade but that had
not yet taken slaves onboard. The Netherlands had readily agreed to such a
clause, but since the Dutch flag was not used much in the trade after 1817, this
was not a significant development. The British judges at Sierra Leone
repeatedly urged their government to negotiate for an equipment clause with
,61Spain and Portugal and viewed such a clause as vital to the courts' success.
Although Spain resisted for several years,26 it finally agreed in principle to a
259. Letter from W.M. Smith & H.W. Macaulay, Comm'rs at Sierra Leone, to Viscount
Palmerston (Apr. 9, 1834), in CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE BRITISH COMMISSIONERS, AT
SIERRA LEONE, THE HAVANA, RIO DE JANEIRO, AND SURINAM, RELATING TO THE SLAVE
TRADE, class A, at 45-46, in 14 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish Univ.
Press 1968) (1835-36). In this case, the British commissioners sat alone, due to the vacancy
of the Portuguese seats on the commission. Letter from Viscount Palmerston to Lord
Howard de Walden (Oct. 7, 1834), in CORRESPONDENCE WITH FOREIGN POWERS, RELATING
TO THE SLAVE TRADE, class B, at 18, in 14 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo. reprint,
Irish Univ. Press 1968) (1835-36).
260. Letter from W.M. Smith & H.W. Macaulay, Comm'rs at Sierra Leone, to Viscount
Palmerston (Apr. 9, 1834), in CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE BRITISH COMMISSIONERS, AT
SIERRA LEONE, THE HAVANA, RIO DE JANEIRO, AND SURINAM, RELATING TO THE SLAVE
TRADE, class A, at 45-46, in 14 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish Univ.
Press 1968) (1835-36).
261. Letter from W.M. Smith & Edward W. H. Schenbey, Comm'rs at Sierra Leone, to Viscount
Palmerston (Jan. 6, 1834), in CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE BRITISH COMMISSIONERS, AT
SIERRA LEONE, THE HAVANA, RIO DE JANEIRO, AND SURINAM, RELATING TO THE SLAVE
TRADE, class A, at i, in 14 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press
1968) (1835-36).
262. See Letter from the Earl of Aberdeen to Comm'rs at Havana (Apr. 24, 1830), in
CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE BRITISH COMMISSIONERS, AT SIERRA LEONE, THE HAVANA, Rio
DE JANEIRO, AND SURINAM, RELATING TO THE SLAVE TRADE, class A, at 91, in 12 BRITISH
PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1968) (1829-30) (reporting
Spain's refusal of a proposed equipment clause).
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revision of the treaty in September 1834,263 and the treaty was signed on June
28, 1835,264 although news of it had still not reached the Spanish officials in
Havana by January io, 1836.265 As Figure 3 above suggests, after the equipment
clause was adopted, traffic under the Spanish flag decreased noticeably.
Despite strong encouragement from the British, Portugal would not agree
to a new treaty including an equipment clause, and this reluctance proved a
serious barrier to suppression efforts.266 As Figure 3 indicates, the adoption of
the Spanish equipment clause in 1835 coincided with a remarkable uptick in the
trade under the Portuguese flag. Though the trade as a whole was increasing
during these years and other factors may have played a role in the increasing
use of the Portuguese flag, the trend is noticeably correlated with, if not
verifiably caused by, the change in the Spanish treaty. Trade under the
Portuguese flag only decreased when, in 1839, Britain attempted to close the
loopholes by unilaterally seizing Portuguese ships under a creative
reinterpretation of the 1817 treaty. In response, in 1842, Portugal finally agreed
to a new, comprehensive treaty.
The equipment clause loophole in the Brazilian treaty was closed not by
treaty amendment but by judicial initiative. Although the Brazilian legislature
had failed to ratify the equipment clause amendment, in 1839, the Anglo-
Portuguese courts in both Rio de Janeiro and Sierra Leone independently
began condemning ships equipped for the slave trade under an innovative
reinterpretation of the existing treaties. Although the Brazilian judges objected
to this reinterpretation, the practice soon became settled and a large number of
Brazilian ships were condemned simply for being equipped for the slave trade,
occasionally with the concurrence of a Brazilian judge but more often with the
263. Letter from George Villiers to Viscount Palmerston (Sept. 9, 1834), in CORRESPONDENCE
WITH FOREIGN POWERS, RELATING TO THE SLAVE TRADE, class B, at 11, in 14 BRITISH
PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1968) (1835-36).
264. Letter from George Villiers to Viscount Palmerston (June 28, 1835), in CORRESPONDENCE
WITH THE FOREIGN POWERS, RELATING TO THE SLAVE TRADE, class B, at 8, in 14 BRITISH
PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1968) (1835).
265. Letter from W.S. Macleay & Edward W.H. Schenbey, Comm'rs at Havana, to Viscount
Palmerston (Jan. io, 1836), in CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE BRITISH COMMISSIONERS, AT
SIERRA LEONE, THE HAVANA, RIO DE JANEIRO, AND SURINAM, RELATING TO THE SLAVE
TRADE, class A, at 212, in 14 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish Univ.
Press 1968) (1835-36).
266. See Letter from Viscount Palmerston to the Baron de Moncorvo (Apr. 30, 1836), in
CORRESPONDENCE WITH FOREIGN POWERS, RELATING TO THE SLAVE TRADE, class B, at 46-54,
in 14 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1968) (1835-36);
Letter from Viscount Palmerston to Lord Howard de Walden (Apr. 20, 1839), in
CORRESPONDENCE WITH FOREIGN POWERS RELATING TO THE SLAVE TRADE, class B, at 71, in
17 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1968) (1839).
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toss of the coin choosing the British arbitrator to break the tie if the British and
Brazilian judges disagreed.2
67
Some participants in the system believed that the courts would have been
more effective if, in addition to closing the loopholes in the substantive
coverage of the treaties, the courts were granted additional powers, including
the ability to punish criminally slave ship crews and owners and the ability to
declare slaves found on plantations in Cuba and Brazil free unless it could be
proven that they had not been imported illegally 68 While perhaps desirable,
these additional powers were not within the realm of diplomatic plausibility. In
the later years of the courts' operation, however, the governments agreed that
the courts at least had the power to detain captured slave crew members until
they could be turned over to their own nation for criminal prosecution. 69
267. See BETHELL, supra note 5, at 166-79; see also Letter from H.W. Macaulay & R. Doherty,
Comm'rs at Sierra Leone, to Viscount Palmerston (Sept. 2, 1839), in CORRESPONDENCE
WITH THE BRITISH COMMISSIONERS RELATING TO THE SLAVE TRADE, 1839-40, class A, at 111-
12, in 18 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1968) (1839-40)
(enclosing a "Report of the Case of the Brig Emprehendedor"); Letter from George Jackson &
Frederick Grigg, Comm'rs at Rio, to Viscount Palmerston (Sept. 23, 1839), in
CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE BRITISH COMMISSIONERS RELATING TO THE SLAVE TRADE, class
A, at 258, in 18 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1969)
(1839-40) (enclosing a report on the case of the Maria Carlota).
268. For the suggestion about jurisdiction over slaves on land, see LORDS REPORT 1850, supra
note 211, at 71 (testimony of David Turnbull). For suggestions of criminal punishment,
either in national courts or in mixed courts, see, for example, FIRST COMMONS REPORT,
supra note 143, at 5 (testimony of Viscount Palmerston); id. at 34-35 (testimony of Capt.
Joseph Denman); id. at 122 (testimony of John Carr, Chief Justice of Sierra Leone); and id.
at 166 (testimony of Cdr. Thomas Francis Birch).
269. Compare Letter from W. Fergusson & M.L. Melville, Comm'rs at Sierra Leone, to Viscount
Palmerston (Sept. 23, 1841), in CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE BRITISH COMMISSIONERS AT
SIERRA LEONE, THE HAVANA, RIO DE JANEIRO, AND SURINAM, RELATING TO THE SLAVE
TRADE, class A, at 31, in 21 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press
1969) (1842) (acknowledging Palmerston's instruction that there was no legal authority for
the detention of crews), with Letter from Geo. Frere, Jr., & Frederic R. Surtees, Comm'rs at
Cape of Good Hope, to Viscount Palmerston (Oct. 31, 1846), in CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE
BRITISH COMMISSIONERS AT SIERRA LEONE, HAVANA, RIO DE JANEIRO, SURINAM, CAPE OF
GOOD HOPE, JAMAICA, LOANDA, AND BOA VISTA, PROCEEDINGS OF BRITISH VICE-ADMIRALTY
COURTS, AND REPORTS OF NAvAL OFFICERS, RELATING TO THE SLAVE TRADE, class A, at 113,
in 34 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1969) (1847-48)
(acknowledging the opinion of British law officers that under Article XII of the Anglo-
Portuguese Treaty of 1842, supra note 163, slave crews could be detained in custody by the
mixed commission until they could be turned over to their own governments for trial), and
Letter from Ildefenso Leopoldo Bayard to Alfredo Duprat, Portuguese Comm'r (May 22,
1847), in CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE BRITISH COMMISSIONERS AT SIERRA LEONE, HAVANA,
RIO DE JANEIRO, SURINAM, CAPE OF GOOD HOPE, JAMAICA, LOANDA, AND BOA VISTA,
PROCEEDINGS OF BRITISH VICE-ADMIRALTY COURTS, AND REPORTS OF NAVAL OFFICERS,
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Rather than leading to more prosecutions, however, this practice may simply
have increased the incentives for slavers to claim no nationality at all.
4. Limitation: Reluctant Treaty Partners
The most serious impediment to the success of the mixed court system was
the reluctance of Spain, Portugal, and Brazil strictly to enforce the ban on the
slave trade. This lack of cooperation was not principally manifested in the
behavior of the mixed court judges from those countries, although these judges
did sometimes vote to acquit, especially in the commission at Rio de Janeiro.27°
To the contrary, on several occasions, the British judges actually spoke quite
favorably of their colleagues. Upon the death of a Brazilian judge who had
served for six uninterrupted years in Sierra Leone (during which time
admittedly few cases were heard), the British commissioners wrote to London
that "his public conduct was marked by a spirit of courtesy and conciliation
towards his colleagues in office, with whom he at the same time lived privately
on terms of intimacy and friendship." '271
The British judges at Havana spoke of some of their Spanish colleagues in
similarly favorable terms, in one early case noting "the most perfect unanimity
prevailed during the whole of the proceedings; and that my Spanish colleagues
continued to manifest the same zeal to uphold the dignity and authority of the
Court, which I before stated they had displayed at the commencement.1 7
2
Nor was the main problem outside pressure on the courts, though the
mixed courts at Rio de Janeiro and Havana did sometimes face threats
stemming from popular opposition to their work. For example, in Rio, one
individual who had acted as a proctor for British captors in a number of cases
RELATING TO THE SLAVE TRADE, class A, at 130, in 34 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS
(photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1969) (1847-48) (instructing the Portuguese conmmissioner
that slave crews should be sent to Loanda or Cape Verde and "delivered to the Governor-
Generals, to be dealt with according to law").
270. See supra text accompanying notes 170-176 (discussing the rates of condemnation and
acquittal in various courts).
z7i. Letter from Oct. Temple & H.W. Macauley, Comm'rs at Sierra Leone, to Viscount
Palmerston (June 30, 1834), in CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE BRITISH COMMISSIONERS, AT
SIERRA LEONE, THE HAVANA, RIO DE JANEIRO, AND SURINAM, RELATING TO THE SLAVE
TRADE, class A, at 63, in 14 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish Univ.
Press 1968) (1835-36).
272. Letter from H.T. Kilbee, Comm'r at Havana, to George Canning, Sec'y (July 31, 1824), in
CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE BRITISH COMMISSIONERS AT SIERRA LEONE, THE HAVANNAH,
RIO DE JANEIRO, AND SURINAM, RELATING TO THE SLAVE TRADE, class A, at 74, in 12 BRITISH
PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1968) (1825-26).
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was threatened that should he be involved in any more cases, he would be
"waylaid and murdered." As a result, the captors were left without
"professional assistance" in prosecuting their cases because he had abandoned
his work out of fear. 7 ' Although these threats sometimes slowed the courts'
proceedings, local authorities took sufficient measures-albeit sometimes
reluctantly-to protect the physical safety of the courts, and the threats do not
appear to have seriously hampered their functioning.
In terms of lack of cooperation, the far more serious problem was the
unwillingness of the Spanish, Portuguese, or Brazilian governments to engage
in any meaningful enforcement of domestic laws against the slave trade by
preventing the landing of slave ships, blocking the sale of imported slaves, or
criminally prosecuting those involved. Viscount Palmerston, British naval
officers, and British officials in the field all believed that the governments of
Cuba and Brazil could end slave importations if they wanted to by taking these
measures.27 4 It turned out that they were correct, for once each of these
countries finally began enforcing its domestic laws, the slave trade was finally
and successfully extinguished.75 Changes in attitudes that led to the
enforcement of laws against the slave trade in Brazil and then later Cuba were
essential to the final suppression of the trade.
When the treaties were first signed, it was not initially obvious how
essential the cooperation of local officials in Cuba and Brazil would be to the
successful suppression of the slave trade. By giving the British the power to
search, seize, and condemn slave ships in international courts, the treaties
seemed to embody strong international enforcement mechanisms. These
powers were unprecedented at the time, and have been unmatched in human
rights treaties and international courts created since then. But as robust as
these powers were, and as much energy and expense as the British devoted to
the effort, the oceans were vast, and the most vulnerable part of the slave trade
system turned out to be the point of sale in the Americas. Much as modern
efforts to interdict drugs on the high seas are unsuccessful when decoupled
from effective enforcement on land, naval enforcement alone was unlikely to
end the slave trade.
273. Letter from George Jackson & Frederick Grigg, Comm'rs at Rio, to Viscount Palmerston
(Jan. 16, 1839), in CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE BRITISH COMMISSIONERS AT SIERRA LEONE,
THE HAVANA, AND RiO DE JANEIRO, RELATING TO THE SLAVE TRADE, class A, at 135-36, in 17
BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1968) (1839).
274. See, e.g., FIRST COMMONS REPORT, supra note 143, at 161-62 (testimony of Cdr. Thomas
Francis Birch).
27S. See infra Section II.C.
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The correspondence from British officials in Brazil and Cuba is filled with
complaints about the supineness and outright corruption of local authorities,
who turned the other way when slave ships landed and auctioned off their
cargos. When the new Captain-General of Cuba assured the British diplomats
in Havana that he was determined to enforce the antislavery treaties, Viscount
Palmerston was skeptical:
No doubt can be entertained that he has a power of putting a stop to it
if he will: if the Cuba Slave Trade has ceased, General Valdes will have
proved himself sincere: if that trade still continues, he will have
demonstrated that his professions are all as hollow and valueless as
those of all his predecessors.27
6
For many years, port officials in Havana would clear for departure ships
obviously equipped for the slave trade.2 77 The tolerance of local governments
for the slave trade was so great that until very late in the game, slave traders
who safely escaped British patrols on the high seas and reached the territorial
waters of Cuba and Brazil engaged in only token efforts to conceal their illegal
activities. In 1836-more than fifteen years after the Spanish treaty took
effect-British officials were outraged but not surprised by the appearance in
276. Letter from Viscount Palmerston to Comm'rs at Havana (July 31, 1841), in
CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE BRITISH COMMISSIONERS AT SIERRA LEONE, THE HAVANA, Rio
DE JANEIRO, AND SURINAM, RELATING TO THE SLAvE TRADE, class A, at 206, in 21 BRITISH
PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1969) (1842).
277. Letter from Walter W. Lewis & L. Hook, Comm'rs at Sierra Leone, to Viscount Palmerston
(Apr. 1O, 1841), in CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE BRITISH COMMISSIONERS AT SIERRA LEONE,
THE HAVANA, RIO DE JANEIRO, AND SURINAM, RELATING TO THE SLAVE TRADE, class A, at 78,
in 21 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1969) (1842).
Palmerston was also upset by the case, writing to the British diplomats in Lisbon in regard
to the Maria da Gloria's claim for damages against its captor that
[t]he Claimant was engaged in a proceeding that was in violation of the laws of
God and man; it was undertaken in fraud, and defended by perjury; and he
escaped the punishment due to his crime, not because he did not deserve to suffer
it, but because he was found in a place, where, under the strict letter of the
Treaty, he was not liable to be detained.
Letter from Viscount Palmerston to Lord Howard de Walden (Oct. 7, 1834), in
Correspondence with Foreign Powers, Relating to the Slave Trade, class B, at 18, 19, in 14
British Parliamentary Papers (photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1968) (1835-36); see also
Letter from Viscount Palmerston to Comm'rs at Rio (Oct. 8, 1834), in Correspondence with
the British Commissioners at Sierra Leone, the Havana, Rio de Janeiro, and Surinam,
Relating to the Slave Trade, class A, at 147, in 14 British Parliamentary Papers (photo.
reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1968) (1835-36) (stating that the commission misapplied the law
to the facts in releasing the Maria da Gloria).
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one Havana newspaper of an advertisement for the open sale of newly
imported Africans.278
In response to nearly constant complaints from British diplomats, the other
governments would engage in denials and token responses. For example, when
the British commissioners at Havana reported that the Portuguese consul there
was granting papers to slave vessels, the British complained to the Portuguese
government in Lisbon, which revoked the consul's authority and declared
documents furnished by him to be invalid.279 Yet such minimal, occasional
efforts to sanction participants in the slave trade were little more than
meaningless gestures. For many years, the other governments did not deploy
significant numbers of their ships in suppression efforts even in their territorial
waters.28° Their national courts often did not condemn ships obviously
engaged in the slave trade. 8, Slave traders brought in for criminal trial were
routinely acquitted. 8'
Another issue, as with modern international courts, was compliance with
the courts' decisions. While there was no overt defiance of the judgments, the
governments in Cuba and Brazil tolerated the virtual reenslavement of many of
the Africans freed by the mixed courts. In the British colony at Sierra Leone,
the slaves emancipated by the mixed courts fared no worse (though also no
278. Letter from George Villiers to Don Juan Alvarez y Mendizabal (Mar. io, 1836), enclosed in
Letter from Mr. Villiers to Viscount Palmerston (Mar. 12, 1836), in CORRESPONDENCE WITH
FOREIGN POWERS, RELATING TO THE SLAVE TRADE, 1836, class B, at 20-21, in 14 BRITISH
PARLALMENTARY PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1968) (1835-36).
279. Letter from the Earl of Aberdeen to Comm'rs at Havana (Dec. 15, 1841), in
CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE BRITISH COMMISSIONERS AND WITH FOREIGN POWERS,
RELATING TO THE SLAVE TRADE, class A, at 249, in 21 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS
(photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1968) (1842).
28o. See, e.g., Letter from Chris Edwd. Lefroy to the Earl of Dudley (Dec. 13, 1827), in
CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE BRITISH COMMISSIONERS AT SIERRA LEONE, THE HAVANA, RIO
DE JANEIRO, AND SURINAM, RELATING TO THE SLAVE TRADE, class A, at 172, in 12 BRITISH
PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1968) (1829-31) (discussing the
lack of Dutch cruisers assigned to suppress the slave trade in Surinam).
281. See, e.g., Letter from W.S. Macleay to the Earl of Aberdeen (Aug. 19, 1828), in
CORRESPONDENCE WITH BRITISH COMMISSIONERS AT SIERRA LEONE, THE HAVANA, Rio DE
JANEIRO, AND SURINAM, RELATIVE TO THE SLAVE TRADE, class A, at 147, in 12 BRITISH
PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1968) (1829-31) (reporting the
acquittal of a slave vessel by the Spanish Court of Admiralty in Havana).
282. See, e.g., Letter from the Earl of Aberdeen to Comm'rs at Rio de Janeiro (Sept. 21, 1841), in
CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE BRITISH COMMISSIONERS AND WITH FOREIGN POWERS,
RELATING TO THE SLAVE TRADE, class A, at 355-56, in 21 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS
(photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1969) (1842) (discussing the acquittal by Brazilian
criminal courts of crew members declared by the mixed commission to have been engaged
in piracy relating to the slave trade).
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better) than the rest of the large population of free Africans. A few of the
emancipated Africans were employed as messengers and clerks by the court,2
s3
while the rest took their place as ordinary laborers in the colony. Thus, as long
as they remained in British-controlled territory near Sierra Leone and were not
recaptured by slave traders, the 65,ooo Africans freed by the mixed courts at
Sierra Leone actually received the benefit of their freedom.
The several thousand emancipados in Cuba and Brazil, however, were
"virtually slaves" kept in repeated apprenticeships.4 In Brazil, the
emancipated slaves were hired out as apprentices, many employed by the
government itself' 8 ' At first, it was reported that they were "well treated, and
not overworked. ,,86 Eventually, it became clear that this was not the case, and
the Brazilian government established a commission of inquiry in Rio to
investigate allegations of mistreatment of emancipados27
In Havana, a number of emancipados who had been effectively reenslaved in
the hands of private individuals were forced to seek the help of the British
government in obtaining their freedom."' s In one particularly poignant case, an
African woman who had been emancipated by the mixed court was treated as a
slave by the family to which she had been apprenticed and sent to a sugar
plantation."9 When her young daughter (who was also legally a free person)
was in danger of being sold, the mother hid the girl with family friends who
283. Letter from Comm'rs at Sierra Leone to Viscount Palmerston (Sept. 20, 1841), in
CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE BRITISH COMMISSIONERS AND WITH FOREIGN POWERS,
RELATING TO THE SLAVE TRADE, class A, at 31, in 21 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo.
reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1968) (1842).
284. FIRST COMMONS REPORT, supra note 143, at 16 (testimony of Viscount Palmerston).
285. Letter from Mr. Fox to Viscount Palmerston (Oct. 15, 1834), in CORRESPONDENCE WITH
FOREIGN POWERS RELATING TO THE SLAVE TRADE, class B, at 34, in 14 BRITISH
PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1968) (1835-36).
286. Id.
287. Letter from Comm'rs at Rio de Janeiro to Viscount Palmerston (July 7, 1841), in
CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE BRITISH COMMISSIONERS AND WITH FOREIGN POWERS,
RELATING TO THE SLAVE TRADE, class A, at 354-55, in 21 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS
(photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1969) (1842).
288. See, e.g., Letter from Mr. Turnbull to the Earl of Aberdeen (Dec. 24, 1841), in
CORRESPONDENCE WITH SPAIN, PORTUGAL, BRAZIL, &C., &C., RELATIVE TO THE SLAVE TRADE,
class B, at 85-86, in 23 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press
1969) (1843) (describing the cases of "two individual emancipados, Gavino and Matilda,
both of whom have been subjected to long periods of uncompensated compulsory
servitude").
289. Letter from Mr. Turnbull to the Earl of Aberdeen (Dec. 14, 1841), in CORRESPONDENCE
WITH SPAIN, PORTUGAL, BRAZIL, &c., &C., RELATIVE TO THE SLAVE TRADE, class B, at 52-60,
in 23 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1969) (1843).
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eventually brought her to the British consulate. The mother, along with the
friends, was then thrown in prison for failing to reveal the girl's whereabouts.
A tense series of exchanges between the British consul and the colonial
government followed, with both the girl and her mother eventually getting
certificates of freedom thanks to the British consul's intervention.29 °
In the face of these problems, the British eventually made arrangements for
emancipados to be transported to British colonies,29 ' though this led to sinister
allegations that the British were hoping to benefit their colonies by taking
African laborers away from Cuba and Brazil.
5. Limitation: Faltering Domestic Support
The occasional faltering in domestic support within Britain for the slave
trade suppression effort also limited the courts' effectiveness. More than sixty
years elapsed from the moment Britain banned the slave trade under its flag in
1807 until the trade as a whole was finally extinguished. Understandably,
domestic political interest and support for the effort waxed and waned over the
decades, and with it the resources and attention devoted to crafting the most
effective policies for suppression. As noted previously, this simmering debate
reached a crisis point when, from 1848 to 185o, Parliament engaged in almost
continuous hearings and discussions about whether to stay the course in
suppressing the slave trade or to abandon the system of treaties and courts
backed with naval power. 92 One political faction, which included some
abolitionists who opposed all use of military force because of their Quaker
beliefs, wanted to withdraw the Africa Squadron from its antislavery patrol and
even withdraw from the antislavery treaties. 93 Another faction wanted the
government to redouble its efforts at suppression of the trade.
ago. Id. at 54-55.
291. See Letter from J. Kennedy & Campbell J. Dalrymple, Comm'rs at Havana, to Viscount
Palmerston (Dec. 4, 1846), in CORRESPONDENCE WITH BRITISH COMMISSIONERS, class A, at
61, in 34 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1969) (1847-48)
(discussing further removal of emancipados to Jamaica); see also Letter from Viscount
Palmerston to Comm'rs at Havana (Mar. 15, 1841), in CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE BRITISH
COMMISSIONERS AT SIERRA LEONE, THE HAVANA, RIO DE JANEIRO, AND SURINAM, RELATING
TO THE SLAVE TRADE, class A, at 166, in 21 BRrTSH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo reprint
Irish Univ. Press 1969) (1842) (discussing the removal of emancipados to Jamaica); Letter
from Mr. Stephen to Viscount Canning (Jan. 25, 1842), in CORRESPONDENCE WITH FOREIGN
POWERS, class B, at 310, in 23 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish Univ.
Press 1969) (1843) (discussing a plan to remove emancipated Africans from Rio).
292. See supra text accompanying note 211.
293. See generally FIRST COMMONS REPORT, supra note 143.
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In addition, hard-learned lessons about which tactics were effective were
sometimes lost due to changes in personnel in the British Foreign Office and
the Admiralty, changes made both for simple administrative reasons and
because not all officials were equally committed personally to the cause of
abolition. When officials committed to abolition were replaced by officials who
were less enthusiastic, treaty enforcement often became less effective.
The Gallinas expedition in 1840 is one prime example. The provocation for
the expedition was the kidnapping of a free African woman and her infant,
both of whom were British subjects at Sierra Leone. With the support of the
British governor there, Captain Denman of HMS Wanderer went ashore at
Gallinas to rescue the woman. Having done so, he induced the local chief to
sign a treaty banning the slave trade, and enlisted the chief and his men in
burning the Spanish slave traders' storehouses.
29 4
When news of Captain Denman's endeavor spread, two other British
captains then undertook similar actions elsewhere on the African coast.
Initially, London reacted positively; the admiralty granted Denman a
promotion, and Parliament gave him and his men a reward of £4ooo. Foreign
Secretary Palmerston instructed that "[t]he course pursued by Captain
Denman seems to be the best adapted for the attainment of the object in view"
and encouraged other captains to follow his example.2 9 The initial reaction by
the slave traders was dramatic as well. The slave trade in that region of the
African coast dropped precipitously,29 6 and word of the incident quickly
reached as far as Cuba, where slave traders viewed the new tactics as a serious
threat to their livelihood. 9r
But a few months later, the Earl of Aberdeen replaced Viscount Palmerston
as Foreign Secretary. Aberdeen was more conciliatory toward foreign powers
and more legalistic, and he circulated a letter stating that the Queen's legal
advisers believed such raids to be illegal under international law9 8 News of
Aberdeen's letter and the change in policy also reached the slavers quickly, and
the trade resumed.2 99 New and inexperienced officers on the African coast
294. See Letter from Governor Doherty to John Russell (Dec. 7, 1840), in CORRESPONDENCE
RELATIVE TO SLAVE TRADE AT THE GALLINAS (London, W. Clowes & Sons 1841), available at
http://gateway.proquest.coni/openurl ?url ver=Z39.88-2oo4&resdat=xri :hcpp-us&rft
_dat=xri:hcpp:rec: 1841-019917.
295. Buron v. Denman, (1848) 154 Eng. Rep. 450, 455-56 (Exch. Div.).
296. See FIRST COMMONS REPORT, supra note 143, at 32 (testimony of Capt. Joseph Denman).
297. See LORDS REPORT 1850, supra note 211, at 59-60 (testimony of David Turnbull).
298. See BETHELL, supra note 5, at 185.




began engaging in safer, but less effective, distant offshore patrols.3"' One of
the Spanish slave traders whose slaves Denman had liberated and whose
warehouse he had burned sued Denman in a British court for an astonishing
£18o,ooo. The court eventually ruled in Denman's favor, but not until 1848.301
The Queen's advocate then issued another opinion stating that such raids of
onshore barracoons were lawful when authorized by a treaty with the local
chief, which Denman's raid had been. British captains in the African squadron
then began entering into new treaties with local chiefs and pursuing such raids
again, but several years had been wasted in the interim.3"2
C. From Crisis to Success: The Final Abolition of the Slave Trade
Even as the mixed court system reached its peak of effectiveness in terms of
volume of cases in the late 183os and early 184os, the weaknesses in the system
discussed in the preceding sections led the British government to augment, and
then replace, the mixed court system with a combination of military force and
domestic courts. The pressure brought to bear by this shift in strategy-along
with other economic, political, and social changes - eventually led to changes in
the domestic policies of Portugal and Brazil that culminated in the ultimate
suppression of the slave trade under the domestic laws of those countries. But
the final surviving branch of the transatlantic slave trade, the traffic to Cuba,
was only extinguished once the British turned back to cooperative international
legal action by concluding a treaty with the Americans.
300. Denman later testified that this strategy of destruction of barracoons and close blockade of
ports of embarkation would have been much more effective than the strategy of more
distant off-shore cruising pursued by the navy for many years. FIRST COMMONS REPORT,
supra note 143, at 22 (testimony of Capt. Joseph Denman). Several other naval officers
agreed. See, e.g., id. at 154 (testimony of Cdr. Thomas Francis Birch). On the other hand,
some witnesses were skeptical. See LORDS REPORT 1849, supra note 211, at 114-17 (testimony
of Commodore Charles Hotham); SECOND COMMONS REPORT, supra note 214, at 16
(testimony of William Smith).
301. This case, Buron v. Denman, (1848) 154 Eng. Rep. 450 (Exch. Div.), is famous in its own
right in international law for establishing the "act of state" doctrine.
302. For a list of forty treaties entered into with local chiefs, see THIRD REPORT FROM THE SELECT
COMMITTEE ON SLAVE TRADE, HOUSE OF COMMONS (1848), at 224-25, reprinted in 4 BRITISH
PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1968) (1847-48) [hereinafter
THIRD COMMONS REPORT].
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1. Portugal
In the late 1830s, negotiations between Britain and Portugal for a broader,
more comprehensive treaty failed. 3 The Portuguese raised a number of
objections to the proposed treaty, including its unlimited duration. 0 4 In
response, the British resorted to a creative reinterpretation of the 1817
Portuguese treaty. That treaty allowed the slave trade to continue only between
Portuguese possessions south of the equator. After the independence of Brazil
in 1826, Britain argued that Portugal had no colonies in the Americas, and thus,
all trade under the Portuguese flag was illegal. Moreover, Portugal was in
breach of its treaty obligations, and Britain was entitled to enforce those
obligations by any means necessary.3"'
Viscount Palmerston recognized that this was a debatable legal argument,
one Portugal was likely to view as an aggressive affront to its sovereignty. In a
private letter to the British diplomat in Lisbon, Palmerston wrote that if
Portugal responded by declaring war, "so much the better .... There are
several of her colonies which would suit us remarkably well. ",3, 6 In another
letter, he stated, "We consider Portugal as morally at war with us and if she
does not take good care and look well ahead she will be physically at war with
us also."
30 7
Thus, in 1839, the Parliament passed a statute popularly known as
Palmerston's Act"°8 that authorized the capture and condemnation of
Portuguese slaving vessels in British vice admiralty courts rather than the
mixed commissions. The bill was initially rejected in the House of Lords,
where the Duke of Wellington and others argued that it would encroach on the
powers of the executive by bringing the nation to the brink of war, not only
with Portugal but with other maritime nations that were offended by Britain's
303. See Letter from Lord Howard de Walden to Viscount Palmerston (Apr. 28, 1839), in 27
B.S.P. 588 (1856) (enclosing a list of twenty-five pieces of correspondence between Britain
and Portugal between 1837 and 1839 on negotiations for a new treaty).
304. Letter from Viscount Palmerston to Lord Howard de Walden (Apr. 27, 1839), in
CORRESPONDENCE WITH FOREIGN POWERS, class B, at 91, 91-1oo, in 17 BRInSH
PARIAMWENTARY PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1968) (1839).
305. Draft of a Note To Be Presented by Lord Howard de Walden to the Portuguese
Government, enclosed in Letter from Viscount Palmerston to Lord Howard de Walden (Apr.
20, 1839), in CORRESPONDENCE WITH FOREIGN POWERS, class B, at 71, 78, in 17 BRITISH
PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1968) (1839); see also Wilson,
supra note 195, at 513.
306. BETHELL, supra note 5, at 155.
307. Id.
308. Palmerston's Act, 1839, 2 & 3 Vict., c. 73 (Eng.).
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aggressive efforts to police the oceans.30 9 Their constitutional objections were
answered by having the Crown first issue orders to British officers to seize
Portuguese ships (thereby preserving the executive's prerogative to make
decisions that might lead to war) and then by having the Parliament pass
legislation to protect those officers from possible lawsuits.310
Portugal viewed Palmerston's Act as "a gross usurpation of power" and "a
flagrant violation of international law," but did not go to war over it.3 ' For the
next three years, Portuguese-flagged slave vessels were captured by British
cruisers and condemned either in the mixed courts on the grounds that they
were actually Spanish or Brazilian under the law of nations, or in the British
vice admiralty courts under the Palmerston Act.3"2
Portugal finally signed a new treaty in 1842 that both closed the loopholes
in the earlier treaties and expanded the number of mixed commissions."3
Under the new treaty, the mixed commissions finally had the power to keep
slave crews in custody until they could be turned over to their own government
for prosecution, 1 4 and the Portuguese government began in earnest to
prosecute at least some of these cases.35 Portuguese warships began seizing
309. BETHELL, supra note 5, at 161.
310. Id. at 162-63.
311. Id. at 164-65.
312. For examples of ships condemned as Spanish, see supra note 164.
313. See Anglo-Portuguese Treaty of 1842, supra note 163.
314. See Letter from George Frere, Jr., & Frederic R. Surtees, Comm'rs at Cape of Good Hope, to
Viscount Palmerston (Oct. 31, 1846), in CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE BRITISH
COMMISSIONERS AT SIERRA LEONE, HAVANA, RIO DE JANEIRO, SURINAM, CAPE OF GOOD
HOPE, JAMAICA, LOANDA, AND BOA VISTA, PROCEEDINGS OF BRITISH VICE-ADMIRALTY
COURTS, AND REPORTS OF NAVAL OFFICERS, RELATING TO THE SLAVE TRADE, class A, at 113,
in 34 BRITISH PARL EANTARY PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1969) (1847-48);
Letter from Senhor Bayard to Alfredo Duprat, Portuguese Comm'r (May 22, 1847), enclosed
in Letter from George Frere, Jr., & Frederic R. Surtees, Comm'rs at Cape of Good Hope, to
Viscount Palmerston (Nov. 11, 1847), in CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE BRITISH
COMMISSIONERS AT SIERRA LEONE, HAVANA, RIO DE JANEIRO, SURINAM, CAPE OF GOOD
HOPE, JAMAICA, LOANDA, AND BOA VISTA, PROCEEDINGS OF BRITISH VICE-ADMIRALTY
COURTS, AND REPORTS OF NAVAL OFFICERS, RELATING TO THE SLAE TRADE, class A, at 129,
in 34 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1969) (1847-48).
315. Letter from George Jackson & Edmund Gabriel, Comm'rs at Loanda, to Viscount
Palmerston (Apr. 30, 1847), in CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE BRITISH COMMISSIONERS AT
SIERRA LEONE, HAVANA, RIO DE JANEIRO, SURINAM, CAPE OF GOOD HOPE, JAMAICA, LOANDA,
AND BOA VISTA, PROCEEDINGS OF BRITISH VICE-ADmiRALTY COURTS, AND REPORTS OF NAVAL
OFFICERS, RELATING TO THE SLAVE TRADE, class A, at 169, in 34 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY
PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1969) (1847-48) (noting the Portuguese
prosecutor's appeal of an acquittal to Lisbon and stating that "it furnishes proof of the
sincerity of the authorities at Lisbon, and consequently holds out some hope that the
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slavers off the coast of Africa in greater numbers, and prize courts in the
Portuguese colonies began condemning those captured in coastal waters (over
which the mixed commissions lacked jurisdiction).316 By 1848, witnesses
testified before Parliament that Portugal had been seriously engaged in
suppression efforts for the past few years, though they disagreed on how
universal or effective those efforts were.3 17 Portugal's decision to crack down on
the trade meant that slavers were less willing to fly the Portuguese flag, and the
business of the Anglo-Portuguese mixed courts never reached significant levels
again. ,8 In effect, the Anglo-Portuguese courts were killed by their own
success.
2. Brazil
A similar breakdown in relations between Britain and Brazil over the slave
trade occurred in 1845 and proved fatal to the Anglo-Brazilian mixed courts.
The treaty authorizing the Anglo-Brazilian courts arguably expired on March
13 of that year.319 Brazilian officials, though not willing to defend the slave
trade publicly, refused to renew the treaty and its provisions for the right of
search and trials in mixed courts, insisting that Brazil would suppress the trade
with its domestic laws.32°
impunity on which slave-traffickers have hitherto confidently reckoned when brought
before the ordinary tribunals, may no longer attend them").
316. See Letter from George Jackson & Edmund Gabriel, Comm'rs at Loanda, to Viscount
Palmerston (Feb. 6, 1847), in CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE BRITISH COMMISSIONERS AT
SIERRA LEONE, HAVANA, RIO DE JANEIRO, SURINAM, CAPE OF GOOD HOPE, JAMAICA, LOANDA,
AND BOA VISTA, PROCEEDINGS OF BRITISH VICE-ADMIRALTY COURTS, AND REPORTS OF NAVAL
OFFICERS, RELATING TO THE SLAVE TRADE, class A, at 147, in 34 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY
PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1969) (1847-48) (describing the case of the Flor de
Campos, taken by the Portuguese brigantine Tamega, and referring to the Lisbon Decree of
io September 1846, which directed that "the same system should be followed with respect to
vessels condemned by the Prize Court" as those in the mixed commissions).
317. FIRST COMMONS REPORT, supra note 143, at 21 (testimony of Capt. Joseph Denman); see also
LORDs REPORT 1849, supra note 211, at 123 (testimony of Commodore Charles Hotham).
318. See supra Figure 3.
319. The Anglo-Portuguese Treaty of 1817, supra note 2, which was incorporated by the
Convention Between Great Britain and Brazil, for the Abolition of the African Slave Trade,
Nov. 23, 1826, 14 B.S.P. 609, only authorized the mixed courts for a period of fifteen years
after abolition; since the Brazilian trade had been outlawed in 1830, the fifteen years expired
in 1845. See Separate Article to Additional Convention Between Great Britain and Portugal,
for the Prevention of Slave Trade, Sept. 11, 1817, 4 B.S.P. 115 (providing a fifteen-year
expiration period after the complete abolition of the trade).
320. See BETHELL, supra note 5, at 247-53.
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Britain once again resorted to creative treaty interpretation. There was no
saving the mixed courts, since the Brazilians appeared to be correct about the
expiration of the treaty authorizing them. But the British construed a separate
Brazilian treaty, which had declared the slave trade to be piracy, to trigger the
universal jurisdiction over piracy allowed by the law of nations and to
authorize the condemnation of Brazilian-flagged slaving ships in British
courts.32' Once again, this was a somewhat debatable interpretation of
international law. But in August 1845, Parliament passed Aberdeen's Act,
which, like Palmerston's Act, authorized the capture and condemnation of
Brazilian and unflagged vessels. In the next few years, the volume of cases
heard in the British courts increased dramatically.32 For example, of the thirty-
three cases heard by the vice admiralty court at St. Helena in the first six
months of 1848, nineteen were Brazilian, while the remainder had no papers.323
Aberdeen's Act was not well-received in Brazil. In 1848, a Brazilian citizen
who was a former slave ship medical officer told the British Parliament that
Brazilians viewed the British suppression effort as either "wild and
impracticable," or an effort to "check the rising prosperity of Brazil."3 4 But like
Portugal before it, Brazil was neither willing nor able to go to war with Britain
over the issue.2 '
Despite Britain's aggressive use of vice admiralty courts against the
Brazilian trade, the volume of the trade increased in the late 184os. Ironically,
the demand for slaves had been fueled by British free trade legislation that had
removed tariffs on Brazilian sugar.326 The tension between the two countries
reached a climax in 185o-51, when a handful of British ships began attacking
slave vessels in Brazil's territorial waters and even its harbors.2 7 One of the
British ships and a Brazilian fort even exchanged shots. It was a small display
of force, but it was effective. Brazil could not afford to go to war with Britain
(though it was also apparent that Britain, with its commercial ties to Brazil,
was not eager for war either).
321. Convention Between Great Britain and Brazil, for the Abolition of the African Slave Trade
art. 1, Nov. 23, 1826, 14 B.S.P. 609; Wilson, supra note 195, at 518.
322. See supra Figure 3.
323. THIRD COMMONS REPORT, supra note 302, at 226-29.
324. SECOND COMMONS REPORT, supra note 214, at 37 (testimony of Jose E. Cliffe, M.D.).
325. See BET-ELL, supra note 5, at 281.
326. See, e.g., LORDS REPORT 185o, supra note 211, at 225 (testimony of Robert Hesketh).
327. BETHELL, supra note s, at 325-41; LLOYD, supra note 23, at 142-47.
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
Moreover, in the preceding years, popular sentiment against the slave trade
had grown in Brazil.2 The only face-saving option seemed to be for Brazil to
put an end to the traffic itself. Thus, in September 185o, Brazil enacted new
anti-slave trade legislation and began to enforce it. Once the Brazilian
government began policing the landing and sale of slaves, the number of slaves
imported into Brazil dropped precipitously, from more than thirty thousand in
185o to five thousand in 1851 to none in 1853.329 One of the last known slave
ships to arrive in Brazil, the schooner Mary E. Smith, which had been illegally
outfitted in Boston, sailed in 1855. The crew could not find any place to land
the 400 slaves onboard and began to run out of food and water. A Brazilian
warship finally captured the unfortunate vessel. One American involved in the
venture died in prison, and the Brazilian government punished other crew
members.33 In this manner, the slave trade into Brazil was finally
extinguished, though slavery itself was not abolished in Brazil until 1888.331
3. Spain, Cuba, and the United States
Though relations between Spain and Britain were sometimes tense, they
never broke down in the same way relations with Portugal and Brazil did.
Instead, other factors led to the obsolescence of the Anglo-Spanish courts. The
decline in the courts' cases began in the 184os, when the new Captain-General
of Cuba arrived in 1842 and began enforcing the laws against the slave trade,
and the open markets for newly imported slaves in Havana were shut down.332
In 1845, the Spanish government passed stricter legislation for punishing illegal
slave traders.333 Following this new legislation, the court at Sierra Leone was
directed to detain the captain and crew of Spanish ships until they could be
carried to the Canary Islands for criminal trial by the Spanish government.
3 4
The decline in slave imports to Cuba continued through the mid- to late-
328. BETHELL, supra note 5, at 313-15.
329. Eltis, supra note 52, at 114-15 tbl.I.
33o. HOWARD, supra note 57, at 47.
331. Id.
332. ELTIS, supra note lo, at 200.
333- See Letter from N.W. Macdonald & John Carr, Comm'rs at Sierra Leone, to Viscount
Palmerston (Dec. 12, 1846), in CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE BRITISH COMMISSIONERS AT
SIERRA LEONE, HAVANA, RIO DE JANEIRO, SURINAM, CAPE OF GOOD HOPE, JAMAICA, LOANDA,
AND BOA VISTA, PROCEEDINGS OF BRITISH VICE-ADMIRALTY COURTS, AND REPORTS OF NAVAL
OFFICERS, RELATING TO THE SLAVE TRADE, class A, at 37, in 34 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY




184OS,'3 ' and the British attributed this decline to stricter enforcement by the
Cuban authorities. 316 Enforcement actions had driven slave prices so high that,
according to British officials in Havana, the trade was no longer profitable.
37
From the 184OS onward, the slavers became reluctant to fly the Spanish flag,
evading the mixed courts' jurisdiction by sailing under the American flag or
under no flag at all; only a handful of cases came before the Anglo-Spanish
courts after that.
In 1851, with the slave imports at a record low in both Brazil and Cuba,
victory for the abolitionists seemed imminent. However, in the mid-x85os, the
slave trade to Cuba began to increase once more. An increase in sugar prices led
to increased demand for new slaves, even at the higher prices that prevailed
because of enforcement of the 1845 Act. In addition, the colonial Cuban
authorities had somewhat relaxed enforcement."' Moreover, tense relations
between Britain and the United States kept the British navy from engaging in
the sort of aggressive action in Cuban waters that had triggered domestic
suppression in Brazil.339 The United States continued to object strenuously to
the search of its ships, and British mercantile interests supportive of free oceans
were more sympathetic to these claims. In addition, Britain did not want to
give the United States any excuse to annex Cuba. By 186o, the British were
doing very little to suppress the slave trade to Cuba. 340
On the eve of the American Civil War, anything related to the institution of
slavery might have been expected to be a delicate issue in the United States.
Ironically, however, by this time the illegality of the transatlantic slave trade
was a rare point of agreement between the North and the South. Indeed, the
constitution of the Confederate States of America adopted in March 1861
actually banned the slave trade. 4' In the spring of 186o, the United States sent
its own warships to Cuba, where they reportedly conducted searches of
335. See Letter from J. Kennedy & Campbell J. Dalrymple, Comm'rs at Havana, to Viscount
Palmerston (Jan. 7, 1847), in CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE BRITISH COMMISSIONERS AT
SIERRA LEONE, HAvANA, RIO DE JANEIRO, SURINAM, CAPE OF GOOD HOPE, JAMAICA, LOANDA,
AND BOA VISTA, PROCEEDINGS OF BRITISH VICE-ADMIRALTY COURTS, AND REPORTS OF NAVAL
OFFICERS, RELATING TO THE SLAVE TRADE, class A, at 69, in 34 BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY
PAPERS (photo. reprint, Irish Univ. Press 1968) (1847-48) (noting that no slave vessels
arrived or departed from Cuba).
336. See FIRST COMMONS REPORT, supra note 143, at 5 (testimony of Viscount Palmerston).
337. ELTIS, supra note lo, at 201.
338. Id. at 202.
339. Harral E. Landry, Slavery and the Slave Trade in Atlantic Diplomacy, 185o-186i, 27 J. S. HIST.
184 (1961).
340. Id. at 196, 201-03.
341. Const. of the Confederate States of America art. I, § 9, cl. 1 (1861).
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suspected Spanish and French slave vessels despite America's lack of mutual
search treaties with those countries. Later that year, President Buchanan stated
in his message to Congress:
It is truly lamentable that Great Britain and the United States should be
obliged to expend such a vast amount of blood and treasure for the
suppression of the African slave trade, and this when the only portions
of the civilized world where it is tolerated and encouraged are the
Spanish islands of Cuba and Porto Rico.-42
But it was not until civil war broke out in the United States that a final turn in
policy helped set the stage for the ultimate suppression of the transatlantic
slave trade. In March 1862, Secretary of State William Seward responded
favorably to an approach by British diplomats eager to finally conclude an
effective anti-slave trade treaty with the United States. The United States
hoped to prevent Britain from intervening in the war on the side of the
Confederacy and thus wanted to do what it could to foster goodwill in an
otherwise tense relationship. Moreover, President Lincoln's administration
viewed the extinction of the slave trade as a moral issue. Seward's one request
was that the draft treaty appear to have come from the United States. The
British readily agreed to the faqade, manufacturing a fake correspondence to
make it seem as if the proposal had come from the Americans. On April 25,
1862, the U.S. Senate unanimously ratified a treaty with Britain, which
provided for mutual rights of search and the trial of slave ships in mixed
courts. 3.
Other factors in Cuba-including changes in attitudes, the increased
domestic enforcement of anti-slave trade laws, a decline in sugar prices and a
concomitant drop in the value of slaves, and the perception that the institution
of slavery itself might be doomed-also played a significant role in the final
suppression of the Cuban slave trade in the 186os. 4 But the abolitionists in
Britain viewed the conclusion of the Anglo-American courts treaty as the final
nail in the coffin of the slave trade. As one historian noted, "Henry Brougham,
last survivor of the original British abolitionist group of 1807," spoke in the
House of Lords about the new treaty, saying it was "'in many respects the most
342. President James Buchanan, Speech to the Senate and House of Representatives (May 19,
186o), in S A COMPILATION OF MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS: 1789-1897, supra
note 39, at 593, 595.
343. Milne, supra note 257, at 511-14.
344 ELTis, supra note lo, at 218-22.
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important event that had occurred during the period of his sixty years warfare
against the African Slave Trade. ' ' 34s
The Anglo-American mixed courts never actually heard any cases, but that
was in large part because no slave ships were willing to use the American flag
once the treaty was signed. The network of treaties, begun forty-five years
earlier, was complete. Finally, no flag existed under which the traffic could
continue with impunity. The transatlantic slave trade was dead.
III. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND INTERNATIONAL
COURTS: RETHINKING THEIR ORIGINS AND FUTURE
Why have contemporary scholars of international law forgotten the
antislavery courts? The standard account of the development of international
human rights law begins in earnest with the post-World War II era, with the
Nuremberg trials and the drafting of foundational international human rights
instruments like the U.N. Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, and the Genocide Convention. 6 Likewise, most accounts of the
history of international courts and tribunals describe the Permanent Court of
Arbitration established in 1899 and the Permanent Court of International
Justice created in 1921 as the first permanent international adjudicatory
bodies, 347 and the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg as the first
international tribunal charged primarily with enforcing humanitarian
norms. 48 Earlier developments in human rights law or international
adjudication -like the ad hoc arbitrations for settlement of war claims between
the United States and Britain arising out of the Revolutionary and Civil Wars
and the development of the humanitarian laws of war -are acknowledged, but
generally receive only passing attention.
Indeed, as one scholar has noted, many historical accounts of human rights
jump directly from the American and French Revolutions in the late eighteenth
century to 1945. 349 In so doing, these accounts attribute the sudden resurgence
345. Milne, supra note 257, at 514.
346. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
347. See CASSESE, supra note 8, at 281-82; Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, Judicial Independence in
International Tribunals, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1, 9 (2005) (describing the Permanent Court of
Arbitration in 1899 as one of "the first tentative steps towards the ideal of formal
international adjudication").
348. See CASSESE, supra note 8, at 454.
349. Jan Herman Burgers, The Road to San Francisco: The Revival of the Human Rights Idea in the
Twentieth Century, 14 HuM. RTS. Q447, 447-48 (1992). For examples of this approach, see
LYNN HuNT, INVENTING HUMAN RIGHTS 181, 196, 201-03 (2007), which argues that
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of human rights ideology as "a reaction to the atrocities committed during the
Second World War. 353 They assume that the idea of human rights was largely
dormant and underwent little further intellectual development during most of
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and that it arose almost out of
nowhere in the immediate aftermath of World War II, at which point it took
form in the international legal arena for the first time.351 This discontinuous
story is simply wrong. Scholars are just beginning to fill in the missing pieces
of the pre-World War II history of international law as a mechanism for the
protection of human rights, and the anti-slave trade movement is a central part
of that missing picture." 2
Full exploration of the intellectual and social links between the nineteenth-
century abolition movements and the modern international human rights
movement is beyond the scope of this Article, but evidence shows that some of
those involved in the twentieth century development of international human
rights law were aware of the role of international law and cooperation in the
suppression of the slave trade in the previous century.
For example, at the founding convention of the United Nations in San
Francisco in 1945, representatives of nongovernmental organizations
("NGOs") were pivotal in pushing for references to human rights to be
included in the U.N. Charter.35 3 The great powers that had crafted the Charter
had not included any mention of human rights in the original draft. One of the
nongovernmental representatives present at the convention was W.E.B. Du
nationalism, socialism, and communism led to the declining popularity of human rights
until the aftermath of World War II, and JACK MAHONEY, THE CHALLENGE OF HUMAN
RIGHTS: ORIGIN, DEVELOPMENT, AND SIGNIFICANCE 21-37 (2007), which skips from early-
nineteenth-century philosophers to the aftermath of the Second World War, with a brief
mention of Karl Marx's criticism of rights as a reason for the "eclipse" of the appeal of
human rights as a political concept in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
35o. Burgers, supra note 349, at 448.
351. See HUNT, supra note 349, at 176 ("The long gap in the history of human rights, from their
initial formulation in the American and French Revolutions to the United Nations'
Universal Declaration in 1948, has to give anyone pause. Rights did not disappear in either
thought or action, but the discussions and decrees now transpired almost exclusively within
specific national frameworks.").
3S2. Burgers, supra note 349, at 449-64 (discussing nongovernmental organizations' advocacy of
international human rights standards as well as the League of Nations' treatment of human
rights issues in the 1920s and 193os). PAUL GORDON LAUREN, THE EVOLUTION OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS (1998), is a magisterial overview of protection of human
rights around the world that includes much pre-World War II history, but his book is not a
legal history and does not specifically trace the intellectual and social origins of the use of
international law as a mechanism for protecting human rights.




Bois, attending on behalf of the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People (NAACP). 35 4 Du Bois had written his doctoral dissertation on
the suppression of the slave trade,35 and through his attendance at several Pan-
African Congresses in the early decades of the twentieth century he had
coupled his work on behalf of African Americans with broader international
efforts to promote human rights. Other NGOs active in the post-World War II
period could likewise trace their genealogy to the nineteenth-century abolition
campaign.
356
The modern international human rights movement finds not only a
sociological but an intellectual forbearer in the nineteenth-century debate over
the use of international law, force, and diplomacy to promote human rights
goals. Given the heavy focus by international human rights scholars on the
novelty and innovations of post-World War II developments in human rights
law, it is startling to find some of the very same debates about the legitimacy of
international human rights-based interventions occurring almost a century
earlier. During the debate over whether to abandon efforts to suppress the
slave trade, for example, one member of the British parliament skeptically
asked Palmerston whether suppression was in England's interest "apart from
the interest of humanity." Palmerston argued that humanity was the main
consideration, though there were others.
3s7
"Assuming that it is simply from motives of humanity," the questioner
continued, "do you think it a legitimate mode of disposing of the resources of
this country?" Palmerston answered in the affirmative, calling it a "moral
duty. ' 358 The prescient questioner then took Palmerston's argument to the
extreme: "Supposing one nation abolished the punishment of death, would it
3s. See CAROL ANDERSON, EYES OFF THE PRIZE: THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE AFRICAN
AMERICAN STRUGGLE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, 1944-1955, at 38-43 (2003).
355. See Du BoIs, supra note 18.
356. For example, another NGO represented at the U.N. Convention was the National League of
Women Voters. See DOROTHY B. ROBINS, EXPERIMENT IN DEMOCRACY: THE STORY OF U.S.
CITIZEN ORGANIZATIONS IN FORGING THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 209 (1971).
The National League of Women Voters was the offspring of the National American Woman
Suffrage Organization, see League of Women Voters, Our History, http://www.lwv.org/
AM/Template.cfm?Section=OurHistory&Template=TaggedPage/TaggedPageDisplay.
cfm&TPLID=36&ContentlD= 15O (last visited Nov. 26, 2007), which was in turn a product
of the merger of earlier women's suffrage organizations which had close ties to abolitionist
organizations. See Judith Resnik, Sisterhood, Slavery, and Sovereignty: Transnational
Antislavery Work and Women's Rights Movements in the United States During the Twentieth
Century, in WOMEN'S RIGHTS AND TRANSATLANTIC ANTISLAVERY IN THE ERA OF
EMANCIPATION 19, 22 (Kathryn Kish Sklar & James Brewster Stewart eds., 2007).
357. FIRST COMMONS REPORT, supra note 143, at 19 (testimony of Viscount Palmerston).
358. Id.
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not be a legitimate effort of that government to interfere with other nations,
which had not done so, to induce them to follow the example?" Palmerston
stated that it would be legitimate for a nation to pursue that goal, "or any other
measure tending to the interests of humanity," in the same way England had
pursued the abolition of the slave trade.5 9 The antislavery movement was thus
not only a precursor to the modern international human rights movement, but
foresaw and justified that movement.
There does not appear to be a good explanation for the disappearance of
the antislavery courts from the international law "canon." Perhaps the
shameful complicity of so many nation-states in the institution of slavery
makes this story less appealing than the Nuremberg narrative, which
conveniently attributes responsibility for the Holocaust to a handful of
individuals. The British abolitionist discourse contains embarrassing overtones
of the "white man's burden," and the controversial history of colonialism
extended for more than a hundred years after the abolition of slavery. For
scholars in the United States, perhaps America's problematic (but eerily
familiar) role as the reluctant outsider in the antislavery regime is less
appealing than its starring turn at Nuremberg with Justice Jackson's eloquent
speeches as chief prosecutor. Perhaps with so many of the records of the courts
buried in handwritten archives their story was simply forgotten.
In any event, giving the antislavery courts and treaties the central place they
deserve in the international human rights law narrative changes that narrative
in important ways. Compared to the post-World War II, Nuremberg-centric
story, an understanding of international human rights law that begins with the
antislavery movement places a much greater emphasis on nonstate actors-
both the slave traders who were the human rights violators and the civil society
leaders of the abolitionist movements in various countries. While Nuremberg
was concerned with individual criminal liability, it was focused on crimes
committed at the behest of nation-states; indeed, crimes against humanity
were only recognized at Nuremberg to the extent they were perpetrated in
connection with the crime of aggressive war that was the principal basis for the
court's jurisdiction.
Modern international courts like the International Criminal Tribunals for
the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR) have likewise focused on
crimes committed in armed conflict by individuals either affiliated with the
state or groups with aspirations of statehood. As shown by the work of these
modern courts, the paradigmatic international trial is still based on the




of mass slaughter and mistreatment of civilian populations in the context of
warfare. Nuremberg is a powerful and important precedent, but it has a
somewhat limiting effect on the scope of conduct that we imagine falls within
the realm of international concern and redress.
Reviving the centrality of private transnational actors to the history of
international human rights law's origins highlights the possibility of making
international legal mechanisms a more central tool for addressing human
rights violations by private actors today, such as nonstate terrorist
organizations that commit war crimes and crimes against humanity, or
individuals and businesses engaged in contemporary forms of forced labor
trafficking. This would represent a dramatic shift in the focus of international
human rights law and activism. Most debate about the International Criminal
Court, for example, focuses on its role in preventing and punishing acts of
state-sanctioned violence and the threat to state sovereignty posed by
international prosecutions of national government officials.36° Comparatively
little attention has been given to the possibility of using an international court
to address terrorism by nonstate actors, 36 ' human trafficking, or the role of
corporations in grave human rights abuses. Indeed, as Philip Alston points out,
nonstate actors traditionally have been viewed as falling outside the direct
application of international human rights law, which is binding only on states
themselves.362 And yet, the antislavery story told here suggests that one of the
most suitable uses for international courts may be in combating illegal action
by nonstate, transnational actors. Why not, for example, consider using an
international court to address modern issues of slave labor and human
trafficking with transnational dimensions?
The history of the antislavery treaties also underscores the potential for the
dissemination of human rights ideology across national borders, both through
networks of nonstate actors and through the mediating force of international
law and international legal institutions. In the nineteenth century, Quakers on
both sides of the Atlantic spread the ideology of antislavery beyond their sect;
in the twenty-first century, secular NGOs in conjunction with evangelical
36o. See, e.g., Posner & Yoo, supra note 347, at 69 (arguing that prosecutions "will inevitably raise
questions about the legality of a decision by a state to use force and the legality of the tactics
used by a state").
361. Although there was some initial suggestion that the International Criminal Court should
have jurisdiction over terrorism, this suggestion was discarded. See Richard J. Goldstone &
Janine Simpson, Evaluating the Role of the International Criminal Court as a Legal Response to
Terrorism, 16 HARv. HUM. RTS. J. 13, 14-15 (2003).
362. See Philip Alston, The "Not-a-Cat" Syndrome: Can the International Human Rights Regime
Accommodate Non-State Actors?, in NON-STATE AcTORS AND HuMAN RIGHTS 3, 6 (Philip
Alston ed., 2005).
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Christians seek to influence foreign policy on human rights issues, such as




Giving the antislavery courts their rightful place in the international human
rights narrative also broadens the focus of that narrative beyond states'
relationships with their own citizens to include the relationships between
citizens of more developed and less developed countries. The principal
conceptual innovation of Nuremberg and the postwar human rights regime
was ostensibly to move international law beyond its preoccupation with state-
to-state relations; the Nuremberg prosecutions pierced the veil of sovereignty
and made a state's treatment of its own citizens a proper concern for
international law. 64 This was certainly an important development. But many
of the most pressing contemporary human rights problems do not involve
states' treatment of their citizens, but rather the obligations, if any, of citizens
in wealthy countries to those in less developed countries. 6 Forty-four percent
of people in sub-Saharan Africa live on less than one dollar per day. 66 Some
824 million people in the developing world live with chronic hunger. 
6 7
Roughly two million people in sub-Saharan Africa die of AIDS each year. 6
And a half of a million children worldwide still die each year of the measles,
even though vaccination against that disease is one of the most cost-effective
public health measures. 6 9
To be sure, few, if any of these problems are susceptible to resolution by
international courts. But most will require some form of coordinated
international action. To those who think that it is impossible that citizens of
developed countries should ever care enough about people on the other side of
363. See Elisabeth Bumiller, Evangelicals Sway White House on Human Rights Issues Abroad, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 26, 2003, at Al.
364. See Louis HENKIN ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS 73 (1999) (stating that "[u]ntil the late 1930's, the
international political system, and international law, continued to maintain that how a state
treated its own inhabitants was not a matter of legitimate international concern" and
describing the Nuremberg Charter's inclusion of "crimes against humanity" (emphasis
omitted) as "the first formal assertion of an international law of human rights").
365. See, e.g., Peter Singer, What Should a Billionaire Give -and What Should You?, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 17, 2006, § 6 (Magazine), at 60; cf. Noah Feldman, Cosmopolitan Law?, 116 YALE L.J.
1022 (2007) (discussing contemporary debates over moral, ethical, and legal duties owed "to
citizens of other countries who live far away and whose lives barely interact with ours").
366. UNITED NATIONS, THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS REPORT 4 (20o6), available at
http ://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Resources/Static/Products/Progress20o6/MDGReport2oo6.
pdf.
367. Id. at 5.
368. Id. at 14.
369. Id. at 11.
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the world to devote significant resources to these problems, the abolition of the
slave trade stands as a stark counterexample. People did care. Nations did
cooperate. And in the span of a human life, the transatlantic slave trade was
extinguished.
In addition, close examination of the history of the abolition of the slave
trade should cause international legal scholars to rethink the relationship
between power, ideas, and international legal institutions. To the extent that
the treaties against the slave trade and the mixed courts were effective, it was in
no small part because Britain was willing to use its substantial economic and
military power to support them. At the same time, the international legal
regime gave Britain's use of its economic and military power a legitimacy that
it would have otherwise lacked, and it amplified Britain's ability to influence
other nations' conduct with regard to the slave trade. Once other nations had
agreed in principle to the immorality of the slave trade, it was difficult for them
to oppose overtly efforts to suppress that trade.
Moreover, Britain was able to project its momentary power at the end of
the Napoleonic wars far into the future by creating permanent international
legal mechanisms that operated for decades to come in support of its
abolitionist agenda. In the immediate aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars in
1817, Britain perhaps had the military power to seize Portuguese and Spanish
slave ships whether or not those nations agreed. But because of the treaties,
Britain was able to continue to seize their ships twenty years later in 1837, an
exercise of power it might not otherwise have been willing or able to carry out
in the absence of the treaties. Over time, Britain was even able to persuade
more powerful countries like France and the United States to join in the
increasingly universal international legal regime against the slave trade,
something that might not have been possible without the initial treaties.
Moreover, even when Britain subsequently engaged in somewhat dubious
unilateral actions against the slave trade, it was at least able to argue that those
actions were justified under the spirit of the treaties, forestalling a more
vigorous opposition from the affected countries.
The potential for a mutually beneficial and reinforcing relationship
between state power and international law is missing from many contemporary
theories. Most theories of international adjudication assume that because of the
absence of world government, international courts are by definition powerless
institutions with no "hard" enforcement powers, dependent instead on the
negative reputational consequences that noncompliance with the courts'
decisions might have.37' For proponents of international courts, this
370. Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1823
(2002); Posner & Yoo, supra note 347, at 14.
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assumption leads to a tendency to discount the importance of state power and
to focus instead on factors that magnify or reduce the reputational
consequences of court decisions. For skeptics of international courts, this
assumption leads to doubt about the efficacy of international adjudication.
Both arguments are wrong, or at least incomplete. Both sides overlook the
possibility that powerful individual states might have the incentive and ability
to enforce the judgments of international courts, and that such actions might
be perceived as more acceptable and legitimate by other states than would
unilateral action by those same powerful nations .1
7
The role of state power in supporting international courts does not appear
to be entirely unique to the antislavery courts. Indeed, a similar lesson can be
seen in the experience of the ICTY. After its creation by the U.N. Security
Council, the ICTY indicted war criminals from the former Yugoslavia. The
ICTY itself lacked enforcement power, but many of those war criminals were
apprehended by NATO forces. Others, like Slobodan Milosevic, were handed
over to the Tribunal in response to a combination of threats and bribes related
to foreign aid.372 Just as with the antislavery courts, the ICTY's success has
been tied to the willingness of particular nations to use their economic and
military power to support its legal work. In turn, the ICTY's legal mandate has
given greater legitimacy to the involvement of NATO and the European Union
over many years in what would otherwise be considered the domestic affairs of
the Balkan countries.
Certainly, national governments' use of economic and military powers to
buttress international court judgments would not be effective or plausible for
all international dispute resolution bodies. Moreover, such actions might be
highly troubling in some circumstances, especially to the extent that they
undermined the equality of nations by amplifying differences in state power.
There is a fine line between using power to support international institutions
and abusing power through international institutions.
But fraught as it is, the relationship between international courts and
economic and military enforcement powers is an area that deserves greater
371. Ironically, a similar point was made by Cdr. Henry James Matson of HMS Waterwitch in his
testimony before the British Parliament in 1848. Matson explained that the local chiefs in
Africa had entered into antislavery treaties with the British in 1841 and 1842 because they
had abandoned hope of being able to carry on the trade when the barracoons were destroyed
by British warships. "Then of what value is the treaty itself?" a puzzled member of
parliament (clearly taking the realist view) asked Matson. "Because you can enforce it,"
Matson answered. FIRST COMMONS REPORT, supra note 143, at 85 (testimony of Cdr. Henry
James Matson).




study by international legal academics, and greater consideration by
policymakers.
The history of the antislavery courts is not only a story of military and
economic power, however, but also a story about the power of ideas. Those
who are realistic about state power often underestimate the extent to which
ideology can affect human behavior, and in turn the behavior of the nation-
states made up of those very same humans. Britain's multidecade campaign
against the slave trade demonstrates the fact that nations can be influenced by
moral ideas as well as material self-interest.
Constructivist international relations scholars, among others, have
highlighted the potential of transnational networks and international legal
regimes for influencing state behavior by influencing state perceptions of self-
interest. Abolitionism appears to have taken hold in Britain largely as a result
of domestic social and political forces, but abolitionism's spread to so many
countries around the world in a short period of time is less well-explained.3 73 A
detailed analysis of the way in which the ideology of abolition took root in
many disparate slave-holding societies requires in-depth study of social history
that is beyond the scope of this Article. But the narrative recounted here at least
suggests the possibility that it was no mere coincidence of social conditions in
different countries or even transnational networks of nonstate actors that
fostered the spread of abolitionist ideology. Instead, at least some small role
was played by international treaties and international courts themselves.
Certainly, those who were most closely involved in the negotiation and
enforcement of the antislavery treaties thought so. Palmerston, for example,
argued that "the efforts of this country to engage other governments in co-
operating for the suppression of the slave trade have very much tended to
awaken a moral feeling in other countries upon that subject. '374 When Britain
bribed Spain, Portugal, and Brazil to sign the antislavery treaties, it is not clear
that either elites or a majority of the population in each of these nations
believed what the treaties said-that the traffic in slaves was unjust and
inhumane.3 71 Yet by the time that the slave trade was finally suppressed some
fifty years later, a Brazilian leader felt that "'the whole of the civilised world"'
373. For example, Kaufmann and Pape suggest that the British antislavery story does not support
constructivist theories of international relations because British abolitionism was mainly a
product of domestic religious and social movements, not of the influence of cosmopolitan
networks. See Kaufmann & Pape, supra note 20. But they do not consider how it happened
that the policy of abolition was eventually adopted by other countries, and whether
transnational networks or international law played any role in that spread.
374. FIRST COMMONS REPORT, supra note 143, at 20 (testimony of Viscount Palmerston).
375. Anglo-Spanish Treaty of 1817, supra note 121, pmbl.
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was convinced of its immorality. , 6 Changes in domestic attitudes were critical
to the final suppression of the slave trade. The possibility that the universality
of the antislavery treaty regime may have played some part in this shift in
attitudes is at least worthy of further investigation.
In terms of academic theories of international law and relations, the slave
trade abolition story presents something of a challenge to the major theoretical
schools, with elements that support each theory, but also elements that they
have difficulty explaining. Realists and neorealists will tend to focus on the
material self-interest of Britain; the fact that weak countries like Spain,
Portugal, and Brazil joined the treaties while powerful countries like the United
States and France did not for many years; Britain's use of its hegemonic
military and economic power to achieve its goals; and the coincidence of the
suppression of the slave trade with the national self-interest of each country
that abolished it. In the realists' view, international law is a mere
epiphenomenal artifact of the underlying power dynamics-though realists
have a hard time explaining why nations go to the trouble of creating
international law if that is true.3 77 Those skeptical of the adequacy of the
explanatory power of realism will point to the substantial evidence that
Britain's actions harmed, rather than helped, its material position in the world;
to the fact that the cash payments and other benefits given by Britain to Spain,
Portugal, and Brazil likely did not begin to compensate them for the total
economic costs of the abolition of the slave trade and then slavery itself; and to
the reality that the coercion Britain actually brought to bear-for example, a
few shots fired by ships in Brazilian territorial waters, with no real
commitment to war-was trivial compared to the change in policy it elicited.
Institutionalists will likely see the treaties and the court system they created as
rational, utility-maximizing mechanisms for cooperation.37s In the absence of
376. KRASNER, supra note 20, at 1o8.
377. See, e.g., JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 114-17
(2005) (discussing the abolition of slave trade, though not the antislavery courts, from a
rational-choice perspective).
378. See Posner & Yoo, supra note 347, at 14-18 (arguing that international adjudication is possible
when "states have a surplus to divide," when "the present value of the payoffs from
continued cooperation exceeds the short-term gains from cheating," and when "states have
imperfect information about whether an action is consistent with a treaty, and the tribunal
can help bring that information to light"). Posner and Yoo argue that courts with
"dependent" judges are more likely to be successful than those with "independent" judges.
The fact that the judges on the mixed courts were not independent of their governments
might initially seem to support Posner and Yoo's argument, but in fact the mixed courts do
not fit neatly into the category of dependent tribunals based on the criteria that Posner and
Yoo propose. The antislavery courts were permanent, rather than created for the duration of
a dispute; states consented to them before particular disputes arose; the power to initiate
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such mechanisms, even a state that wanted to abolish the slave trade would be
tempted to defect in order to gain material advantage, but the regime created
the opportunity for cooperation and thus mutual long-term gains for all
participants . 79 Liberal international relations theorists will be more interested
in the evidence about how domestic politics and interest groups shaped British
foreign policy. Constructivists, as I have noted, will be interested in the way in
which state interests were constructed and reconstructed by their
interactions s° Postcolonialists might view the entire enterprise as a byproduct
of European desire to establish economically viable colonies in Africa. And so
forth.
There is some measure of truth in each of these theories, and yet each is
necessarily reductionist. It is fashionable among legal academics to propound
grand unified theories, and such theories have their value. Yet there remains a
case to be made for thick descriptions of complex events and acknowledgement
of the fact that no one theory can fully explain how and why something as
dramatic as the global abolition of the slave trade and then of slavery itself
occurred, let alone predict future changes in global society of a similar scale.3"1
cases rested with individual naval officers seeking prize money; and each court was bilateral,
but the network of treaties was multilateral. See id. at 26 & tbll. The mixed courts also do
not fit neatly into the framework for international judicial effectiveness proposed by Anne-
Marie Slaughter and Laurence Helfer. See Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Why
States Create International Tribunals: A Response to Professors Posner and Yoo, 93 CAL. L. REv.
899 (2005). They were not deeply embedded in national legal systems, like the modem
European supranational courts, though there were some connections in both personnel and
jurisprudence between the mixed courts and the British vice admiralty courts. See id. at 908.
They did not exactly allow access by private citizens without the support of a government,
but they did create incentives for individual naval captains to initiate cases. See id. In many
respects, however, they do support Slaughter and Helfer's more general arguments about
"constrained independence" of international tribunals. As in the modern courts Slaughter
and Helfer examine, there were both political and structural constraints on the mixed courts'
actions, such as relatively clear treaty provisions about what was prohibited. See id. at 945-
46. Moreover, the discursive constraints of legal analysis appear to have been real, as
demonstrated by the cases like the Maria da Gloria, see sources cited supra note 146, in which
British judges voted for acquittal, or cases in which non-British judges easily voted for
condemnation.
379. Cf. Guzman, supra note 370 (discussing a theory of international law that "explains
compliance using a model of rational, self-interested states").
380. For a summary of the various schools and subschools of international relations theory,
particularly as applied by international lawyers, see Oona A. Hathaway, Between Power and
Principle: An Integrated Theory of International Law, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 469,476-86 (2005).
381. See generally Peter J. Katzenstein & Nobuo Okawara, Japan, Asian-Pacific Security, and the
Case for Analytical Eclecticism, 26 INT'L SECURITY 153, 154 (2001) (arguing "against the
privileging of parsimony that has become the hallmark of paradigmatic debates" and noting
the advantages of "drawing selectively on different [theoretical] paradigms").
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The history of the antislavery courts told purely through the lens of realism,
neorealism, institutionalism, rational choice, institutional liberalism,
constructivism, or any other "ism" would be an impoverished one, and so this
Article does not claim that it entirely supports any one of these theories, or any
novel grand unified theory of the author's invention. But champions of existing
theories do need to grapple with the complexities, and contradictions,
presented by this history.
Beyond the realm of theory, one can find in the history of the abolition of
the slave trade echoes of many contemporary debates in foreign policy, such as
the efforts by some powerful countries to promote democracy and human
rights in various societies around the world. Is it true, as Lord Castlereagh
suggested, that "[m] orals were never well taught by the sword"?382 Or is it only
the sword that works? Or is it possible, as Palmerston argued, that a
combination of military force, international law, and moral persuasion is most
effective?
The very different circumstances of the world two centuries ago cannot
give us answers to these questions but provide food for thought as we
contemplate them today. Palmerston's view suggests that instead of viewing
international courts solely as a threat to their sovereignty and independence,
powerful countries should consider the extent to which international courts can
be a vital tool for adding legitimacy to their actions and entrenching norms
they support. Why is it, for example, that the United States government
perceives the International Criminal Court (ICC) primarily as a threat to its
own independence rather than as a potentially valuable tool for advancing
human rights, democracy, and the rule of law-goals that it has repeatedly
characterized as the centerpiece of its current foreign policy? At a moment
when U.S. military and economic power is at a peak (and a peak that seems
unlikely to last forever as China's 1.3 billion people and India's 1.1 billion
people move toward full economic development), the United States should
consider projecting that power into the future by creating and supporting
stable international legal institutions rather than fostering a world order based
on power alone.
Finally, the history of the abolition of the slave trade suggests that the time
horizon of many international legal scholars and practitioners is simply too
short. Today, some observers of the International Criminal Court suggest that
it is doomed to fail because the United States is not a participant. The same
might have been said about the antislavery courts during the forty-five years
382. BETHELL, supra note 5, at 12.
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before the United States finally joined the treaty regime. 8 For many of the
international courts that were greeted with such fanfare in the post-Cold War
optimism of the 199os, and that are now dismissed in the neorealist pessimism
of the post-September 11 world, it may simply be too early to judge.
At the end of the day, the story of the abolition of the slave trade is a
hopeful one for international law, for human rights, and for humanity. In 1762,
Rousseau famously wrote, "Man was born free, and everywhere he is in
chains."38 4 A century later- after many statutes had been passed, many treaties
had been signed, many cases had been adjudicated, several wars had been
fought, and millions of minds had been changed on the morality of slavery and
the slave trade -the chains were broken.
383. The analogy might seem not quite apt because the United States was not the global
superpower in the i8oos that it is today. But though not yet a global hegemon, the United
States was significant as a large slave-holding society with a significant commercial and
military maritime presence. Nor is the ICC the equivalent of the antislavery courts without
the British; the ICC does, after all, enjoy the support of more than one hundred countries,
including the richest and most powerful countries in the European Union.
384- JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SociAL CONTRACT 156 (Susan Dunn ed., Yale Univ. Press
2002) (1762).
